The mission of the Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ) of the College of Arts and Letters (CAL) is to recognize existing undergraduate research in San Diego State University’s College of Arts and Letters, to engage student agency in undertaking research, and to serve as an educational channel that actualizes undergraduate research as a pillar of higher education.
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Dear Reader,

Undergraduate research enables students to transform their education and to prepare for studies beyond their undergraduate careers. The Undergraduate Research Journal (URJ) at the College of Arts and Letters (CAL) stemmed from an investigation of the existing undergraduate research landscape in San Diego State University’s College of Arts and Letters. Through our inquiry, we discovered the need to establish an infrastructure that widens undergraduate students’ access to research across the College. As students of a critically conscious college built with avenues for student agency and transformational pedagogic activities, acting upon the need for undergraduates to recognize their research experience and to publish that research, we established the first Humanities and Social Sciences undergraduate research journal in the California State University system.

URJCAL, with a prospect to become a university-wide journal, is a bottom-up pilot project aimed at promoting undergraduate research. More importantly, however, it is part of a movement to create a university environment that encourages boundary-pushing endeavors: a reconceptualization of knowledge, scholarship, and how we learn. Under the principle of transforming higher education through the research process, this journal provides undergraduates the opportunity to publish their work and pave their way to a potential profession and life of research. Through publication, we seek to facilitate the process of
undergraduate empowerment; we hope that the scholars with whom we have worked become agents of social change; and we hope to expand undergraduate research to widen spheres in scholarship and society.

The content of this introductory issue traverses across time and place, circling the globe from East to West: Simon Shieh analyzes freedom and autonomy in Guo Muruo’s poetry; Claudia N. Mendez questions the reality of sacred prostitution in ancient Mesopotamia; Andrea Alvarado exposes the magnificence and sociopolitical significance of art during Süleyman’s reign of the Ottoman empire; Johnny Kwok traces the development of German Imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; Sierra Marcelius develops a case study of social movement violence in Paraguay; and Brandon Brookes examines Japanese terrorism through the novels of Murakami Haruki.

We believe that this journal is an historic watershed for the College of Arts and Letters and the whole of undergraduate research at San Diego State University (SDSU). The Editorial Board worked arduously in the process of developing this journal, and sincerely thank all of the undergraduate researchers who submitted and re-submitted their work. We would like to thank our faculty advisors for their guidance and the College of Arts and Letters leadership for their collaboration and support in making this journal a reality. Finally, we thank the Dean’s Office staff and Academic Affairs for their help in processing the finances attached to the project through the newly initiated Student Success Fee at SDSU.

Sincerely,
The URJCAL Editorial Board
His sense of self-worth is constituted symbolically, his cherished narcissism feeds on symbols, on an abstract idea of his own worth, an idea composed of sounds, words, and images, in the air, in the mind, on paper.
—Ernest Becker

The poetry of an individual is a window into his/her mind. The poetic line and the human action are both symbols, or many symbols, from which an observer interested in their relation to an abstract concept—in this case freedom—can interpret significant meaning. The poem is a reflection of the ways in which an individual interacts with social “structures of significance,” and it is the very nature of this interaction with which my exploration of freedom is primarily concerned (Geertz, 1973, p. 9). This project uses poetry to study conceptions of freedom in China between the years 1920 and 2000. My analysis examines both the content of certain poems, along with the act of poetic creation in their relation to their writers’ search for freedom.

In this paper, I will discuss an aspect of freedom that holds particular significance in the China of today—personal autonomy. I explore Guo Moruo’s (1892-1978) ideas of autonomy from 1892 until roughly 1925 through an analysis primarily of his poetry, supplemented by his written correspondence, criticism and essays. Guo Moruo’s life and work, in his pioneering ideas about the self, can be seen as a microcosm of the evolution autonomy in China. He was indeed one of the first Chinese writers to turn his back on tradition and embrace personal autonomy in his quest for “true freedom” (Guo, 1958).
First, I will define the concept of autonomy and distinguish it from that of freedom. Next, I will briefly describe China’s socio-political environment as it relates to Guo Moruo’s youth and early adulthood. The subsequent sections will be divided based on three elements of Guo’s life and work that are critical to understanding his autonomy. They are change, purpose and action, respectively. Here I will argue that Guo, in his quest for autonomy, turns his back on Chinese tradition, adopts the doctrine of pantheism, and finally discovers the paradox of autonomy in his endeavor to become a culture hero. I will conclude the paper by drawing a conceptual parallel between Guo Moruo’s “brand” of autonomy and that of present day Chinese as exemplified in the contemporary poet, Bei Dao (1949–). Through this comparison, I illuminate a problem fundamental to new generations of Chinese people today, which is that of finding a meaningful autonomy.

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY

Autonomy has been essentially equated with freedom in modern Western discourse arguably since the Age of Enlightenment. Therefore, it is deeply embedded in the social fabric and literary tradition of Western cultures. Because of its simultaneously inconspicuous and vital role in our lives, it is important to highlight the distinction between freedom and autonomy when tracing autonomy’s emergence among a people with a different historical and cultural relationship to freedom, such as the Chinese.

The concept of freedom is a useful point of contrast from which autonomy can be more clearly explained. Freedom is not necessarily autonomy, and the autonomous agent is not free by virtue of her autonomy. Freedom can be understood as having a “negative” and “positive” duality. According to Isaiah Berlin (1970)—one of the most prolific writers on freedom—negative freedom is “the area within which the subject is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons” (p. 121). In other words, it is the space in an individual’s life that is free from external interference—be it interference from the state,
one’s parents, social norms, or religious law. The concepts of autonomy and freedom begin to overlap in positive freedom. An individual is free in a positive sense as far as she possesses the power and resources to do or be that which she wants (Berlin, 1970, p. 122).

Whereas freedom addresses the ability to do or be that which one wants, autonomy addresses the nature—more specifically, the “independence and authenticity”—of those desires (Christman, 2011). A prisoner is not free in a negative sense, but can still be autonomous in a “global” sense insofar as she is the source of her own moral obligations, pursuits, self-conception, etc. (Christman, 2011). The ideally autonomous individual has a degree of negative freedom, in that certain conditions exist that allow her to think and act without interference from others. More fundamental to autonomy is an individual’s potential for positive freedom, such that she is the source of her own thoughts and actions. This requires that they have the capacity—intellectual, emotional, psychological or otherwise—to govern themselves. The competencies required for autonomy will differ depending in which sphere of life one seeks autonomy, but a few philosophers, notably Bernard Berofsky, have outlined basic competencies. Berofsky (1995) offers a utilitarian conception of autonomy, which requires that the autonomous individual demonstrate “rationality, discipline, knowledge, and independence” (p. 2). This realistic and achievable framework responds to the abstract doctrine of the “authentic” or “true” self that made autonomy so enticing for people like Guo Moruo.

Autonomy is a central tenet in Kant’s moral philosophy, which he describes as the capacity of an agent to act rationally rather than under the influence of desires or dogma. In other words, “autonomy lies in the ability to create the laws which bind us” (Berlin, 1970, p. 5). The autonomous agent must adopt her own moral law, and must be able to see her values as universal, as far as rationality is universal. While Kant’s theory addresses many key components of autonomy, such as the ability to reflect on one’s self, to accept or reject one’s own values, and to change aspects of one’s own
life, it fails to account for the role of cultural traditions in which we are all undeniably enmeshed. This will prove a particularly relevant issue for Chinese who in the early twentieth century were just emerging from centuries of dynastic rule and ideological hegemony.

To reject a cultural pattern requires autonomy, but autonomy does not require that an individual reject any cultural pattern that she wholeheartedly, genuinely accepts. Strict adherence to the laws of reason, even if those laws self-originate, over the laws of tradition is not a prerequisite to personal autonomy. The role of autonomy is not to vanquish all traditional modes of living and thinking, but rather to allow individuals to reject those aspects of the cultural fabric that their authentic, independent selves disagree with (Christman, 2011).

SHIFTING CULTURAL PARADIGMS IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY CHINA

Autonomy in China emerged from a society whose people saw themselves as insignificant in the context of their nation and their history. China had, for centuries, been a kingdom ruled by an emperor in which Chinese Confucianism mandated universal reverence for one’s parents, ancestors, and China’s emperor. The children of farmers went on to become farmers; those of the intelligentsia and aristocracy were educated for the sole purpose of passing the Imperial Entrance exam. Every individual knew her place, and understood that it was significant only in the grand scheme of social order and national achievement.

The 1911 revolution brought an end to the Qing dynasty and, in conjunction with the May Fourth Movement of 1919, precipitated a significant paradigm shift among China’s intellectuals. These two events served to abolish the imperial government and render deeply entrenched traditional values obsolete. It was in these tumultuous socio-political upheavals that Chinese writers and intellectuals began to question the tradition that was for so long, and in such a vital way, the bedrock of their public and private lives. The fact of these questions, rather than the
questions themselves, was the force driving them into the edges of autonomy.

In 1911, reformers were able to harness the formidable discontent of the peasant masses and turn them on the imperial government. They attempted to establish a republican government based on Western liberal democracy, but were undermined when they settled for Yuan Shikai as their president. Yuan, they soon discovered, was a power-hungry despot who ignored the republican ideals that the revolutionaries valued. When he tried to make himself emperor in a desperate move to solidify authoritarian power, Yuan was overthrown by a series of rebellions. These rebellions devolved China into a patchwork of warlord territories that was not unified until the Communists came to power under Mao Zedong in 1949 (Introduction to China’s Modern History, 2009).

Despite this initial failure, student intellectuals continued to advocate for reform, culminating in the May Fourth Movement of 1919 when thousands of students gathered in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to protest the unequal treatment of China in the Treaty of Versailles. The students wanted a new China, one that could compete intellectually and economically with the West.

The leaders of the May Fourth Movement, most notably Sun Yat Sen, envisioned enlightenment for Chinese society at large through the rejection of traditional Confucian dogma and the adoption of Western values and ideas. Particularly the doctrines of humanitarian individualism and romantic nationalism that swept Europe in the nineteenth century were brought to China by students who had studied overseas and saw the need for reform and revolution in their home country. These Enlightenment era ideas were propelled by a momentum and an idealism reminiscent of the American and French revolutions. With these ideas, all problems facing the individual and society could theoretically be solved through “intelligence and virtue over ignorance and wickedness” (Berlin, 1970, p. 5).
Guo Moruo and other Chinese writers such as Lu Xun (1881-1936) and Hu Shi (1891-1962) were an important part of this movement. They played a considerable role in planting the seeds of personal autonomy among the debris of traditional Chinese culture. As I will argue, there was no modern writer in China before Guo to embrace autonomy and struggle against tradition with as strong a determination. Guo Moruo was as innovative to Chinese literature and culture as he was typical of the autonomous individual of the twentieth century.

GUO MORUO: TORTURED AND SAVED BY AUTONOMY

The political and social environment of China in the early twentieth century demanded a violent break from tradition, and initiated a new social order that found freedom in humanitarian individualism and republicanism. This environment, along with the eccentricity of a young Guo Moruo, laid an uncertain foundation that inspired anxiety about the future, and dissent towards his physical and cultural environment. The unease that this amounted to sparked a burning desire in Guo; first for change, then for purpose, and finally for action. Autonomy, which served simultaneously as the source of his anxiety and as his vehicle for change, is arguably Guo’s greatest legacy as a Chinese poet.

CHANGE

From birth, Guo Moruo was set on a track that ran down a socio-political and cultural border between the traditions of old China and the mosaic of intellectual and moral doctrines that promised a new republic. Guo was born in the small market town of Sha Wan in Sichuan province in 1892, only 19 years before the fall of China’s last dynasty. His childhood was, in many ways, typical of “well-to-do young Chinese” of his day in that he went to school, drank, smoked, gambled and had significant exposure to both Chinese and Western literature (Roy, 1971, p. 55). The imperial examination system had been abolished, precipitating a radical change in the
school curriculums that worked toward the ambiguous goal of preparing students for “contact with Western civilization” (Roy, 1971, p. 55). Guo was frustrated, however, at the inadequacy of his teachers, and longed to leave his small town. In 1909, when Guo was 17 years old, he defended a group of students who got involved in a fight with local soldiers. He was consequently expelled from his school in Sha Wan and happily travelled to Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, to continue his education (Roy, 1971, pp. 26-35).

Being in Chengdu brought Guo closer to the political changes that were taking place across the country, but despite his private urge to rebel, Guo could not find a role for himself in the revolution. About a year after his move to Chengdu, the political situation in the city began to deteriorate rapidly. Anti-government movements led the city to declare independence from the Emperor on November 27, 1911. The next day saw widespread mutiny by garrisons across Sichuan and a night of looting before a new administration took over. The students, concerned about the welfare of their community, formed a volunteer army. Guo cut his queue in defiance of the dynastic regime, and rushed to join the student army. However, he did not get so far as unpacking his bags before the narrowness of the army bunks scared him back to his dormitory (Roy, 1971, pp.41-43).

Even though the old China was being forced into irrelevance, it still played an integral, though discordant, part in Guo’s cultural identity, thanks in large part to his family. Guo returned to Sha Wan with a thirst for revolution, but was met with a marriage arranged by his family to a woman he had never met. He was very disappointed to learn, on his wedding night, that she was unattractive, uneducated, and had bound feet. This undesired marriage, compounded by the fact that the woman originally arranged for him had suddenly died, instilled in him a guilt that stemmed from the essence of his cultural identity—namely, his traditional Chinese parents whom he loved but whose worldview he could not bring himself to accept as his own. This guilt only grew as Guo moved soon after his wedding to Japan to study medicine—leaving his wife to live with his parents without a child—
and even more so when he married Sato Tomiko, who bore him five children (Roy, 1971, pp. 43-55).

Faced with the decision to blend in with a crumbling social order or to forge his own path, Guo chose the latter, and so marked his definite turn toward an obscure ideal of autonomy. His was a cultural identity rife with incohesion and contradictions, which became a source of constant anxiety for the young man. As Erich Fromm (2013) notes, “freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychological conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality” (p. 386). The conditions for positive freedom and meaningful autonomy were aloof in the young Guo Moruo insofar as he only knew what he did not want. Without a clear concept of an alternative to what he saw as a “dogmatic” and “oppressive” Chinese culture, Guo’s autonomy was perilously empty.

PURPOSE

Guo followed his individualist drive to Japan, where he enrolled as a premedical student. While his escape from China facilitated autonomy, Guo’s failure to support his country in its volatile socio-political transition begot feelings of guilt. These feelings resulted first in his failure to join the ranks of the Student Volunteer Army in 1911, but resurfaced in 1919 when Chinese students in Japan were pressured to return to China to support its protest against Japan’s exploitation of China. Limited finances prevented his return, and, in combination with his refusal to divorce his Japanese wife, Guo was subjected to considerable hostility from his countrymen.

Guo was faced with an existential conundrum: he wanted an autonomy that he could not find within China for lack of freedom—in a negative sense from political and cultural strictures, in a positive sense to broaden his cultural horizon—but which would also illuminate a purpose aligned with building a new China. He found this purpose in poetic creation, and more specifically in pantheist expression—a philosophy that provided meaningful autonomy.
Pantheism is defined by the New Oxford American Dictionary (2010) as “a doctrine that identifies God with the universe, or regards the universe as a manifestation of God.” Guo described pantheism in the introduction to his translation of Goethe’s Sorrows of the Young Werther:

The entire nature is the expression of the divine, and so is the self. So I am the god, and the entire nature is also the expression of myself. When the human finally gets rid of the subjective ‘I,’ he can then finally be in the oneness with the divine, and transcend the temporal and spatial limits to become immortal. (Xin, 2008, p. 148)

Pantheism for Guo took the Spinozian form of a monism of existence, as explained by Spinoza (1994) in his Ethica:

Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily one of the infinite attributes of God. (p. 117)

Guo used this doctrine to resolve the problematic duality of his cultural identity by conceptually unifying all things under his own consecrated self. From a more objective perspective, pantheism was the knife that severed his ties with the past, as well as the moral substance that cushioned his fall into complete personal autonomy. In this way, pantheism allowed Guo to transcend the guilt stemming from the traditional Chinese aspect of his cultural identity. As he wrote in a letter dated February 16, 1920: “Unless I rid myself completely of my past, my future will be enveloped in dark shadows” (Lee, 1973, p. 187). Poetry was the vehicle that allowed Guo to express his new transcendental pantheistic autonomy, and it is precisely this pantheism that conferred an identifiable purpose on his work.

Guo published his first collection of poems, entitled The Goddesses, in 1921. The poems in this collection burst with “beautiful excess and noble rage” that sometimes recollect the long lines and irrepressible eleutheromania of Walt Whitman, sometimes the somber expressionism of Goethe (Yi, 2004, p. 2). Literary critic Achilles Fang’s response to Guo’s
work is indicative of its influence in China: “the emergence of Guo Moruo on the Chinese poetic scene was almost miraculous; it marked the end of tradition” (Roy, 1971, p. 80). This statement is proven line after line, wherein autonomy, wearing the mask of pantheism, enjoys sublime and unprecedented representation.

The expression of pantheism through poetry was psychologically liberating in that it allowed Guo to transcend his ambivalence towards his pluralistic cultural identity. The insistence and immediacy with which he emphasizes his contempt for conformity and false idolatry reflects his abrupt and extreme reverence of his own ego:

I worship iconoclasts, worship myself.
For I am also an iconoclast!
(Guo, 1958, p. 39; Hong, 2002, p. 187)

Every idol has been struck down before me!
Down! Down! Down!
I would snap my vocal chords in song!
(Guo, 1958, p. 37; Hong, 2002, p. 187)

These lines have an obvious parallel with those of Whitman: “I celebrate myself, and sing myself” (“Song of Myself”). Guo’s pantheist autonomy needed to resolve his personal anxiety, and did so by purging his identity of its affinity and obligation to any system or people. Paradoxically, it did so by rendering everyone and everything as a force contained in his self, without distinction or complication. In his poem “O Earth, My Mother,” Guo imagines ideal autonomy as freedom from filial piety and tradition:

O earth, my mother,
through past, present, future
you are food, apparel, shelter for me;
how can I repay the benefits you have bestowed upon me?

O earth, my mother,
my former self was just an ignorant child,
I only enjoyed your affection,
I did not understand, I did not know how to repay your affection. (Guo, 1958, p. 27)

Guo’s ambiguous conception of pantheism, and by extension autonomy, can be understood as existing somewhere between the question in the first stanza and the last clause of the last stanza. Pantheism was the comforting gloss that Guo spread over the paradox of autonomy—the paradox being that autonomy was both the source of his anxiety and the cure. Guo appropriated pantheism in order to feel included in a larger conceptual network that would present a supremely significant purpose; one that would imbue an otherwise empty autonomy with cosmic meaning. However, in his attempt to use pantheism to reconcile the paradox of autonomy, Guo finds no logical explanation for its psychic remedy. His admission, “I did not understand...,” is reminiscent of a religious convert reflecting on her unreformed self. The hollowness of Guo’s explanation remains so through to the end of the poem: “I know that you love me and wish to encourage me to work / I shall learn from you to work, never to stop” (lines 83-84). This hollowness reflects the empty foundation on which pantheism stands. Despite all its romantic gestures toward meaningful autonomy, it lacks substantiating logic. It is a philosophy meant to reconcile a paradox that is inherent in autonomy.

It is evident again in his poem, “Egret,” that Guo is unwilling to test the ideological foundations of his fragile philosophy. The second line of the poem asks, “Where have you flown from, / where are you flying to?” and the last line ends with the question, “Where can you be flying to?” (Guo, 1958, p. 53). The trepidation that Guo betrays when confronted with the concept of autonomy is indicative of a paradox that needs further investigation. To explore this paradox further, we must view Guo’s pantheist autonomy as the strivings of a cultural hero bent on the destruction of a flawed society and the creation of true one.
ACTION

Am I not like another Christ crucified! —Guo Moruo, 1921

In 1951 Guo wrote in his book entitled, Tiandi Xuanhuang: “Alas, in order to save China, to save the Chinese, unless there is a thoroughgoing war, unless all the ugly garbage is burned out, the phoenix and nirvana cannot be reborn” (Lee, 1973, p. 191). Guo’s philosophy of pantheism thus extended beyond his private life into his newfound calling to cultural heroism.

The culture hero is the epitome of all that is desirable in her culture. She is autonomous because her heroism is unparalleled, of her own volition, and contingent on personal sacrifice, the highest of which is martyrdom. Anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973) called society “a codified hero system,” which he explained in the following terms: “a mythical hero system in which people serve in order to earn a feeling of primary value, of cosmic specialness, of ultimate usefulness to creation, of unshakable meaning” (p. 5). Guo was obsessed with cultural heroism, as is evident in his constant invocation of such figures in his writing\(^1\), and always desired the title for himself. This drive toward cultural heroism made Guo see himself as an entity distinct from his homeland, whose now secure autonomy conferred valuable insight on him. In his poem, “Good Morning,” he imagines himself as an omniscient hero figure greeting China: “I greet you with a Good Morning,/my youthful homeland,/my new-born kinsfolk,/boundless reaches in southern lands of my Yangtze…” (Guo, 1958, p. 21).

Guo imagines a geopolitical as well as a cultural revolution. The former is simply a world without political borders, or what Guo terms “the Supranational (Chao guojia).” Autonomy is a central tenet of this new

\(^{1}\) David Roy (1971) a biographer of Guo Moruo, compiled an extensive list of such references, finding that only one-fifth of them were Chinese, and of those, none lived after the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) (p. 92).
geopolitical landscape, which, according to Guo, diverges from the nation-state in its guarantee of humanism and individual freedom (Shih, 2001, p. 99). The idea of the supranational is alluded to in his poem “The Good Morning,” wherein the omniscient speaker greets first his “homeland,” followed by the Pamirs, Himalayas, Ganges, Red Sea, Nile, Pantheon, Belgium, Ireland, and ending with “the New World,/grave of Washington, of Lincoln, of Whitman,/Whitman! Whitman!” proceeded by Japan and the final line: “Hasten to share in this millennial dawn!” (Guo, 1958, p. 22).

Arguably more important to Guo’s cultural heroism was the romantic concept of being the destroyer of an old culture and the creator of a new. Wolfgang Kubin (1996) says of poets like Guo, “In modern times the poet advances not only to a poeta alter deus, but sees himself in the aftermath of God’s death as deus and as the founder of his own religion” (p. 248). In his preface to the first issue of Chuangzao Jikan (The Creation Quarterly), Guo declares: “The Creator—I’ will call upon the might of the ‘erupting volcano’ and the ‘Sturm und Drang’ of the Universe’ to ‘create a bright world’ ” (Yi, 2004, p. 155). Guo strove tirelessly for a cultural heroism that would place him at the vanguard of China’s rebirth.

In his poem “Nirvana of the Phoenixes,” Guo tells the story of two phoenixes whose sublimely tragic death in a conflagration is followed by an epic and redemptive rebirth from the ashes. The birds, which lament their existence in “the mire and gloom of this world,” are not representative of China the nation-state, but rather of the spirit of old China, onto which Guo projects his sublime romantic sentiments (Guo, 1958, p. 12). The rebirth ends the poem with an optimism whose combination of sublimity and ambiguity is reflective of Guo’s idealistic pantheism: “Soar then, soar!/Sing

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{The name of a Romantic movement that took place in German literature and music from the late 1760s to the early 1780s (Kubin, 1996, p. 253).}\]
for joy, sing for joy! / We sing for joy, we soar/we soar, we sing for joy!” (Guo, 1958, p. 18).

Guo’s romantic self-image as a culture hero, tasked with the responsibility to destroy the old and create the new, is important to the paradox inherent in autonomy. Without a pragmatic definition of autonomy—that which Berofsky uses to underline specific competencies that prevent the idea of autonomy from dissolving into “a pale substitute of ‘the real thing’”—the individual is left with an empty ideal that necessarily culminates in heroic death (Berofsky, 1995, p. 2). This empty and ultimately destructive conception of autonomy, which is equivocated in Guo’s poetry and psyche with pantheism, soon collapses on its weak foundation:

I am a worshiper of idols.
    I am I!
My ego is about to burst. (“Heavenly Hound”)

The idealistic autonomy that Guo sought in pantheism necessitated a complete break from the past, and absolute moral isolation—equated in pantheism with hollow monism. Isaiah Berlin uses a helpful Lockean allegory to describe the freedom that Guo Moruo found in pantheism: “If I save myself from an adversary by running inside and locking all doors, I am freer than if I were captured by him, but probably not freer than if I had defeated him” (Berlin, 1970, p. 140). Herein lies the paradox of autonomy.

Guo chose early in life to lock himself inside of his own ego against the threat of guilt, which originated in the conflict of his heterogeneous identity. Problematic in this was that Guo’s moral “identity”—a significant part of that ego in which he locked himself—was fundamentally Chinese. Before pantheism offered him the silver bullet that would reconcile his Chinese moral identity with his Western intellect, Guo saw death as the only way to destroy the source of his guilt. Death therefore seemed the logical conclusion of his autonomy. In 1918, when Guo wrote, “The Temptation of Death,” we find this analysis to be true:
I have a little blade  
Who leans by the window and smiles at me.  
She smiles at me, saying:  
‘Moruo, why must you upset yourself so?  
Come quickly and kiss me  
That I may bring you surcease of sorrow.’

Outside my window, blue sea water  
Calls to me unceasingly,  
She calls to me, saying:  
‘Moruo, why must you upset yourself so?  
Come quickly, embrace me  
That I may bring you surcease of sorrow.’ (Roy, 1971, p. 77)

The existential crisis of a man who has locked himself within a soul void of moral guidance, in flight from his Chinese identity, is evident in this poem.

To suffer mortality is, for Guo, the failure to deny internal conflict. Once the individual frees himself from all inner conflict by accepting that he is everything and everything is himself, he is immortal. In order to do this, the individual, paradoxically, must destroy his metaphysical self, as Guo describes in his “Preface” to his translation of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther:

When the human finally gets rid of the subjective “I,” he can then finally be in the oneness with the divine, and transcend the temporal and spatial limits to become immortal….In order to enjoy the bliss of eternity, one must first forget oneself. However, Goethe’s method of forgetting self does not rely on the tranquility of the soul but on the action of the self. One must burn his entire body and soul for a moment of complete self-fulfillment and infinite self-expansion, and pour all of his spiritual power into the world. (Xin, 2008, p. 148)

When Guo finally discovered that the writings of his favorite thinkers—Zhuang Zi, Wang Yang Ming, Spinoza—and poets—Goethe, Tagore and Whitman—all espoused a common ideology in what Spinoza articulated, for Guo, as “pantheism,” the young man’s autonomy was infused with moral significance. Guo writes in a letter dated February 16, 1920:
If I do not rid myself completely of my burden of guilt, my pitiful soul will remain embroiled in a sea of tears, with no prospect of escape. In the past, the only solution I could see to my problems was death; but now I have adopted a different approach, and want to move in the direction of life. (Roy, 1971, p. 98)

Guo’s “past” self—that which was unaware of a purpose and yearned for a meaningful call to action—grappled with the paradox of autonomy that necessitated Guo’s own demise. Guo later finds purpose in poetry, and discovers pantheism to be the “new approach” that serves as his call to action.

Xin Ning (2008), in his analysis of modern Chinese self-hood, comes to a similar conclusion when he addresses what he calls “the existential crisis of modern Chinese subjects” (p. 37). This crisis, which I discuss as the “paradox of autonomy,” led to the tendency in modern Chinese artists to construct “an idealistic world in art and literature that is detached from…reality” in an effort to transcend their existential crisis (Xin, 2008, p. 37). Guo, Xin argues, is distinct in that he fails to find redemption in the act of artistic creation, and must therefore take his autonomy into the realm of action as a culture hero and finally a martyr:

What distinguishes his transcending efforts from those of the aestheticians, however, is his emphasis on action. Instead of withdrawing the self from the world of reality and creating a secured haven in the enclosed world of art, the self must actively invest its feelings and emotions in the objective world and try to expand to the extreme to absorb the entire objective world into the subjective domain in order to make the former an expression of the latter. Even if the efforts finally fail, the failure is paradoxically a mark of the subject’s victory. Guo values passionate extremism much more than the balanced tranquility of the soul. In this aspect, his comment on Goethe once again is telling. As [Guo] says: “he [Goethe] shows unreserved compassion to the insane, and instead of taking suicide as a sin, he pays it his homage. To be able to commit suicide is the supreme virtue. —This is the idea beyond those mediocre followers of the ‘golden mean.’” (Xin, 2008, pp. 148-149)
This obsession with martyrdom can be seen in Guo’s poem, “Victorious in Death,” about the culture hero Terence MacSwiney. MacSwiney was a leader of the Irish Republican Army who, after being arrested and imprisoned by the British Government, “disdained to eat the English bread” and died after seventy-three days of hunger strike (Guo, 1958, p. 44). To Guo, MacSwiney fought for a political and personal freedom similar to that which China and himself were fighting for. MacSwiney wanted freedom for Ireland from British rule in much the same way that Guo wanted freedom for China from internal strife and Western exploitation. MacSwiney’s death represents, for Guo, his dedication to the cause of political freedom, but it also qualifies his freedom as an absolutely autonomous individual who is physically and metaphysically free from British hegemony:

Truth shall restore the light by Nature given,
And, like Prometheus, bring the fire of Heaven!
The mighty ocean is sobbing its sad lament,
the boundless abyss of the sky is red with weeping,
far, far away the sun has sunk in the west.
Brave, tragic death! Death in a blaze of glory! Triumphal
procession of a victor! Victorious death!
Impartial God of Death! I am grateful to you! You
have saved the MacSwiney for whom my love and
reverence know no bounds!
MacSwiney, fighter for freedom, you have shown how
great can be the power of the human will!
I am grateful to you, I extol you; freedom can henceforth
never die!
The night has closed down on us, but how bright is the
moon.... (Guo, 1958, p. 46-47)

Terence MacSwiney’s story is a familiar one in the history of culture heroes, many of which Guo worshiped, like the ancient Chinese poet Qu Yuan. Qu lived during the warring states period, a time of political upheaval reminiscent of early twentieth century China, and was exiled for his
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opposition to feudal authority, after which he allegedly drowned himself. In Guo’s romantic imagination, the autonomous spirit that fuels the heroic actions of men like MacSwiney and Qu Yuan is made somehow complete, or even sanctified in death.

Yi Zheng (2004) gives this existential dilemma a global relevance by calling it “a cultural response to the burdens of modernity” (p. 153). It can certainly be understood as such through Guo’s poetry, which shows a China suffering in the moral vacuum of the May Fourth Era, yearning for existential absolution. This is indeed the lament of the phoenixes before they are reborn:

I raise my brow and ask of Heaven,
but Heaven is reserved and aloof, has no knowledge of these things.
I bend my brow and ask the earth,
but the sea is raising its voice in grieving.

Ah!
To exist in the mire and gloom of this world
would cause even a diamond sword to rust. (Guo, 1958, p. 12)

This vacuum was filled, we now know, by the extraordinary personality of Mao Zedong and the moral compass of Communism. Guo, in his autonomous moral insecurity, was swept up first by the doctrine of pantheism, but soon after publishing The Goddesses and returning alone to China, found himself enchanted by Communism. We are reminded of the words of Ernest Becker (1973) in reflecting on Guo’s turn to Communism: “man simply cannot justify his own heroism; he cannot fit himself into his own cosmic plan and make it believable” (p. 196). Guo, like so many other artists and writers animated by a strong sense of autonomy, needed to make his work relevant to a larger ideal—one that would grant him a cultural heroism of global significance.

Guo lived the rest of his life in China, without his Japanese wife and children, as a high-ranking official of the Chinese Communist Party. His renunciation of traditional Chinese culture, followed by his realization of an
autonomy conferred by a global trend of humanitarian individualism and republicanism, followed again by his stalwart espousal of Communism, is in many ways the story of the late 19th and 20th century.

Guo Moruo cannot be called the father of Chinese autonomy—if such a “Chinese” aspect can indeed be distinguished—but the characteristics of his autonomy can be seen in the contemporary Chinese individual. It is an autonomy that can be characterized by the proclivity for a moral ideology or cultural identity that will facilitate the subject’s ascension to an individualistic or egocentric cultural heroism of global significance.

CONCLUSION
In his 1995 book, China and the American Dream, Richard Madsen talks about a “culture fever” in his moral inquiry into China in the 1980s and 1990s. By this, Madsen meant that “Chinese culture had become an object of extraordinarily widespread, heated debate” since the death of Mao Zedong and subsequent economic and political reforms. “It was,” Madsen continues, “an attempt to come to grips with why the Chinese government’s political and economic reforms had failed to fulfill their promise and to find a morally adequate vision for the future” (p. 193).

This search for culture, and by extension moral guidance, that characterizes contemporary China can be seen through another lens as a search for meaningful autonomy. Communism was, for many people like Guo Moruo, a clear path into personal autonomy. This is because Communism offered the moral guidance to do so, but also because it was underpinned by a logical foundation—that is, until theory met practice. This mixture of logic with the silver bullet promises of lofty ideologies like pantheism, led many like Guo to renounce their old way of life, including the people attached to it, to adopt Communism. These cultural mavericks became, in effect, autonomous individuals because they chose their path for themselves, albeit a path ultimately, under Mao, of heteronomy.
Mao died in 1976 and was succeeded by the more moderate Deng Xiaoping, who set out to amend the radical economic policies of Mao. This set China on its path of rapid development, but in doing so, questioned Communism’s moral supremacy. There is now an emerging class of young middle and upper class Chinese who possess the negative freedom from want and political interference, as well as the qualities that Berofsky argues are necessary for the attainment of positive liberty and autonomy. They are in these ways much like Guo Moruo after he moved to Japan, and like Guo, many of them are turning to Western cultural trends to inform their own cultural identity.

These Chinese have been criticized—by older generations of Chinese, and by foreign observers—for their collective lack of moral conscience, and their disproportionate adulation of material wealth. It can be said that that which Guo saw in pantheism, young middle and upper class Chinese see in capitalism. Like every system that has come before it, from Confucianism to Communism, capitalism is a path to cultural heroism. What sets capitalism apart is its contentment with mortality. Unlike Communism, whose goal is the abstract and lofty betterment of mankind, capitalism starts and ends in the material world. Its moral foundation of perseverance, ability and fairness are undermined by the fact that they are issued not by God, but by man; their rewards not eternal, but temporal. The autonomy that this system confers is, like pantheism, incomplete.

Contemporary Chinese writers like Bei Dao, who lived through Mao’s reign, and struggle with the flickering zeitgeist today, have a very strained concept of personal autonomy and freedom. Their inner drive towards an autonomy ideal reminiscent of Guo’s pantheism is constantly suppressed by an authoritarian government. Furthermore, their autonomy lacks a divine force to justify it, to give it a purpose that transcends the material world and grants immortality. Desperate for a larger meaning they turn to literature; but alas, they are reminded of the disillusioned Guo Moruo, who abandoned his romantic pantheist poet identity for that of a
lifeless Communist official. Bei Dao betrays in his poem, “Untitled”, the anxiety begotten in a freedom that he can conceive of, but cannot realize:

He sits in the small cabin underwater
    calm as ballast
    schools of fish surrounding him shine and beam
    freedom, that golden coffin lid
    hangs high above the prison
    behind the giant stone a line of people
    wait to enter the emperor’s
    memory

The exile of words has begun (Old Snow, 1991, p. 25)

It is this hallowed meaning—shining and beaming, imaginable yet intangible—that eludes contemporary Chinese autonomy, not for lack of rationality, independence or ability, but for lack of naiveté. Bei Dao’s generation saw the crescendo-ing transmutation of autonomy from romantic idealism to Communism to entitlement over others’ freedoms, through to its decrescendo to disenchantment and realization that Mao’s communism had satisfied and then vacated a spiritual exigency.

Bei Dao and his contemporaries float in tormenting autonomy between the authoritarian state and the seemingly amoral capitalists of the post-Mao generation. Bei was exiled in 1989 for his involvement in the Tiananmen Square protests of that year, and his poetry reflects a resignation to freedom: “Freedom,” he writes, “is the distance between the hunter and the hunted” (August Sleepwalker, 1990, p. 89). He looks to poetry, as did Guo Moruo, for meaning; but only sees the finite distance between himself and fate.

REFERENCES


The debate over whether sacred prostitution existed in ancient Mesopotamia, and if it did, what it looked like exactly, is largely the result of a confusion in the terminology used when approaching the subject. “Sacred prostitution” is the label commonly attributed to the practice of “the sale of a person’s body for sexual purposes where some portion (if not all) of the money or goods received for this transaction belongs to the deity” (Budin, 2008, p. 3). “Sacred sex” or “cultic sex”, on the other hand, centers more on the theology behind the practice itself, which in this case, was considered most important. No form of monetary exchange for sex is implied. Because of the contention present in academia around the term “sacred prostitution”, this paper will use the term sacred sex to address the basic idea of the practice. Later in the paper the issue of monetary exchange for sexual practices, i.e. sacred prostitution, will be explored.

Popular literature on sacred sex in antiquity generally presents an ancient theology that embraces the opposition between that which is sacred and that which is profane. The term "sacred" comes from the Latin sacer, i.e. holy, and the term "profane" comes from the Latin pro-fanum, fused into profanus, meaning “before” or “outside” of the temple, i.e., unholy. This theology is explained by a copious many as a practice that included ritual sex services offered by women, and arguably by men, in a religious setting. The practitioners would serve as vessels of sexual energy for fertility goddesses like the ancient North Eastern goddess of Sumer, Inanna, known as Ishtar later in the Babylonian Empire (Baring & Cashford, 1991, pp. 145-146). It has been widely believed by many scholars and writers that these sacred sex
services were common practices in ancient Mesopotamia and aimed to ensure the abundance of life on earth. The sexual act was meant to draw down the fecundity of the goddess to infuse all of life with fertile energy. Women played an important role in the temple, serving as either the high priestess who participated in the sacred marriage rite during the New Year festivities or as temple priestesses who offered sacred sex to visitors of the temple.

This practice is thought to have occurred from the rise of ancient Sumer during the fifth millennium BCE, to the fall of the Neo-Babylonian Empire during the sixth century BCE. It adapted throughout the years to various kingdoms that claimed authority over this region—the Sumerians, Semitic Akkadians, the Amorites, the Kassites, the Hurrians and Indo-European Mitanni, the Assyrians, and finally, the Neo-Babylonians who were conquered by the Persians.

Although this image of sacred sex work is the most popular and most represented in academia, popular literature, etc., this topic has generated heated debates amongst scholars over the past three decades. This literature review will explore the three different argumentative approaches that scholars take when debating on the practice. Some scholars claim that such practices were integrated deeply into the psyche and worldview of a people. Because of this, these acts were considered honorable, liberative, and anticipated with genuine interest by the women involved. These scholars usually focus on sacred sex practices in the land of Sumer—where they originated. Other scholars assert that the role of women as sacred sex workers was coerced and not one of choice. These scholars seem to focus on the practice during later civilizations where it increasingly resembled commercial, non-ritual prostitution. Recently, a new group of scholars claim that there is no evidence to indicate the existence of sacred prostitution in ancient Mesopotamia; simultaneously, these scholars do not disprove the existence of sacred sex practices conducted without monetary exchange.
SACRED SEX AS LIBERATIVE

The practice of sacred prostitution is thought by some to have originated in ancient Sumer, a land located in the southern region of ancient Mesopotamia that was first occupied at about 4,500 BCE. The leading scholar of Sumerian history and Assyriologist, Samuel Noah Kramer (1897-1990), wrote extensively on this civilization. His research indicates that during this time urban centers’ “technological inventiveness, industrial specialization, and commercial enterprise found room to grow and expand. It was in these cities of Sumer that an effective system of writing was first invented and developed,” known as cuneiform (Kramer, 1969, p. 4). Vern L. Bullough (1971), however, stresses that though nearly half a million cuneiform tablets exist, fewer than two percent of them deal with myths, epics, prayers, hymns, and similar religious texts. Various scholars who argue that sacred sex work in antiquity was liberative frequently turn to these texts which have proven to be the basis of scholarship exploring sacred sex work in the ancient East.

Kramer wrote specifically on religion and religious practices in ancient Sumer. He was the first to identify the hieros gamos, or “sacred marriage” rite in this region, and wrote extensively on it in his book, The Sacred Marriage Rite (1969). Kramer’s work, which illustrates the worldview of the ancient Sumerians and early Semitic Akkadians, allows a clear understanding to come about of why sacred sex rites were practiced in Sumer. He tells the readers that during this time the Sumerians developed a philosophy and religion intimately tied to the daily living and ethical values of all the people (Kramer, 1969, p. 18). They believed that the cosmos were engendered by a primeval sea exemplified as the Sumerian goddess, Nammu. A pantheon of immortal beings directed the universe and all movements therein, from the potential of the planted seed to the cycle of the most distant planet (Kramer, 1969, p. 18). The goddess of love and fertility, Inanna, had supreme influence over the prolificacy of all plant, animal, and human life on earth. According to Kramer, Sumerians believed with
certainty that humanity was fashioned out of clay for the sole purpose of serving the gods and goddesses, including Inanna. Because of this worldview, the Sumerians understood hardships, such as low yearly crop yields, to be the result of failing to serve the deities. Religious devotion, like sacred sex, was then deeply-seated into the minds and livelihoods of the people (Kramer, 1969, p. 18).

Kramer (1969) believed that these earlier ideas of fertility evolved into a sacred sex practice known as the sacred marriage rite, enacted during New Year celebrations in the Third Dynasty of Ur (c. 2500 BCE). The high priestess or selected, hierodule—whom he defines as a sacred sex practitioner from Inanna’s temple—and high priest, or king, would engage in ceremonial sex during this rite. Their union would draw down and then out fertile energy for all of life inhabiting the land. Kramer (1969) writes

The Sacred Marriage rite was a jubilant, rapturous occasion celebrated with joyous music and ecstatic love songs. Not a few of these have become known to the scholarly world, some only very recently, and many more are no doubt still buried in the ruined cities of Sumer. (p. 84)

In “Cuneiform Studies and the History of Literature: The Sumerian Sacred Marriage Texts”, Kramer (1963) notes that six hymns provide evidence of the sacred marriage rites and rituals (p. 490). According to Kramer (1969), this particular sacred sex ritual was considered a liberative practice; one in which women engaged consensually (p. 84). Kramer (1969) presents ancient love poetry from the middle of the third millennium BCE, wherein accounts of the Sacred Marriage rite and sacred sex work are evident, to further support his deductions on this practice:

“My bridegroom, I will drink fresh [?] milk with you,
The milk of the goat, make flow in the sheepfold for me,
With...cheese fill my holy churn...,
Lord Dumuzi, I will drink fresh milk with you.” (p. 62)

Anne Baring and Jules Cashford have touched on the subject of sacred sex work in their independent books as well as in their co-authored
book, *The Myth of the Goddess: Evolution of an Image* (1991). Like Kramer (1963), Baring and Cashford (1991) argue that sacred sex work was a liberative practice for women, not just in ancient Sumer, but also in later empires of the region (p. 197). According to Baring and Cashford, Inanna’s priestesses were highly respected members of society in ancient Sumer. Their bodies were seen as vehicles of the goddess Inanna’s divine energy. Men visiting the *ziggurat*—from the Akkadian *ziqqurratu*, meaning temple—would, in a sense, be visiting the goddess who would bestow sexuality and grant divine ecstasy to both the priestess and the man (Baring & Cushford, 1991, p. 197). The words identifying these sacred sex workers, e.g., prostitutes and harlots, no longer “[convey] the original sacredness of their service to the goddess, although the original meaning of the word ‘prostitute’ was ‘to stand on behalf of’” (Baring & Cashford, 1991, p. 197).

Baring and Cashford (1991) explain that sexual intercourse was performed daily within and outside of the *ziggurat*. The practitioners were identified by Baring and Cashford as *hierodules*, a Greek word meaning ‘servant of the holy’. *Hierodules* performed sacred sex rituals with the goal of embodying metaphysical ideas of fertility (Baring & Cashford, 1991, p. 197). The motive behind sacred sex work lies within Sumerian cosmology, for which Sumerians held central an interconnection between the cosmological realms. In this way a stirring below incited a stirring above. More clearly stated, the sacred, divinely blissful sexual act occurring through sacred sex practices was one of the channels (the other being birth) through which the goddess Inanna poured her divine energy of fertility into life (Baring and Cashford, 1991, p. 197). Following the myth of Inanna, whenever the goddess descended into the nether world, as was customary once a year, the land would lose fertility and nothing would grow. Sacred sex work was then essential because it ensured Inanna’s return every New Year and therefore the fruitfulness of all life on earth. This belief was prominent from the Sumerian to the Babylonian Empire (Baring & Cashford, 1991, pp.197-199).
Baring and Cashford (1991) include poetry excerpts from the book, *Inanna, Queen of Heaven and Earth* (1983), written by Diane Wolkstein and Samuel Noah Kramer. These excerpts support their argument that sacred prostitution was a liberative service capable of completely fulfilling spiritual ideologies. This particular excerpt speaks of how the practitioner prepares herself and further describes the actual sacred sex act itself:

“I bathed for the wild bull,  
I bathed for the shepherd Dumuzi,  
I perfumed my sides with ointment,  
I coated my mouth with sweet-smelling amber,  
I painted my eyes with kohl.

He shaped my loins with his fair hands,  
The shepherd Dumuzi filled my lap with cream and milk,  
He stroked my pubic hair,  
He watered my womb,  
He laid his hands on my holy vulva,  
He smoothed my black boat with cream,  
He quickened my narrow boat with milk,  
He caressed me on the bed.

Now I will caress my high priest on the bed,  
I will caress the faithful Dumuzi,  
I will caress his loins, the shepherdship of the land,  
I will decree a sweet fate for him.”
(Wolkstein & Kramer, 1983, p. 44)

In the book, *The Sacred Prostitute* (1984), the Jungian analyst Nancy Qualls-Corbett explores the liberative nature of sacred sex work in ancient Mesopotamia. She focuses on the devotion of the high priestess and poetess Enheduanna (c. 2300 BCE) who was the daughter of King Sargon I, a king that conquered the land of ancient Sumer during the later part of the third millennium BCE and brought about the rise of the Akkadian Empire. A shift occurred within the temple during the transition of kingdoms, which resulted in Inanna becoming more war oriented. This shift is clearly noted in
the tone of sadness in Enheduanna’s poetry (Qualls-Corbett, 1984, p. 27). Enheduanna’s lament amplifies when she is banished from the temple:

“You have lifted your foot and left their barn of fertility.
The women of the city no longer speak of love with their husbands.
At night they do not make love.
They are no longer naked before them, revealing intimate treasures…who does not worship you?” (Qualls-Corbett, 1984, p. 27)

When Enheduanna regains her former position as high priestess, her poetry is full of joy. According to Qualls-Corbett (1984) “the descriptive and sensitive writings of Enheduanna bring to light the deep devotion of an individual human woman, a priestess, to the love goddess” (p. 29); a devotion that could only be fostered through willingness and genuine interest for the practice. By comparing Enheduanna’s poetry from the time she was banished from the temple to when she returns again with joy, Qualls-Corbett presents a strong argument for sacred sex work as liberative.

In her article, “The Origin of Prostitution in Ancient Mesopotamia” (1986), Gerda Lerner uses the Epic of Gilgamesh to support her contention on the practice of sacred sex. Lerner asserts that this practice was indeed liberative for some women but not for all. The Epic of Gilgamesh, which is thought in academia to have been based upon earlier Sumerian tales from the first millennium BCE, documents the story of a legendary king who might have actually existed during the third millennium BCE. The epic refers to a sacred sex practitioner called a harimtu whom, when engaging in sacred sex, would infuse the fellow practitioner with divine understanding and deeper spiritual awareness. The story goes that the gods create Enkidu, who has various adventures with Gilgamesh. Before he meets Gilgamesh, Enkidu is tamed and civilized by a sacred sex worker, a harimtu, of Ishtar. After six days of divine sexual service, Enkidu is portrayed as carrying within himself a higher wisdom. Moreover, Lerner (1986) draws attention to a section later in the epic where Enkidu has fallen ill and curses the harimtu for introducing him to civilization:
“I will curse you with a great cause
you shall not build a house for your debauch
you shall not enter the tavern of girls
May waste places be your couch,
May the shadow of the town-wall be your stand
May thorn and bramble skin your feet
May drunkard and toper alike slap your cheek.” (p. 246)

It is through the nature of this curse that a hypothesis develops on the possible existence of two types of “organized prostitution”: cultic and commercial prostitution. When the harimtu is cursed by Enkidu in the Epic of Gilgamesh, scholars can assume that, as a sacred sex worker of the goddess, a harimtu lived an easier life compared to the lives of other female sex workers. The women participating in temple services at this period varied not only in social standing but also in the type of sex service they offered. Lerner (1986) adds to the debate the conviction that sacred sex was multilayered and complex, and, therefore, cannot be generalized as a uniform practice for all temple priestesses and practitioners, as has often been the asserted. Sacred sex, Lerner argues, was a liberative practice for some women, but not for all.

Scholars exploring sacred sex as a liberative practice usually analyze older texts, especially those presented in the work of Samuel Noah Kramer. Scholars also look at sacred marriage poetry in cuneiform tablets to support their argument. Gerda Lerner (1986), however, moves beyond that time frame and argues that the practice of sacred sex work began to change continuously in the region with the arrival of new ethnic groups and empires. She identifies two types of sex work or what she calls “organized prostitution,” these are 1. Cultic prostitution—sacred sex service—and 2. Commercial prostitution (Lerner, 1986).
SACRED SEX SERVICE VS. COMMERCIAL PROSTITUTION

Lerner (1986) argues that scholars often generalize sacred sex work into one category, e.g. sacred prostitutes, temple priestesses, or hierodules “without distinction for various types of women engaging in cultic or commercial sexual activity” (p. 239). Sacred sex services originated in ancient Sumer during the third millennium BCE. It was only later during the second millennium BCE in ancient Mesopotamia, around the time when the Assyrian Empire was rising, that commercial prostitution became active near or inside of the temple and directly influenced cultic sex work. Lerner also includes data of the distinct types of prostitution that carried into the Babylonian Empire, as evidence that sacred prostitution cannot be generalized as a liberative practice.

CULTIC SEXUAL SERVICE

Lerner (1986) lists three different types of priestesses who are thought to have been involved in increasingly strict cultic services during the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE): The Entu, the Naditum, and the Kulmashtitum and Qadishtum (pp. 239-242). At this time, the dynamics of sacred sex practices within the temple could be seen to have become more organized and complex and, therefore, that the practice was liberative to the women involved becomes increasingly harder to deduce. The En or Entu priestess was the high priestess who exclusively participated in the Hieros Gamos rite. Her reputation was closely watched. She was allowed to live outside of the cloister of the temple. The second type that Lerner discusses is the Naditum priestesses, about which the most information is known. Naditum priestesses existed in large numbers, especially during the early second millennium BCE, but declined after Hammurabi’s reign ended. They came from the higher levels of society and some were the daughters of kings. They were not allowed to bear children and had many servants to attend to them within the temple. During their stay they enriched the temple with their wealth and were respected business women who owned land, slaves,
and houses. The *Naditum* were forbidden under the death penalty to associate with brothels; but they were allowed to adopt children.

Lastly, Lerner (1986) touches on the lower-ranking temple priestesses known as *Kulmashitum* and *Qadishtum*. These women were even allowed to live outside of the temple, marry and have children, or engage in commercial prostitution after they had provided service to the respective goddess for a certain time. According to Lerner (1986), “we have ample historically valid evidence—linguistic, literary, pictorial, and legal—from which we can reconstruct the female goddesses and the lives and activities of priestesses in ancient Mesopotamia and in the Neo-Babylonian period” (p. 238).

The scholar, Marten Stol presents additional evidence in support of Lerner in the article “Women in Mesopotamia” (1995). Stol focuses specifically on the role of the *Naditum* priestesses. He writes about the existence of cloisters in the Old Babylonian period that were run by wealthy, childless women. Excavated contracts from outside of a brothel in Susa speak of adopted girls who were “destined to be [prostitutes]; their income [would] guarantee the adoptant, a woman, a careless old age” (Stol, 1995, p. 138). Although the *Naditum* priestesses were forbidden to bear children and associate with brothels in any way, they were allowed to adopt girls and use their sex services as a means to obtain wealth. Moreover, Stol (1995) notes that all families (with little reference to societal status or wealth) were required to send their daughters to cloisters in Babylonia (p. 139). It is unclear whether this fits within or was different from the three priestess’s services explained by Lerner above. Additionally, Stol (1995) provides what he calls “hard evidence” of sacred sex work found in texts of Old Babylonian Sippar—these texts identify a low-ranking woman who provided sacred sex services on behalf of the goddess Ishtar of Uruk (p. 139). Stol then posits whether this woman was a *Kulmashitum* or *Qadishtum* priestess: a low-ranking temple priestess that could marry, have children, and live outside of the temple or engage in commercial prostitution, only after having served the goddess for some time.
Like Lerner and Stol, the scholar Martha T. Roth affirms the existence of various types of priestesses in ancient Mesopotamia, especially during the Old Babylonian period, between the nineteenth and seventeenth centuries BCE. Her essay on the subject, “Marriage, Divorce, and the Prostitute in Ancient Mesopotamia” is presented in the anthology, *Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World* (Roth, 2006, pp. 21-39). She explains that, “we do know a certain amount about these cultic women’s private sexual, reproductive, and domestic lives. We know whether they were or were not permitted to marry, to bear children, to raise their children; which ones lived in segregated ‘cloisters’” (2006, p. 23). Yet, Roth clearly states that none of these priestesses participated in any type of cultic sex practice, which disputes what Lerner and Stol have contributed to the study. Roth argues that the only priestess who participated in this practice were the *Entu* priestess who played an important role during the Sacred Marriage rite every New Year (2006, p. 23). By looking closely at the different types of priestesses, the debate becomes much more complex as it moves earlier in time and explores the practice in subsequent empires. Whether these temple priestesses engaged in sacred sex services is now dependent on their role within the temple.

COMMERCIAL PROSTITUTION

Whether or not sex services were involved in cultic settings has recently been explored by scholars like Roth, Lerner and Stol. In addition to the cultic sex services, Lerner (1986) addresses another form of organized prostitution, commercial prostitution, which existed at the height of the Assyrian Empire during the first millennium BCE. According to Lerner (1986), war and conquest brought enslavement and sexual abuse. Poverty and debt led parents and husbands to sell their daughters and wives into commercial prostitution, “slave owners [to rent] out their female slaves as prostitutes, and some masters [to] set up commercial brothels” (Lerner, 1986, p. 247).
Sacred Prostitution in Ancient Mesopotamia: Myth or Reality?

The question of the liberative nature of cultic sex practices, Lerner (1986) argues, can be clearly analyzed through the implications of commercial prostitution in the first millennium BCE.

What earlier was a purely religious cultic function may have become corrupted at a time when commercial prostitution already flourished in the temple precincts … priests may have also encouraged or permitted the use of slave women and the lower class of temple servants as commercial prostitutes in order to enrich the temple” and their personal wealth. (p. 244)

At the height of the Assyrian empire, the practice of sacred sex intermingled with new temple happenings like commercial prostitution. The slaves and lower class temple servants that engaged in commercial prostitution as part of the temple personnel did not hold the original beliefs that once fueled the sacred sex practice of ancient Sumer. To the women exercising commercial prostitution, the work was entirely coerced. Lerner asserts that cultic sex is often confused for commercial prostitution, and in this way is believed to have been coercive to the women practicing cultic sex. Initially, at this time of great change, sacred sex might have been practiced alongside commercial prostitution as it once had in ancient Sumer. Yet, commercial sex work eventually corrupted the practice of cultic sex service to the point where it was no longer liberative and essentially rid it of its original core theology (Lerner, 1986, p. 244).

The accession of the later Akkadian, Assyrian, and Babylonian empires over that of ancient Sumer seems to have continuously transformed the role of women and the practice of sacred sex, according to the scholarly contribution of Lerner, Stol, and Roth. They analyze this practice predominantly in the Babylonian Empire, wherein even the nature of the primary sources analyzed has changed drastically. The inquiry of sacred sex practices in ancient Sumer and the early Semitic Akkadian Empire usually looks to myths, epics, hymns, and tales recoded on cuneiform tablets for answers. Research of this practice after ancient Sumer looks at
documentation of laws and historical accounts as primary sources. Furthermore, Lerner asserts that the change in the nature of sacred sex practices and the onset of commercial prostitution in the region parallels the political and social changes occurring at this time. Sacred sex work began to change here from being a liberative practice for the women involved to one heavily influenced by the coercive nature of commercial prostitution. Because of this, sacred sex was eventually transformed into a coercive practice as well.

Further research into what the practice of cultic sex work truly looked like by scholars like Lerner and Stol have added valuable insights to this particular field of academia. However, the existence of sacred sex practices has begun to be questioned by scholars like Stephanie Budin and Joan Goodnick Westenholz, mostly by debunking previous scholarship on the practice. This refutation of previous scholarship is clearly seen in the exploration of scholarship on what the practitioners themselves would actually do while engaging in sacred sex.

**SACRED SEX PRACTICE AS A MYTH?**

Vern L. Bullough analyzes deviant sex in ancient Mesopotamia in his article, “Attitudes toward Deviant Sex in Ancient Mesopotamia” (1971), elaborating on the different types of sacred sex services present during the Babylonian Empire. He claims that anal intercourse was common amongst the *Entu* priestesses, and was actually used as a method of birth control with no indication of it being a taboo (Bullough, 1971, p. 191). Furthermore, he comments vastly on homosexuality inside the *ziggurat*, saying that “male prostitutes were serving Ishtar at the temple of Erech and other places alongside priestesses. These were called men ‘whose manhood Ishtar has changed into womanhood’” (Bullough, 1971, p. 191).

The scholar of Near Eastern Studies, Stephanie Budin, argues against the claims made by Bullough and many other scholars who take this stance. She does this by first questioning the claim that these women would engage
in such practices as priestesses. In her book *The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity* (2008), she states that: “the sexual status of the entu-priestess is ambiguous. The majority of our evidence suggests that the entu was chaste,” and that, in fact, “Section 127 of the *Codex Hammurapi* offers severe punishment for the man who accuses either the entu or the lawfully wedded wife of illicit sexual relations” (p. 21). Furthermore, she states that male sacred prostitutes most likely did not exist and the names attributed to the male priests that are often translated to mean so, refer to transvestites, castrati, or the “impotent.”

The scholar of Near Eastern languages and literatures, Joan Goodnick Westenholz, also questions such claims. Westenholz explains in her journal article, “Tamar, Qedes, Qadistu, and Sacred Prostitution in Mesopotamia” (1989), that sexual intercourse with an Entu priestess was a prohibition and “provoked a swollen epigastrium, a feverish abdomen, diseases of the testicles and a scaly penis” (p. 263). This prohibition would undoubtedly debunk Bullough’s (2008) claim that the Entu priestess engaged in any sort of intercourse, as intercourse with the priestess was a social and political taboo.

Julia Assante, a scholar of the ancient Near East, has contributed immensely to the collective research on sacred prostitution in antiquity. Her writing has forced scholars to revisit and revise accepted work on the practice, and has clarified much of it as well. In her article, “What Makes a Prostitute a Prostitute? Modern Definitions and Ancient Meanings” (2007), Assante criticizes Martha Roth’s claim that the Entu priestess engaged in sacred sex during the Sacred Marriage rite (p. 118). Assante (2007) avows that, “the entu has long been discounted as a viable mortal substitute for the goddess in a sexual rite with the king because she was either his daughter or a close relative. Moreover, there is no evidence for such an enacted rite” (p. 118). Both Assante’s and Budin’s contributions are part of recent scholarship which takes the position that sacred prostitution in antiquity is a myth.
THE MYTH OF SACRED PROSTITUTION

As more information on sacred prostitution has become available, the broad term of sacred prostitution has been broken down. Scholars have debated about what this practice looked like under the rule of different kingdoms in ancient Mesopotamia. Yet, a few scholars have more recently argued that this practice never existed at all in the ancient world. One such scholar is Stephanie Budin who opens her book, *The Myth of Sacred Prostitution in Antiquity* (2008), by clearly stating her thesis in bold, capital letters: “SAVED PROSTITUTION NEVER EXISTED IN THE NEAR EAST OR MEDITERRANEAN” (p. 1). According to Budin (2008), “sacred prostitution is the sale of a person’s body for sexual purposes where some portion (if not all) of the money or goods received for this transaction belongs to the deity” (p. 3). Budin’s 2008 book refutes the concept of sacred prostitution, of which she thinks is “a long standing mistake, exacerbated by bad scholarship for some 2000+ years” (p. 13), both ancient and recent.

A large part of Budin’s thesis relies on critically analyzing the sources most scholars cite on the practice. These include Near Eastern texts, biblical passages, and Greco-Roman texts. She focuses largely on Herodotus’s *Historiae* (fifth century BCE) due to the fact that his account is the most widely cited, and that he is the first historian to provide a clear description of sacred prostitution. Herodotus wrote that every woman in the Babylonian Empire was required to participate in sacred sex work once in her life. She was to sit outside of the temple of the goddess and wait for a stranger to throw a silver coin onto her lap. When this happened, she would take the stranger with her beyond the temple grounds and provide sacred sexual services to him. She could not reject anyone and only when she fulfilled her duty could she return home (Budin, 2008, p. 62). There has been much speculation over the meaning of this account. Stol (1995), for example, says of this that “the Father of History [was] either completely wrong or misunderstood a form of cultic prostitution” (p. 138). However, Budin (2008) is one of the first to argue that no such practice ever existed and was
probably made up by Herodotus. Budin comments that Herodotus’ writings have been questioned in the field, and some parts have proven to have been made up. Herodotus relied primarily on oral traditions, and sources are scarce in his work. He never states that he had been in the city and, furthermore, Budin notes that the word “prostitute” is non-existent in Mesopotamian vocabulary. According to Budin (2008), these uncertainties have “led some scholars [to] suggest that Herodotus actually made up his sources along with his narratives, once again casting Herodotus into the ‘Liar’s School’ of historiography” (p. 62).

Moreover, Budin (2008) explores the various types of priestesses in ancient Mesopotamia that have been labeled sacred prostitutes. In her book, Budin devotes a separate section to each priestess—the Entu, Nin.dinger, Naditu, Qadistu, Nu.gig, Harimtu, Kar.kid, Kulmasitu, Kezertu, and Samhatu, all of whom existed during different times and under different empires in ancient Mesopotamia. Outlaying scholars’ sacred sex theories of each priestess, Budin (2008) concludes that the priestesses were either chaste or that the historiography of sacred prostitution lacks substantial evidence to support the claims that any of the priestesses engaged in sexual intercourse (p. 32). Thus, Budin refutes claims made by the scholars who assert that the priestesses engaged in sacred prostitution or sacred sex practices.

Joan Goodnick Westenholz additionally claims that “there was no such institution as sacred prostitution in Mesopotamia in spite of its widespread reputation among scholars” in her article, “Tamar, Qedes, Qadistu, and Sacred Prostitution in Mesopotamia” (1989, p. 260). She defines ‘sacred prostitution’, identifies Herodotus as the source of the fallacy in the same manner that Budin did, and proves that the practice never existed through linguistic analysis of the term ‘sacred prostitution’ and a re-evaluation of the “evidence.” Westenholz explains that in the Old Babylonian system, the Qadistu, Naditu, Kulmasitu, and Ugbabtu priestesses were women whose activity was regulated by a strict code. They were devotees of a specific male deity, which meant that their sexuality was
controlled by either celibacy or marriage (Westenholz, 1989, p. 251). Moreover, she writes that the Harintu did engage in prostitution during the Old Babylonian period, though it was not cultic in any way (Westenholz, 1989, p. 262).

Criticism directed toward the type of scholarship presented by Budin and Westenholz addresses their overlooking of important evidence, as well as the restrictive use of the term ‘sacred prostitution’ that includes some form of monetary exchange. In a 2010 review of Budin’s 2008 book, Will Deming, a scholar and professor of comparative religions, notes that Budin’s entire argument is based “entirely on her restrictive definition of sacred prostitution” through which “she is able to rule out sacred prostitution for any text that does not explicitly mention payment” (p. 593). Deming (2010) concludes by stating that “even if we grant that ‘sacred prostitution’ so defined did not exist, we are still left with a phenomenon that Budin labels ‘sacred sex’ (4) but never explores” (p. 593). By this, Deming refers to a comment made by Budin (2008), which states that “E.J. Fisher put it correctly some 30 years ago, ‘ritual prostitution and ritual intercourse represent two quite different practices and should be rigorously distinguished’” (p. 17). Budin, therefore, provides solid evidence to refute ritual prostitution, but does not touch on ritual intercourse or sacred sex practices. Theology is fundamental and is the core of ritual intercourse or sacred sex practices; any form of monetary exchange is not implied as being important here. On the other hand, monetary exchange is implied as being central in ritual or sacred prostitution.

**CONCLUSION**

The scholarly literature available on sacred sex practices in ancient Mesopotamia widely varies and has generated a great deal of debate amongst scholars in the field. Was this practice liberative or coerced for the women involved? How did commercial prostitution influence its evolution? And finally, did this practice even exist at all? This review has touched on these
questions which seem to differ fundamentally in the primary sources adopted. Scholars who believe this practice to have been liberative focus on Ancient Sumer and center their work on the fundamental theology that originally fueled this practice. They assess ancient love poetry that illustrate the cultic practices, and that strengthen their assertions in their writings. Scholars who assert that sacred sex in ancient Mesopotamia was coerced, or an amalgam of liberative and objectifying practices, usually look at later empires, such as the Assyrian empire wherein commercial prostitution slowly began to infiltrate the temple and intermingle with sacred sex practices. Finally, scholars who claim that sacred prostitution never existed in ancient Mesopotamia use linguistic analysis to methodically refute previous scholarship.

After surveying all of the three argumentative approaches to the topic of sacred prostitution in ancient Mesopotamia, one can better understand the evolution of this practice within different empires in the region throughout time. Scholarship has shown that this practice was liberative during its onset in ancient Sumer but became coercive with the introduction of socio-political changes and the introduction of commercial prostitution in later empires. Furthermore, one can see that those who dismiss sacred prostitution as myth, like Budin, still leave behind the unanswered question of the existence of sacred sex practices that do not involve monetary exchange; these scholars, therefore, have not truly dismissed sacred sex practices as myth, but rather dismissed the existence of sacred prostitution, solely.

The inquiry into what the role of the woman as a priestess or sacred sex practitioner truly meant for the woman herself, and even more so, the inquiry into whether or not this practice even existed, is critically important today. Looking deeply into growing movements in feminism and research into spiritual movements that uphold goddess worship like Neo-Paganism, we can observe how women in the modern world seem to be adopting theologies of sex and sexuality rooted in ancient thought systems, as that of
sacred sex in ancient Mesopotamia. The exploration of such ancient
practices that merged women, sex, and religion into an indistinct whole is
essential for understanding an ideology that is budding in our world today.
Therefore, I propose that all the scholarly contributions presented in this
review be taken into account, and a remodeling of the original question be
set in motion. Sacred sex practices, not sacred prostitution, should be further
explored so that the field can gain a clearer understanding of sacred sex in
religion. Kramer once reflected on the possibility of extant texts still buried
under the ruins of an ancient world, detailing the sacred marriage rite. Such
texts demonstrate that this field of study is in its early stages, with a great
deal left to discover.

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Süleyman the Magnificent’s (reign 1520 CE-1566 CE) ascension to the throne came at a time of economic prosperity, social tolerance, and military conquests for the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 16th century, Süleyman’s empire encompassed lands in Africa, Europe, and Asia in addition to the diverse cultures already present. His reign oversaw the transition of old Turkish\(^1\) tradition to the Golden Age of art, dating 1520 CE-1600 CE. Ruling with an iron fist, but accepting of differing beliefs, Süleyman’s motions as Sultan fostered an environment for artistic innovation that reflected the religious, political, economic, and social characteristics during the time of his reign.

The Ottoman Empire’s territory spanned to modern-day Greece and circled the Mediterranean basin, extending into the Arabian Peninsula and Africa (Imber, 2002). While a majority of the population identified as Muslim, many were Roman Orthodox, and smaller populations of Christian denominations and Jews existed throughout the territory (Imber, 2002). Judicially, the empire discriminated against non-Islamic religions, as evidenced by the fact that only Muslims were eligible for judicial offices or to become scribes (Clot & Reisz, 2005). Otherwise, non-Muslims faced little discrimination in daily life or in the potential for economic mobility.

\(^1\) The terms “Turkish” and “Ottoman” will be used interchangeably throughout this essay.
SÜLEYMAN THE MAGNIFICENT

The Sultan served as the great unifier of the many cultures and ruled as the most respected person in the empire. Typically, when a Sultan died, each son had an equal right to take his place and the heirs fought to the death, leaving the empire in a state of political turmoils. Süleyman, however, had a unique ascension because Selim I had all his nephews strangled, Süleyman claimed his seat peacefully as the sole heir (Clot & Reisz, 1989). Moreover, the stability of the state gave him the advantage of beginning his reign without the need to stabilize society. Süleyman actively ruled by leading and fighting alongside his warriors in ruthless expeditions. Motivated to end the European Christian rulers’ expansion in Eurasia, Süleyman's intense commitment can be seen in the bombardment of Hungary—a seizure that spanned a large portion of his reign, but that eventually ended in victory (Clot & Reisz, 1989). Süleyman embraced a lavish lifestyle, putting on vast displays on the day of his departure for conquest or even a walk to Friday prayer (Chapman & Carey, 2010). He believed his role to create a universal monarchy had been allotted by God, and his subjects viewed him, his palace, and his lifestyle as the epitome of Islamic and royal perfection (Clot & Reisz, 1989). He set about to expand the city of Constantinople by commissioning infrastructural projects, expanding the renowned bazaar, and summoning books, art, and artists from conquered countries to incorporate new artistic techniques.

In the prosperous and socially stable environment Süleyman erected, art flourished, and with a number of outside influences, the Turkish style became more distinct. As with other forms of Eastern art, Turkish artists employed geometric patterns on various mediums. Such complexity creates optical illusions to the viewer, especially when portrayed within a mosque where it seems to expand the rooms to a far greater size (Chapman & Carey, 2010). These patterns included circles, stars, lozenges, squares, and hexagons often interwoven with flora. In addition, Saz Composition came to be widely depicted on various art mediums. Artists depicted the Saz leaf, characterized
by long feathered edges and reminiscent of Chinese motifs, around angels and fighting animals (Zygulski, 1992). The Persian artist, Shahquli Baghdad, introduced this style during a time in which many Persians immigrated to Constantinople. Süleyman personally supported Baghdad’s work, asking him to stay as a palace artist (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Süleyman even reconstructed a wall in 1530 at Topaki Palace. With Persian immigration also came improved techniques involving paper mache, mother of pearl, and leather (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 231).

**RELIGIOUS MOTIFS AND INFLUENCE**

The Ottomans interwove their strong Islamic faith into society, politics, and economics. The court mainly comprised of people of the Sunni denomination, which stressed that Islamic ideals should be implemented into the law; the laws were irrefutable because they derived from God’s word (Ruthven, 1997). Religion became part of the daily routine in many respects as evidenced by the Five Pillars of Faith, which include reciting that “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is his messenger”—a phrase often written within works of art, performing five daily prayers, giving alms to the poor, fasting during Ramadan, and making a pilgrimage to Mecca at some point within an individual’s life. For these reasons, many motifs found throughout Ottoman artwork are rooted with religious meaning. For example, the use of cosmic images like the Sun, Moon and Stars represent celestial perfection and Heaven (Zygulski, 1992). The stars vary in number of points with the greater the number representing higher forms of magic (Zygulski, 1992, p. 44). Often times, the Moon appears in an elongated crescent where the points meet and form a circle, a shape symbolizing perfection. Another religious motif, czintamani, appeared in many art mediums. Comprised of three circles with a smaller dark circle within, and arranged in a triangle, this configuration symbolizes the power of sky, water, and earth (Zygulski, 1992, p. 45). Turkish artists, heavily influenced by
nature, utilized religious motifs to illustrate a relationship between their faith and the world around them.

Islamic faith influenced not only the details of artwork, but also the choice of the subject and its portrayal. Perhaps the most striking difference between Western and Islamic art can be seen in the depiction of people. While European artists of the Renaissance glorified the human body, showcasing its power, weaknesses, and raw emotions, Islamic-Ottoman artists portray people abstractly with little detail. Most forms of art depicted flora or geometric patterns over humans or animals, as Muslims believe that only God has the power to create a living being, and therefore, artists should not attempt to take His ability (Chapman & Carey, 2010). When living beings are chosen to be depicted, they are distorted so as to clearly show that the artist is not attempting to recreate life (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Artists often times substituted living subjects for mythological creatures to represent the power of Islam or the Sultan. For example, scenes of a fight between a phoenix and dragon represent a battle between good and evil (Zygulski, 1992).

While few in appearance, Turkish art was not completely devoid of the living image. The hand became an important symbol that represented the hands of the martyrs Ali and Hussain, two important figures worshipped in the Shiite denomination (Zygulski, 1992). Over time, the meaning expanded to represent all of the Prophet’s family, other heroes, and even featured Allah’s name or passages from the Quran. While sometimes appearing in a realistic form, artists often stylized the hand, and sometimes morphed it into a lily or other flower (Zygulski, 1992).

**ARTIFACTS OF THE PROPHET**

The Prophet Muhammad is the most important person within the Islamic faith, and as the religion’s founder, both his practices and conduct influenced art. During his Pilgrimages, the Prophet created a powerful army to spread Islam and left behind many possessions that were worshipped
within the Ottoman Palace. The collection included the holy banner, the “mantel of the Prophet, the sacred seal, the Prophet’s beard, the Prophet’s tooth, the footprint of the Prophet (in stone), the holy Koran, keys to the Kaaba, and historic bows and swords” (Zyguls, 1992, p. 20). His seal later became a common religious motif, and his bows and swords influenced the production of military and ornamental weaponry. Muslims forbade visual depictions of Muhammad unless an artist was skilled enough to do his image justice. If an artist illustrated Muhammad, the Prophet remained faceless, or veiled, to secure his holy presence (Ruthven, 2007).

Muhammad’s preaching was immortalized within the Quran, which is held with the highest respect and considered the greatest Islamic achievement. Muslims revere the ability to bind and translate God’s word to humans, and this sentiment gave birth to the art of calligraphy (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Furthermore, Muslims believe people should not contemplate God’s word, and should rather take it at face value (Ruthven, 1997). Handwritten copies of the Quran were most prized, called for meticulous accuracy, and were stylized beautifully. However, the scripture was never to be illegible on any medium, as the Quran represents God’s sole word without the interference of humans (Ruthven, 1997). Passages and names can be found on mosque walls, cups, pottery, flags, and paintings. The respect held for the Quran also applied to all books, and artists expressed special care towards the written word and the beauty of the cover (Chapman & Carey, 2005). Ottoman calligraphers created their own style of writing so smooth that the artist did not need to lift the brush (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 235).

Techniques used in calligraphy expanded to be incorporated in manuscript paintings, which were commissioned by the wealthy to record and depict science, history, and poetry (Chapman & Carey, 2005). The finished product usually showcased the patron’s name rather than the artist’s, and many times the Sultan would personally fund a project to demonstrate his wealth and support of these fields. These paintings and
other luxury art typically featured living figures. The Suleymanname, for example, recounted and glorified Süleyman’s rule, and Nakkash Osman recorded the sultan’s final years (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 233).

**POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND THE SPREAD OF ART**

During Süleyman’s reign, the empire embraced an era of religious and racial tolerance. The Ottoman borders encompassed a great amount of diverse terrain and people with different religions, customs, and languages. A political policy of religious tolerance relieved social tensions, a contributing factor to the internal peace of the Golden Age. Unlike his father, Selim I, Süleyman did not force any citizen to convert, each allowed to peacefully practice their own religion so long as the citizen remained loyal to the Sultan and paid an added low fine (Imber, 2002). Often, Jews and Christians established communities to pay a collective tax and worship together (Imber, 2002). Still, Jews and Christians who chose to live outside these communities had the opportunity for social mobility and economic prosperity. This time of social peace and encouragement of community, regardless of race and religion, led to an exchange of regional techniques and a flourishing of diverse art.

The Turkish government’s stress for tolerance has roots in their Islamic faith and the history of the Prophet Muhammad, who treated people of different races and monotheistic religions as equals. He adamantly declared that he had received revelations from the same God worshipped in Judaism and Christianity and while in Medina, he acted as a mediator between these rival factions (Ruthven, 1997). Notably, his role as a compromiser and the mutual respect he held with others would later impact the Ottoman Sultans’ peaceful assimilation of Christians and Jews into the empire.
MOSQUES IN CONSTANTINOPLE

In 1453, Sultan Mehmed II conquered the Byzantine city of Constantinople. Ideally located on the Mediterranean with easy access to Europe, Africa, and other trade routes, the city experienced a flourishing economy and served as a center for political and artistic endeavors. More than 50 years later, the city still embodied the former empire’s glory, from which Süleyman and other artists aimed to aesthetically transform the capital. This competitive spirit manifested in the desire to outshine the Hagia Sophia, a Byzantine Christian church of high artistry (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 218). Though it had been converted into a mosque, the building still represented Byzantine prosperity. The grandeur of the mosques erected under Süleyman not only reflects the power he felt as Sultan but also the might of the Ottoman Empire.

Mosques played an important role in the daily lives of the Turks and served as the primary expression of architectural artistry. The mosque functioned not only as a holy setting to pray, but also as a point for communal gatherings and education. In the teachings of the Quran, there is no mention of original sin, and it is therefore not necessary for a formal church to guide worship (Ruthven, 1997, p. 28). The act of reading and fulfilling the Five Pillars of Faith are signs enough of devotion. For this reason, there was never a sole institution that held the most power, in contradistinction to the concentrated power of the European Catholic Church. Vibrant mosques were scattered throughout the empire and provided a beautiful setting to conduct prayers.

The Ottomans developed a unique architectural style that set them apart from the other Islamic Empires. Under Selim I’s rein, the empire expanded to include the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, which led them to believe they were not only the greatest military power, but also religious power (Clot & Reisz, 2007). This, coupled with the economic prosperity and social stability of the empire, gave Süleyman the ability to construct elaborate mosques. Influenced by Byzantine architecture, Turkish
Art in the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire

artists came to erect mosques with a central dome surrounded by semi domes, giving the interior a feeling of expansiveness (Chapman & Carey, 2010, pp. 218-219). Surrounding the central dome were areas for socials gatherings and travelers such as inns, bathhouses, marketplaces, hospitals, libraries, and cemeteries (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 21). Some mosques, including the Suleymaniye mosque built during this time, became renowned medical schools and universities (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

One medium of art used directly in religious worship were carpets. Cast in red and blue tones, these carpets followed the style of calligraphy and featured passages from the Quran (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Unlike other art forms, the carpets were conservative in the use of motifs and fine details. Mosques usually provided a set of carpets that could be used by worshipers, and came complete with a bookstand so that the Quran never had to touch the floor (Chapman & Carey, 2010). The technique of producing the carpets was perfected with the conquering of Egypt as the Ottomans gained access to fine cotton, wool, and silk (Zygulski, 1992). Egyptian artists also introduced the use of green and bright red dyes, equipping Ottoman artists with a wider range of colors. The carpet’s beauty and intricacy caught the eye of European rulers, including King Henry VIII who amassed a large collection (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

Mimar Sinan (1489-1588), the greatest architect of the time, worked directly with Süleyman and the royal family to bring life to edifices that would rival those left behind by the Europeans. His work defines the classical era of Turkish architecture (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Sinan’s career spanned that of multiple sultans as he built hundreds of structures across the empire, including the Sehzade Mosque, Suleymaniye Mosque, and the Selimiye Mosque. With the Selimiye Mosque built in Edirne, Sinan believed he had finally constructed a building to rival the Hagia Sophia (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 221). The interior greatly deviated from the Byzantine style as it featured a central dome resting on eight arches (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Subsequent arches without pillars, coupled with
the calligraphy-inspired walls, gave the illusion of an immense amount of space. Glazed windows were strategically placed to allow in an abundance of light and outside, four skyscraping minarets were stationed around the main dome (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

The construction of the Suleymaniye Mosque forever solidified Süleyman as a patron of the arts. While following the same floor plan as the Hagia Sophia, Sinan employed two semi domes to elongate the interior and the high arches to demonstrate Turkish flair (Chapman & Carey, 2010). To build this structure, Süleyman called on both palace and city ceramists to create tiles.

**MILITARY POWER REFLECTED IN ART**

Since its formation under Osman I, the Ottoman Empire seemed to constantly spearhead conquest. Süleyman continued to conquer foreign lands and became involved in a war with Hungary as a result of “his duty as gazi to enlarge the territory of Islam; his ambition to create a universal monarchy; and his sense of the role he had been allotted by God” (Clot & Reisz, 2005, p. 55). Because of the many successful conquests under Süleyman, as well as the continued fighting and rebellion within Hungary, war-related imagery appeared in Turkish art. This state of military prowess, coupled with the Prophet’s history of war, led artists and metal workers to pay great attention to the efficiency and meaning behind each weapon produced (Zygulske, 1992).

Süleyman and other sultans were influenced by Islamic values to conquer foreign lands, as well as the legislate of jihad. Jihad envelops the duties of a practicing Muslim, including that of spreading Islamic faith (Ruthven, 1997). Jihad is split into two forms: The Greater and The Lesser. The Lesser jihad refers to the war against polytheists, while the Greater refers to the war against evil—a much broader interpretation (Ruthven, 1997). In both situations, a person had to exhibit strength, which, in art, became symbolized in battle scenes. Often times, this was shown through a
hunting scene between two animals such as a lion and deer, with the lion representing the strength of the Empire and Sultan (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 40).

WEAPONRY

War not only represented political and economic power, but also a means of fulfilling the Muslim duty. In the Golden Age, weaponry, flags, tents, and tughhs, all totems that conveyed religious meaning and were used in military formations, artfully incorporated religious symbolism to not only raise the morale of the soldiers, but also to show respect to the cause they fought for (Zygulski, 1992). Much of the military-related artwork depicted the Prophet Muhammad’s sword, Zulfiqar (Zygulski, 1992). Muhammad had obtained the sword during the Battle of Badr, where his forces were victorious in defeating the pagans living in Mecca. He carried it on every expedition thereafter, and it became an important symbol of strength and the power of Allah over false gods (Zygulski, 1992). The sword can be found on many flags, armory, and even replicates for battle and decoration. It has been depicted as a straight edge or curved sabre and, particularly during Süleyman’s time, was often portrayed as a split blade (Zygulski, 1992). Solomon’s seal, crescents, and inscriptions from the Quran were displayed along the hilt or borders, clearly linking the sword to Muhammad.

FLAGS

Flags came to be central to Ottoman military organization, and they were treated as an art medium. Their illustrations not only represented their empire and faith, but also served as essential elements in strategizing attacks. They used a hierarchal system wherein a specific style or size of flag represented the position and rank of an officer (Zygulski, 1992). Flags helped to coordinate movements and retreats to a specific officer when necessary, and different emblems characterized each unit. Typically, an Ottoman flag had a rectangular shape that ended in a triangular point (Zygulski, 1992).
In addition to use in war, flags were taken on the pilgrimage to Mecca. All flags, whether military or not, featured inscriptions from the Quran, usually around the border (Zygulski, 1992). These inscriptions comprised of slogans, names of prophets and heroes, and passages from the scripture. Therefore, it was seen as an honor to be a flag-bearer and carrier of Allah’s words. The flags also had copies of the Quran tied to the staffs, which symbolically showed that the warriors were willing to die for their faith (Zygulski, 1992). The soldiers who died in battle were believed to have been immediately accepted into Heaven without facing God’s judgment and their bodies did not need a funeral, as they were already pure as martyrs by virtue of the cause they fought for (Zygulski, 1992). The flags that belonged to the Sultan were used in religious ceremonies in the palace. The holy banner “Sancak-I serif” was worshipped as Muhammad’s, (though there is speculation as to whether it was actually his), and represented the Ottoman’s superior position as an Islamic military power (Zygulski, 1992). During his campaigns, Muhammad utilized a variety of flags that served as a powerful motivator. The Palace housed three sacred banners: one remained in the court, another stayed with the Sultan in battle, and the third stationed in the hands of the grand vizier. The flag was taken to battle and showed that the Prophet would protect his army (Zygulski, 1992).

In battle, the Sultan carried seven flags, and these flags represented “the number of iklims (climates or spheres of the earth) that were to be subdued by the victorious armies of Islam” (Zygulski, 1992, p. 25). The Sultan’s flag was always white, like Muhammad’s banner. As part of a Sultan’s inauguration, he received an opulent banner that could be used militarily or for display. These often became excessively large with intricate details, and could be hung like tapestries. During Süleyman’s period of expansion, gifts like flags and weaponry were often enlarged to glorify the power and expansiveness of the empire (Zygulski, 1992).
A PROSPERING ECONOMY

The Ottoman economy relied on relations with other empires and thrived under Süleyman as trade became a fundamental aspect of the Turkish economy, whether it involved transporting domestic goods across the vast empire or moving wares between Asia and Europe. Geographically, the Ottomans were stationed to gain access to the three drastically different markets of Asia, Europe, and North Africa. They became so successful that they eventually virtually held a monopoly over the Silk Roads, which pushed Europeans to begin exploring for new routes. The Prophet Muhammad, in fact, came from a family of merchants (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Thus, the Turks not only had the economic incentive, but also the religious justification to pursue a life of trade, because it provided an opportunity to preach their faith (Chapman & Carey, 2010). The annual pilgrimage to Mecca allowed Muslims all over the world to interact, spread ideas and information, reinforce their faith, and work together to achieve a common goal. The parties that travelled together seemingly created a mock city to have skilled people and wares for the long journey (Chapman & Carey, 2010). This helped to unite the various sectors of society. Along the way, forts, mosques, and inns reserved for traveling caravans called caravanserai were set up as safe places for the parties to rest, and also served as ideal trading grounds (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

Although the Turks had access to the European market, the empire had little interest in what Europe had to offer, and instead stayed within its borders and traded extensively with China. Many similarities can be seen between the Chinese and Ottoman designs. Following the Mongol invasion of the 13th Century, the Turks adopted Chinese motifs such as the dragon and phoenix (Zygulski, 1992). Like Islamic art, the Chinese rarely depicted humans and mainly decorated their pottery with flora and mythical creatures (Rogers, 1983). Both civilizations used the same symbols to represent similar ideas that led to beneficial artistic relations and similar market appeal.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND THE ECONOMY

Under the guild system, the Ottoman state controlled output, which became advantageous in the production of war materials (Zygulski, 1992, p. 103). To remain active in their faith by hosting and contributing to religious ceremonies, a group of ascetic Muslims known as dervishes led craftsmen guilds (Zygulski, 1992). This, coupled with the general increase in production under Süleyman, kept a steady flow of military and commercial products. In addition, the government-run Janissary system selected sons of Christian families between 10-12 years of age to receive rigorous military, religious, and academic training (Zygulski, 1992). The students who converted to Islam were guaranteed a career; depending on their success in school they received varying levels of power within their field. The Janissary system served as not only a way to secure competent political leaders, military personnel, and artists, and as a way to integrate subjects of different religions; militarily and politically, this created a loyal circle to support the Sultan (Clot & Reisz, 2005). The Janissary system also turned out highly-skilled artists who worked on court-commissioned projects.

As a result of a well-organized and efficient system of production, the common worker received higher income and had more purchasing power. The domestic market thrived, leading to a rise in the production of ornamental and unessential items (Ruthven, 1997). The famous covered bazaar was a center for trade and played an important role in making artistic wares profitable. Recognizing its importance to the economy, Süleyman expanded the bazaar. It served as an important social setting and site for the communication of news and ideas, and provided an opportunity to meet foreigners. Goods from all over the world were collected there, and the setting provided easy access to new techniques, inventions, and styles. Laws protected merchants and guilds by recognizing that no corporate entities which placed profits above the individual would be viewed as people before the law, (Ruthven, 1997). Thus, the economy called for self-regulation of
private enterprises, reasoning that without original sin, entrepreneurs were able to resist temptation (Ruthven, 1997).

With many successful conquests in a short amount of time, the Ottoman Empire acquired new lands with its own culture, lifestyle, and environment. The acquisitions opened access to exports and new markets to sell domestic goods. With each land conquered, the Sultan called regional artisans to Istanbul. There, the regional artisans worked for the palace and shared their techniques with local artisans (Chapman & Carey, 2010). For example, once Suleyman breached Hungary, he raided the library, seized the entire collection of books, and added them to the Library of Istanbul archives (Clot & Reisz, 2005).

**OTTOMAN SOCIETAL CONDUCT AND PRACTICES**

**CLOTHING**

With a complex population, Ottoman society had to find a way to organize itself, and, under Suleyman, class and gender distinction became more pointed and visible. In a push to standardize a nation of many ethnicities, great attention was turned to the clothing style of both the court and the citizens. He established a harsh dress code that reflected the social status of each individual and punished those who violated the code (Zygulski, 1992). The material of the clothing would illustrate the wealth of a person’s social class. The crown bestowed ceremonial robes to those who provided a service to the Sultan, and certain religious occasions warranted a specified dress (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

Iconic to the Turkish style is the turban. First used to protect the head against the Sun, the turban evolved into a status symbol, the significance of which fell into three stylistic categories. A simple wrap was reserved for the lower classes and minorities. The wrap on a cap was worn by privileged people (descendants of Muhammad) and took varied shapes such as cones or spikes; those embarking on a pilgrimage wore this style in green.
Finally, the turban worn exclusively by the Sultan and the high dignitaries was called a *selimi*. The *selimi* could be two feet high and was decorated with muslin, red fabric, and feathers (Zygulski, 1992, pp. 107-108). The feathers denoted bravery, and when a sultan died, his turban was placed upon his tomb and his dress bagged and saved alongside Muhammad’s belongings (Zygulski, 1992). Süleyman donned a single aigrette with one plume and the large size of the turban showcased the power he held (Zygulski, 1992). During ceremonies, the Sultan had two turbans to represent rule over both the Asiatic and European lands (Zygulski, 1992). Every Friday, the Sultan went out in public for prayer and wore equally elaborate clothing to match the procession (Chapman & Carey, 2010).

**RELIGION TRANSLATED TO LAW**

The strict clothing code represented just one aspect of the proper way in which Muslims were to present themselves in Ottoman society. Within the Quran, the books of *fiqh* outlined the proper way Muslims should conduct themselves. Translated into religious law as the Shari’a, and without a formal church, the Quran held a completely individualistic interpretation (Ruthven, 1997, p. 88). As a result of polygamy, patriarchal households, and unfair inheritance law favoring men, supremacist attitudes became prevalent in society. Women did not partake in the dress code in full, and instead entered the public almost completely covered in veils (Zygulski, 1992). Women were forbidden to occupy any position higher than provincial governor, and within that prohibition, were never recognized. However, the wives and concubines proved to be influential in the decisions the sultan made (Clot & Reisz, 2005). Süleyman eventually came to favor a particular slave and focused most of his energy on her, even though he maintained wives for political alliances with other countries.
FASCINATION WITH THE COURT LIFESTYLE

At this time, Topkapi Palace had taken the title as the official palace over one previously constructed in Edirne. The palace overlooks the Golden Horn, Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus straight, and differs from most European style palaces in its makeup of multiple buildings (Clot & Reisz, 2005). Each building required a person to hold a specific social or political level to gain access. The deeper one travelled into the palace, the more authority one had to hold, displaying a hierarchy of power within the political construct (Chapman & Carey, 2010). At one point, housing extensive gardens and hunting grounds, the palace served as a setting for intellectual discussion, opulence, military authority, and the empire’s greatness (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Sinan’s hand can be seen in the reconstruction of the Outer Treasury, Divan Hall, the Tower of Justice and the harem (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 221). The palace came to be a muse for many artists who held a fascination with its labyrinth layout of arches, towers, and domes and what took place within the walls.

During the Golden Age, the common population expressed great fascination to the private life of the royal family, and both European and Muslim artists turned their attention to the mystery-shrouded harem. Within the walls existed a hierarchy of women, the most powerful of whom dictated the rules of the house. Those that pleased the sultan were given great material rewards and those who spent the most time with the sultan were able to learn about politics and attempt to influence his decisions (Imber, 2002). These women served as a more emotional outlet for the sultan than his arranged marriages, which were used primarily for political strategies. Having affairs with concubines and slaves was a normal occurrence in the royal family, and a son out of wedlock was as equally qualified to ascend the throne as the son of a wife (Imber, 2002, p. 89). As a result, some slaves ended up being of higher social standing than citizens of the lower class, depending on which family owned them (Imber, 2002, p. 89).
These children were not born into slavery, and in the next generations, were able to live as free people.

**POLITICAL RELATIONS IN ART**

If art depicted any person, often it was the figure of the Sultan and the court lifestyle. The Sultan was the most important person in the empire: a descendent of Muhammad deemed the implementer of God’s word (Imber, 2002). The Palace oversaw political actions and served as the example of how the every-day man should base his life. It was the epitome of opulence and power, and many sacred ceremonies and intellectual events took place within its walls (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Under Süleyman, foreigners received a taste of the lifestyle, as he invited great thinkers and dignitaries of Europe and Asia to dine and discuss religion, art, politics, and other subjects (Clot & Reisz, 2002). A stark contrast to the tumultuous Europe, swept up in the bloody aftermath of the Protestant Reformation, the palace served as a civil environment to debate opposing ideologies without the threat of war.

The palace also housed artisans and turned out its own art and clothing. The artists were greatly rewarded when their creations satisfied the Sultan. The harsh threats and possible execution, served as motivation to achieve perfection (Zygulski, 1992). Both domestic artists and artists from the newly conquered lands were summoned to work for the Sultan (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Some stayed for a short amount of time and shared techniques with the local artists, while others became permanent residents of Constantinople.

The daily life of the Palace fascinated artists of this period. Artistic creations included the sultan and foreign dignitaries embarking on hunting trips, and other times depicted entertainment, romance, and the throne room. The settings were incredibly detailed, including the furniture, tableware, and architecture of the rooms. The royal was always depicted larger than the others, thus illustrating his encouragement for intellectual
and creative stimulation (Chapman & Carey, 2010). Focus was especially placed on the thinker’s leisure time such as the banquets, which were shown having an abundance of food and wine. The visitors were often portrayed as audiences listening to the sultan speak. Similarly, other scenes showed an artist with his head bowed giving a book to the sultan. These served to represent the sultan’s academic ability and, therefore, the intellectual right he had to the throne (Chapman & Carey, 2010, p. 43).

The resulting city of Constantinople is stunning and reflects the diversity of the empire. People from all over the empire and world flocked to experience the energy of the city. The exchange of ideas and techniques was supported by Süleyman the Magnificent who called for artisans of conquered countries to share their styles with the artists of Constantinople. In the architecture, there is an interesting combination of European and Islamic influence; the Islamic style, in turn, was influenced by the Chinese and cultures conquered during the empire’s expansion. Religious motifs played a strong role in the design of various mediums and gave a spiritual importance to artistic endeavors. Art of the 1500s reflected not only the political, economic, and social stance of the Ottoman Empire, but also the pride felt for their faith, empire, and Sultan. Foreign and domestic artists alike were able to leave lasting impressions on the empire and certainly created a unique Turkish style.

**REFERENCES**


This essay will attempt to explain how political and socio-economic changes in the Kaiserreich, i.e., Imperial Germany, from 1871 to 1918, affected people from different social groups and classes, and how those changes ultimately led to the rise of German imperialism. Apart from explaining these factors that led to the rise of German imperialism, I will also explain my understanding of why the anti-war/anti-imperialist socialists failed to challenge the aggressive policies of the Kaiserreich. By understanding how this new born state embraced imperialism and why the socialists failed, I hope my interpretation can make my readers aware of signs of imperialism today and know how to contain it, so that humankind can move closer towards peace.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE OF GERMANY

Before starting to analyze the rise of German imperialism, I shall first make clear the meaning of imperialism and the importance of the German example. By imperialism, I mean “a policy of extending a country’s power and influence through colonization, use of military force, or other means” (Gregory, Johnson, Pratt, Watts, & Whatmore, 2009). This definition might sound familiar but one should not think that imperialism was anything new to the late 19th century. It was only a variation of old time colonialism as in Columbus’ time. As historian Eric Hobsbawm (1989) explained, the word “imperialism” only gained its political meaning after the 1870s, when various strong powers started conquering colonies using never-before-seen scale and logic. Although imperialism also involves the quest for colonies, it is no longer merely a search for extractive colonies like in the old times,
where the mother country drained wealth and natural resources out of the colonies, but it is one that involves settler colonies in an effort to make the colony a part of the empire.

Another major difference between imperialism and the expansion of empires in the past is that in a “demystified” modern world, colonialism and imperialism simply could not be practiced from above by the ruling class like it was before, because they needed the general public’s popular support from below as well (Chen, 2010). In consideration of this, the example of Germany would be extremely important to us due to four aspects.

First, it was a newborn state in which the majority of the people lacked a pre-existing sense of national identity, but the country also remained highly active in the international arena of politics starting from its unification in 1871. In other words, by studying the making of Germany after the German unification, we might understand how national identities were formed or enhanced and how this could have led to imperialism. Second, since Germany turned towards capitalism and became the fastest growing economy on the continent in the late 19th century, its social structure changed dramatically and its need for overseas markets also grew rapidly. This implies that the relations between imperialism and the socio-economic changes caused by the development of capitalism would be easier to observe with the German example. I believe this would allow my readers to have a clearer understanding of the economic dimension of imperialism. Next, if we recall that Germany was once under Otto Von Bismarck—the most talented and cautious statesman of his time—the German example might show us that the rise of imperialism could not be stopped, even by a brilliant leader like Bismarck. Finally, the German example could also help us understand the inability of the anti-war/anti-imperialist socialist movement, because Germany had the strongest working-class movement in the world before the outbreak of the war in 1914. From here, we can begin our analysis by studying the political and socio-economic changes in the Kaiserreich.
SOURCES OF GERMAN IMPERIALISM

EFFECTS OF THE CHANGE OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

After the Prussia-led unification of Germany in 1871, Prussia’s emphasis on industries became the national policy and spread to other agricultural states like Bavaria. Farmlands were turned into factories and farmers were turned into workers. This significant change of the economic structure, after Germany’s unification, created a strong need and a strong support for German imperialism. Benefiting from the boom of the Second Industrial Revolution, dating around the 1840s, industry and commerce gradually replaced the predominant role of agriculture (Berghann, 1994). Back in the 1880s, 35-40 percent of Germany’s Gross National Product (GNP) was comprised of agricultural production, while industry was slightly behind, contributing 30-35 percent to the GNP. Yet, by 1913, despite its increase in size, Germany’s agricultural industry was only contributing 25 percent to the GNP, where the shares of industry and commerce rose to 45 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Berghann, 1994). Even though historians often claimed that Germany, at that time, had not fully transferred from an agricultural state to an industrial state, like Britain, the decline of agriculture was clear enough (Smith, 1974).

This drastic change created several different social groups, including the industrialists who benefited from this change and a large amount of former peasants and landlords, who wished to preserve or regain their lost lifestyle and privileges (Berghann, 1994). With the formation of these new social groups, two different colonial ideologies arose, namely the economic viewpoint and the emigrationist viewpoint (Smith, 1974).

THE INDUSTRIALISTS AND THE ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT: EFFECTS OF THE GROWING INDUSTRY

The industrialists were the powerful supporters of the economic viewpoint. Due to the tendency of capitalist production to lower production
costs and to expand markets, the industrialists were desperate to expand their businesses. With those calculations in mind, many industrialists were largely influenced by economist Friedrich List’s claims of creating a “centre/periphery” model, in which overseas colonies could bring raw materials and new markets to Germany and help solve their problems. They believed this would help create an industrialized Germany and would only bring them more wealth (Smith, 1974). Consequently, the industrialists started playing a more active role in politics, hoping that they would have the ability to move the government to serve their interests.

This thirst of the industrialists in pushing the government towards an empire only grew stronger after the 1873 economic crash (Smith, 1974). Having identified overproduction as the cause of the 1873 depression, German industrialists demanded the building of an even stronger imperial Germany. They believed that if the government could act aggressively and make true their demand for an empire, they could earn more than an overseas market. To the industrialists, a German empire would also mean new contracts from the government, where the building of battleships and infrastructure in the colonies could solve their problem of overproduction and help fill their wallets (Smith, 1974). A horrifying example can show us how such a thirst could bring about destructive consequences. In 1908, by making a false report to the newspaper saying that the French government planned to double its stock of machine guns, a German arms making firm managed to get the German government to order a large amount of machine guns from them. The 40-million-mark order was so huge that it raised the firm’s dividends by 12 percent, and also brought about increased German expansion and increased tensions between European states (Hobsbawm, 1989). The consequences that arose from the industrialists’ thirst for profits turned Germany towards imperialism and global conflict.
THE AGRICULTURAL POPULATION AND THE EMIGRATIONIST VIEWPOINT:
EFFECTS OF THE DYING AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY

While the industrialists profited from the changing economic structure and stimulated the economic viewpoint, those who lost their farmlands and village-life became the supporters of the emigrationist view. Starting from the second half of the 19th century, the process of rapid industrialization turned countless small-scale farmlands into factories or workshops. Due to such changes, it became very common for poor peasants to leave Germany in the hopes that they might be able to start a new life somewhere else, after they were no longer able to feed themselves through the agriculture (Hobsbawm, 1989). Besides affecting the peasants, the process of industrialization also drove a huge amount of landlords out of their own lands (Hobsbawm, 1989). They wished to keep their wealth and privileges by diverting their investments somewhere else (Hobsbawm, 1989). To both the peasants and the landlords, a German colony, if it existed, would be the best place for them to go, because it would allow them to keep their citizenship and they would not have to enter an unknown world (Smith, 1974). Consequently, they came up with the emigrationist view which demanded that the German government give its people a good life by expanding overseas and provide them with a place in which to migrate to.

It is important to note that the emigrationist view was not limited to those people, but was also influential on the government. Starting from the 1840s, a large amount of Germany’s agricultural population chose to live elsewhere. Even though, at the same time, there was an influx of new emigrants to Germany, the majority of these newcomers moved to big cities, like Berlin, and the great loss in Germany’s agricultural population was never really restored (Berghann, 1994). This loss of agricultural population made the German government fear that the German economy might suffer a big blow. Losing these people did not just put into question the stability of the supply of food, but also introduced new labor forces and, therefore, a boost to other European powers (Hobsbawm, 1989). In the hope of solving
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this emigration problem and preventing social unrests which were caused by social discontents of the affected people, the government also supported the emigrationist view (Smith, 1974).

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GEO-POLITICS AND GROWING TENSIONS

A report from the British government and the moves of the German navy in China showed how the two colonial ideologies—economic/emigrationist—affected German imperial policies and caused growing tensions between Germany and other European states. For example, in 1900, the British government published the “Report on the German Colonial Estimates for 1900.” This report clearly mentioned that “the supporters of a German colonial policy advocated their maintenance as an outlet for the German surplus population and as a field for German trade” (Parliamentary Papers, 1900). Here, both the economic viewpoint, i.e., a field for German trade, and the emigrationist viewpoint, i.e., an outlet for the surplus population, were explicitly mentioned. The British government’s strong emphasis on Germany’s colonial policy meant a lot, because Britain was still the key player in the global economy and they paid great attention to any trends that may have affected British supremacy. In other words, the report showed that the German public’s demand for expansion, i.e., the two colonial ideologies, imposed a real threat to the British government and had therefore negatively affected Anglo-German relations.

THE COMPETITION FOR STRATEGIC STRONGHOLDS AND ITS AFTERMATH

While the report already showed signs of how Germany’s own economy, through the two growing ideologies, could mean a threat to other countries and lead to worsening international relations, the details of the concession of Kiautschou Bay in China illustrated a similar point. Germany’s aggression over Kiautschou Bay was not arbitrary, but had a long history that could be traced back to the 1870s. After his stay in China between 1868 and 1871, geographer Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen
suggested the German government take over Kiautschou Bay, a place with sufficient coal supplies and a short distance from the Chinese capital, Beijing. In 1895, Adolf Marschall, the Foreign Minister of Germany, demanded that the German Navy suggest a desirable spot in China which could act as a coal station or a naval base. In reply to Marschall, von Richthofen’s arguments are seen echoed in German Vice Admiral Max Rollmann’s report (Huang, 2006). These details of the concession of Kiautschou Bay showed that Germany’s colonial policies were largely based upon economic and geopolitical calculations. While the capturing of Kiautschou Bay further clarified the significance of the economic viewpoint in bringing about an imperial Germany, I would like to point out that Germany’s geopolitical calculations were shared by other European countries. For instance, Britain captured Aden and Seychelles to have them serve as coal stations and strategic strongholds, so that Britain could control the sea line between Europe, Asia and Africa (Levine, 2007). Although this kind of thinking did not cause too much of a problem when Britain was the only economic superpower, it certainly did not work out smoothly when all the new players, like Germany, used the same approach to capture strategic strongholds. It is clear that when a more competitive global market meets with the thirst for colonies, relations between different countries could worsen rapidly and growing tensions would likely follow.

NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND THE USE OF NATIONALISM

While socio-economic factors were crucial in leading to German imperialism, the significance of political changes should not be overlooked. The first important political change was the rise of opposition powers that had a chance to disturb the absolute rule of the Kaiserreich. Having experienced a change of economic structure, growing industries brought Germany with its antithesis, i.e., a growing working class (Berghann, 1994). To the German ruling class, the lessons of the 1848 revolutions over Europe reminded them that the empire could be seriously threatened if these
working class people turned into revolutionary socialists (Hobsbawm, 1995). In fact, working class struggles at the time were so powerful that during the period of the Paris Commune, Germany—still Prussia at that time—even sided with its longtime enemy, the French government, to suppress the Communards (Marx, 1871).

Besides the growing working classes, the unification of Germany also meant that the Kaiserrreich had to face other oppositions directly. For instance, the Liberals demanded democratization and opposed the centralization of power in the hands of Berlin, thus posing a threat to the ruling classes (Pflanze, 1955). Facing all these fears brought up by a new political environment, Bismarck was forced to use the rhetoric of Nationalism to defend the Kaiserrreich. The only problem was that this use of Nationalism did not go as Bismarck planned and ended up being Germany’s biggest problem.

BISMARCK’S USE OF NATIONALISM

One might see Bismarck’s calculation in many of his speeches. An example of this would be his speech to the Prussian Landtag, in which he claimed that “we have no cause to nourish any other than a German national patriotism” (Pflanze, 1955, p. 557). By condemning the socialists as “anti-German” on one hand, and ending the Liberals’ link with the national cause on the other, Bismarck believed that he could use Nationalism to serve in the interest of the Kaiserrreich and the Junker class, i.e. the nobles (Berghann, 1994; Pflanze, 1955). Although the greatest concern of Bismarck in the early 1870s was the safety of Prussia, scholars have noticed that under the pressures from the Liberals and the working class people, his concerns over the “political nation,” i.e., Germany led by Prussia, slowly joined with his concerns for the “cultural nation,” that is, a Germany that was based on cultural identity (Pflanze, 1955). It is not uncommon for one to find Bismarck’s speeches inflammatory. Historian Otto Pflanze, in his article, “Bismarck and German Nationalism” (1955), has provided a typical example
of Bismarck’s speeches in one of his works, and the speech fits perfectly with our definition of imperialism:

May it be our holy duty to nourish a strong and proud national sentiment and also to impregnate [our] children with the doctrine that the German, as soon as he crosses his border, loses in prestige if he cannot say that fifty million Germans stand united behind him, ready to defend German interests and German honor.

The bond which holds us inseparably together was formed from a mixture of blood, wounds, and death on the battlefield of St. Privat, from deeds performed in common under the attack of the hereditary foe who threatened our nationality and had need to destroy our unity...history reveals that unity is most firmly established by comradeship in war. (p. 559)

With Bismarck’s influential and popular public speeches before and after 1890, the German public had started to view the Kaiserreicht as a “national state” (Pflanze, 1955). However, to use nationalism to fight the threats of social discontents is like playing with fire. Bismarck himself was cautious enough of the possible dangers, and he always wanted to prevent chauvinistic nationalism and Pan-German thoughts from developing. He believed that by carefully playing with nationalism, the problem of Austria-Hungary could be left aside, Pan-Germanism, and his own statesmanship of “balance of powers” could lower the hard-feelings of other European powers, especially that of Britain and France (Pflanze, 1955). It might be so that the newborn state would not be threatened if those policies were worked out smoothly, but Bismarck’s many calculations were not perceived by the public (Pflanze, 1955). As a result, when the more aggressive and more careless William II became the new Kaiser in 1890, the Kaiser’s inadvertent passion quickly turned German nationalism into aggressive imperialism (Pflanze, 1955; Smith, 1974). From here, one might see that in dealing with the political issues, Bismarck unintentionally prepared the German public to support the new Kaiser’s aggressive Weltpolitis, i.e., World Policy, a plan that aimed at making Germany a global power.
BISMARCK’S WAR AGAINST THE CATHOLICS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The importance of Bismarck the “Blood and Iron” prime minister did not stop here, because he also dealt with the political challenges brought forth by the Catholics. Bismarck was a Lutheran, and this made the Catholics in Germany fear that a Prussian/Protestant-led unification would destroy all the privileges of the Church. The formation of the Catholic Centre Party in 1870, just one year before the unification of Germany, was clearly a way to preserve the influence of Catholicism. Yet, this move by the Catholics also worried Bismarck and other bureaucrats, as the Vatican had disturbed the political powers that stood against the church in Italy and France, and the link between Catholics and the Vatican had always been unclear (Hobsbawm, 1989). Having learned from the case of Italy, the German ruling class wanted to dissolve the power of the Catholics once and for all. In order to achieve this goal, Bismarck started the Kulturkampf, i.e., the Culture War—an attack on the Catholics between 1871 and 1878. He made clear that if the Catholics wanted to preserve their status, they need to work with the Reich. As a result, the Catholic Centre Party introduced different Nationalistic ideas and moved closer to the government, hoping that they could protect their own power by bandwagoning (Pflanze, 1955). The Catholic leaders spread nationalism to the common Catholics, and ordinary Catholics believed that voting for the Centre Party was the best way to survive Bismarck’s attack on Catholicism. The malice of the Kulturkampf brought forward the German government’s growing aggressiveness, and had the popular support of the Catholics. As the Catholics helped popularize the official Nationalist rhetoric and ideology, Germany moved even closer towards imperialism.

THE GROWTH OF EDUCATION AND THE PRINTING INDUSTRY: A FURTHER PUSH

While the political and socio-economic changes created much support for an imperial Germany, the growth of education and print media gave this support a further push. The government’s nationalist propaganda
was magnified by the increase of the literate population through education and the growth of the print media. Public education in Germany grew sufficiently after the unification. Between 1864 and 1911, students attending public primary schools, middle schools and high schools increased (see Appendix, Table 1). This means that more people had read the official ideologies such as the works of Bismarck, which were often collected in textbooks. It is therefore not surprising that Bismarck (as quoted in Pflanze, 1955) exclaimed “our national future lies to a great extent in the hands of the German teachers. The schools have a very healthy influence upon our national institutions” (p. 559).

Ideology not only worked under the state’s initiation; it was also driven by the ‘civil society’. With education, the illiteracy rate dropped to below 10 percent, and more people started to read on their own. Although the huge growth of publications was created by both the Left and the Right, the “anti-Nationalist” Left was still the minority (Berghann, 1994). As a result, the literate German people were generally more familiar with the official ideology, because they undoubtedly had easier access to different nationalistic views. Borrowing Benedict Anderson’s (2006) insights, we can find that the developments in print media and education helped building up the “imagined community” among fellow Germans. The fact that most of the nationalist associations grew drastically in size should give us a better understanding of how the political and socio-economic changes mentioned above could have been boosted by education and the print media.

**FAILURES OF THE ANTI-WAR/ANTI-IMPERIALIST SOCIALISTS**

**UNWELCOMED BY THE STATE AND THE PUBLIC**

Having studied the reasons behind the popular support for German imperialism, we shall turn to answer why the anti-imperialist socialists failed to stop the aggressive acts of the Kaiserreich. Although in Germany at that time, socialists included radicals that supported different schools of thought
or tools of analysis, they all held the basic socialist view that capitalism must be put to an end. With their shared belief in overthrowing the current system, the socialists first failed because they were considered some sort of a public enemy. To the German ruling class, the socialists were their greatest nightmare, as they demanded democratization and the overthrowing of capitalism. Many of the socialists even supported Marxist demands and tried to “expropriate the expropriators” by replacing private properties with public ownership. Due to the proven effectiveness of the state apparatus in crushing the Catholics, Bismarck decided to use it to deal with socialism. With the introduction of the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1878, the socialists could hardly organize openly. Even if the socialists were not entirely dissolved, the laws definitely hindered the spread of socialism. Because of this, the socialists could only increase their influence by organizing less radical organizations, such as singing clubs and arts groups, but could hardly recruit radicals (Berghann, 1994). Hence, more radical socialists, such as those that supported Marxism, could only reach out to greater popular support until the end of the laws in 1890.

As mentioned, socialists were considered to be public enemies, so much so that much of the public showed no opposition to the Anti-Socialist Laws. Since most socialists were atheists and internationalists, socialists slogans, such as “the workers have no fatherland,” disturbed many common people (Berghann, 1994). Between 1905 and 1914, the membership of the Socialist Party (SPD) remained lower than the membership of other German trade unions (see Appendix, Table 2). This suggests that although the German working class was very active, socialism was something more than fighting for proper wages. Moreover, as described in the SPD’s 1891 Erfurt Program, the voting system in Germany was highly unfavourable to the socialists. As a result, even though the SPD won the most votes in every Reichstag election after the Anti-Socialist Laws were cancelled in 1890, they did not replace the Centre Party as the largest party until 1912 (see Appendix—Table 3). The German socialists had to face challenges from the
ruling classes, the political/electoral system and many ordinary people. These challenges made them weak, if not powerless, in stopping the German colonial expansion that erupted since the late 1870s. When they finally became the largest party in 1912, it was already too late to stop German imperialism.

WEAKNESSES OF THE SOCIALISTS

The socialists certainly faced many hardships, alas they were also blamed for their own failures. The disputes over the SPD’s 1875 Gotha Program showed that the SPD was not very radical in its early years and it therefore did not fight actively against German imperialism (Marx, 1875). At that time, under the strong influence of Ferdinand Lassalle, an early socialist leader in Germany, not many SPD members were militant. In fact, many of the SPD members even admired Bismarck and believed he would bring about a socialist Germany, just as Lassalle himself believed (Ryder, 1967). It is hard to think that they would act against German imperialism, as German imperialism was believed to be something good for the Nation. The truth is, it was only until after the 1878 Anti-Socialist Laws that more socialists started to agree with Marxist analysis and come up with a more radical party program in 1891, i.e. The Erfurt Program. This highly ambiguous take towards the German state was later met with Eduardo Bernstein’s Revisionism inside SPD, and it only made the analysis and attitude of the SPD over German expansion even more unstable (Engels, 1891). All this meant that the German socialists did not always see German expansion as an aggressive act of imperialism, and the anti-imperialist line was not always the official party line. It is no wonder that a SPD member who won the Iron Cross in 1914 wrote ironically that, “how will anyone be able to say we do not love our fatherland when after the war so and so many thousands of our good party comrades say ‘we have been decorated for bravery’” (Hobsbawm, 1989).
Following along with the argument that German socialists were responsible for their own failures, Perry Anderson’s argument, which explains that the leaders of the German socialists, like Karl Kautsky, were not very familiar with revolutionary socialism until the final years of the 19th century, could help us understand the weaknesses of the socialists to a greater extent (Anderson, 1989). When a total war finally seemed inevitable, the German socialist leaders took the side of the state instead of agreeing with Lenin’s more radical anti-war line. To the leaders, their take was revolutionary, because they believed, like the Russian socialist leader Georgi Plekhanov (1905), that a Russian victory over Germany would mean a big blow to the international socialist movement. For this reason, the majority of SPD deputies (108 out of 110) supported the war credits in the Reichstag in 1914. However, many socialists from the younger generation, such as Lenin (1917) and Rosa Luxemburg, criticized the German socialist leaders for failing to grasp the dialectical conception of nationalism and the development of historical stages.

Having failed to realize the power of the working class, socialists from older generations became the supporters of the imperialist state of Germany. It was under such misery that Lenin praised Karl Liebknecht and Otto Rühle, the only two SPD deputies who “violated party discipline” and voted against the war credit as the only representatives of socialism in the Reichstag (Lenin, 1917). It was under this same background that Rosa Luxemburg described the SPD which was led by the older socialists as a “stinking corpse” that failed to fight imperialism (Lenin, 1917). These events might not fully explain the failure of the socialists, but it should at least be clear that the socialists were dragged by both external and internal hardships, and that they could not fight against German imperialism but had to be a part of it.
CONCLUSION

German imperialism did not appear naturally, but was made possible by “top-down” and “bottom-up” support that was largely caused by different political and socio-economic changes. Economically, a growing capitalist industry resulted in the influential economic viewpoint and the emigrationist viewpoint. Due to the fact that both viewpoints created pressure for Germany to expand, Germany’s increasing aggression in the global market caused conflicts between it and other European states. Politically, Germany’s unification in 1871 increased the State’s pressure, stemming from its oppositions. The State then needed to use the rhetoric of nationalism and a high-hand policy to suppress its oppositions. As the oppositions tried to protect themselves by supporting the government’s talk of nationalism, the German public was strongly affected by German nationalism and provided strong support for an imperial Germany. With the rapid developments of education and print media, the economic and political factors were further magnified, and the move towards an imperial Germany was more or less irreversible.

Although the socialists belonged to a rather different group, their unconventional beliefs and demands made them less popular among the common people. They were thus weak in fighting off the government’s oppression and had little strength in turning Germany away from imperialism. Moreover, as the key leaders of the German socialists failed to see the danger of German Imperialism and believed that they must help Germany defeat Russia, they joined the German government in 1914 and there was no more hope in stopping the Great War.

All these factors carried Germany through many contradictions and hardships, which directed the masses and the ruling elites, such as Bismarck, to turn towards what they believed to be the cure, namely German imperialism. It was due to these developments of history that mankind needed to face the final tragedy that erupted in 1914. This pricey lesson of the rise of German imperialism taught us that once the objective needs, e.g.
the demand for an ever-expanding market, and subjective desires, e.g., the public’s thirst for pride, for imperialism join, even the most talented statesman like Bismarck cannot stop a conflict from happening. Hence, if we were to prevent another war in the future, we do not just have to be wary of any political and socio-economical changes that might create a similar predicament to mankind, but we also have to learn from the mistakes of the socialists and avoid being a blind supporter of an empire.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

TABLE 1: PATTERNS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN PRUSSIA, 1864 – 1911
(BERGHANN, 1994, P. 317)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of pupils (000s)</th>
<th>Year 1864</th>
<th>Year 1886</th>
<th>Year 1911</th>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>2825</td>
<td>4838</td>
<td>6572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Schools</td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>260</td>
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TABLE 2: TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND SPD MEMBERSHIP, 1905-1914—IN 000s (BERGHANN, 1994, P. 337)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Free TUs</th>
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<th>Hirsch-Dunker</th>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1345</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>1653</td>
<td>384*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2455</td>
<td>720</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2549</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>3024</td>
<td>983</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2437</td>
<td>1086</td>
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*Figure for 1906
TABLE 3: REICHSTAG ELECTION RESULTS, 1890-1912—VOTES IN MILLIONS
(BERGHANN, 1994, P. 343)

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<tr>
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<td>2.107</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>3.011</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>1907</td>
<td>3.259</td>
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<td>2.180</td>
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<td>1912</td>
<td>4.250</td>
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<td>1.997</td>
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(TABLE 3 CNTD.)

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<th></th>
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<th>Conservative</th>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1.663</td>
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The Mechanisms in Social Movements ‘Turned Violent’: The Case of Paraguay

Sierra Marcelius

Neoliberal economics and the global development project has been heralded as the best and most efficient way for a country to transition from “developing” to “developed”. However, the low cost production model does not account for the human cost of structural inequality and its consequences. In Paraguay, the continued highly unequal distribution of land and wealth and government policies that benefit large soy producers couple to create food and health insecurity within the large campesino—the traditional rural farmers of Paraguay—and small indigenous populations. But the extreme land inequality, the human insecurity, and the social group disadvantage of the populations did not create the violence by itself; other factors—in this case, the criminalization of protests, the militarization of the police, and continued corruption—induced state weakness and sparked violence. These factors changed the nature of the social and power dynamics between the government and the people. This paper will first outline the theoretical concepts to be used in analyzing the conflict in Paraguay and then apply those concepts to the case study by analyzing the conditions in the country and how the people and the government have responded to those conditions.

Theoretically, people who feel their human rights have been violated or who are living with constant human insecurity will, assuming conditions allow, organize to improve their human security—defined as “freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity” (“Human Security For All,” 2015). The likelihood that this will occur increases if human insecurity is felt only in a specific social group, creating social group disadvantage—the marginalization or exclusion of a particular social group
in the social, economic and political spheres of their society, such as civil society, the industry of their choosing and all levels of government, respectively. People are more likely to organize if they are a part of a disadvantaged social group, because social divisions lend themselves very well to framing, recruiting, organizing and ultimately succeeding in having a group’s demands to improve their human security met (Gurr, 2007, pp. 136, 140). However, according to author Charles King (2007), “violence is not a stage of social mobilization; it is a wholly different type of social interaction, one with its own causes, dynamics, power relationships, and life cycle” (p. 116). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between violence and social movements, despite a host of similarities and connections. A common cause to both social movements and violence, the focus of this analysis, is structural violence. Food insecurity, or the lack of “access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life,” is an aspect of structural violence when it is built into the social structure and institutionalized by the political economy of a country (“Food Security,” 2015). Author Lisa Schirch (2006) explains, “when societies are structured in ways that deprive people or fail to protect their rights, people may behave in ways that cause destruction to themselves or others. Structural violence begins a cycle of violence” (p. 68). However, because of the asymmetrical power structure between the state and the people, this violence is often not sustained conflict in the traditional sense, but instead, patterned sporadic violence (King, 2007). However protracted, even if sporadic, violent conflict only actualizes in weak states, usually caused by corruption for two reasons: 1. because weak states do not provide human security, and 2. because weak states do “not have a monopoly on the use of force within its borders” or a respected rule of law (Rotberg, 2007, pp. 85, 87). Because weak states simultaneously neither provide human security nor maintain order, peaceful social movements in weak states demanding change are more likely to become ineffective and devolve into violence. When all these conditions combine, violent conflict is likely to break out, and indeed has in Paraguay.
Utilizing the Paraguayan case as the typification of structural violence causing social movements to turn violent, this paper will analyze the recent violence in Paraguay and draw from the theoretical concepts outlined involving human insecurity, social group disadvantage, structural violence, state weakness and the state’s relation to conflict.

Paraguay’s political economy is characterized by high land inequality that has its roots in the era of its former military dictator, Alfredo Stroessner. This inequality continues and worsens with current policies, creating a large landless campesino population subject to food and human insecurity. During Stroessner’s reign from 1954-1989, the dictator gave large tracts of government land to his family, friends, supporters and foreign investors, leaving a large proportion of the campesinos without land and a small elite known as the “agribusiness elite” with disproportionate control over the government (“Paraguayan Guerrilla,” 2014). Today, the agribusiness elite, particularly the soybean industry, dominates and controls the Paraguayan economy and the land. In 2008, 80% of arable land was held by 1.6% of landowners: the Gini Index for land concentration was .94; and approximately 36% of the rural population owned less than 10 hectares, which is the minimum amount needed to maintain a family’s economy (Guereña, 2013; see Appendix 1 for more information on Paraguayan land inequality). This phenomenon started and perpetuates because of state corruption: Stroessner gave large tracts of land to his supporters, and President Lugo, who campaigned on land reform and held office from 2008 until 2012, failed to implement any new substantial policies regarding land reform or redistribution (Nagel, 1999; Gilbert & Catalina, 2013). Instead, President Lugo and his successor, President Cartes, continued with policies favoring the agribusiness elite, such as the budgetary policies started in the late 1990s that allocate about 70% of the agriculture budget towards subsidies. These policies benefit agribusiness and distribute only 5% of the budget towards family farms. The tax system also benefits the agro-export business, as soy producers do not pay taxes on their exports. These exporters
pay up to 23.5 times lower annual property taxes than in other Latin American countries, and enjoy both tax exemptions on imports for capital investment and easy access to credit (Guereña, 2013). Essentially, because agribusiness has been allowed to control the Paraguayan political economy for so long, their privilege in the country has become institutionalized, creating human insecurity in the large campesino population and indigenous tribes living in the rural and forest areas.

The campesinos are the largest population dispossessed and targeted by agribusiness, and the industry’s practices create human insecurity in various ways. The first and most extreme is displacement and consequent landlessness; there are approximately 300,000 landless Paraguayans, and 53% of campesinos live in poverty (Zibechi, 2014). “Development-induced” migrants, like the landless campesinos, face the same challenges as refugees in acquiring work, including discrimination and lack of access to aid (Martin & Schoenholtz, 2006, p. 408). However, because campesinos largely rely on their family farms to provide food for their families, these transient, migrant conditions contribute to their food insecurity. In fact, 60% of food consumed in Paraguay is grown by campesinos, although they own only 6.6% of the land (Guereña, 2013). Because landless campesinos face discrimination, lack access to aid, are unwanted workers in an already weak economy, and are forced to sell their land, they migrate to the cities; yet once they settle in these cities, they find themselves in extreme poverty from the lack of employment opportunities (Guereña, 2013; Illich, 2014, p. 3). This cycle contributes generally to the high rate of poverty cited and directly to food insecurity, with 34% of the country’s population facing systematic malnourishment (Illich, 2014, p. 56). While malnourishment is a major threat to campesino health, the routine and targeted spraying of pesticides poisons and kills campesinos living on agribusiness property or in the direct vicinity, disproportionately affecting pregnant women and children. Although there are restrictions on the types of chemicals that can be sprayed and procedures that are supposed to protect the campesino population,
these restrictions and procedures are inadequate and often not respected (Zibechi, 2014; Gilbert & Catalina, 2013). The fumigations not only poison and kill the campesinos living in the area through direct contact, but also contaminate their groundwater supply and kill their farm animals, further contributing to food insecurity (Gilbert & Catalina, 2013). Moreover, in a blatant violation of livelihood and existence to the campesinos and the indigenous peoples, the Paraguayan government has outlawed the diagnosis of illnesses related to pesticides by health professionals (Illich, 2014, p. 38). These fumigation practices lead to further displacement of campesinos, whom often have no choice but to leave the area or risk being poisoned (Gilbert & Catalina, 2013). Finally, the agribusiness contributes to campesino poverty by extorting the land, dispossessing the campesinos of their lands and livelihood resources, and barring access to employment in the campesinos’ traditional vocation. Because soy production is highly mechanized, it only provides a few highly trained jobs to farm managers and equipment operators. The asymmetric model of jobs per acre of soy forces campesinos into unemployment and the resulting poverty, often characterized by landlessness and food insecurity (Elgert, 2013, p. 8). Overall, the agribusiness elite, who have disproportionate control over government policies, create human insecurity by contributing to poverty and food and health insecurity within the campesino population. These elites actualize insecurity by extorting campesino lands and poisoning their water supplies, livestock, and the campesinos themselves.

The indigenous peoples of Paraguay are also targeted by the dominance of agribusiness in the political economy. While “only 55% of the indigenous communities have their own land”, the Paraguayan government is extremely slow to act on legal claims relating to land ownership, and does not protect the indigenous peoples from agribusiness or campesinos, rendering astronomical human insecurity in the indigenous communities (Pero Ferriera, 2012, p. 9). Like the campesinos, the indigenous peoples suffer from targeted fumigations by soybean producers; in 2009, for
instance, five Avá Guaraní communities were targeted with the spraying of pesticides after lawyers saved them from an eviction, contaminating their water supply and causing 200 people to become ill. Targeted fumigations are just one of many threats from the political economy to the indigenous populations’ human security. Another threat is poverty, with rates in indigenous communities being 7.9% times higher than the rest of Paraguay’s population (Pero Ferriera, 2012, pp. 2, 4, 8; see Appendix 2). The indigenous people also rely on the land for livelihood and cultural and religious identity, making extortion of their land a severe violation of Article 8 of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“United Nations Declaration,” 2008). Of all the indigenous communities, the Ayoreo face even greater dangers, because several of their tribes have remained uncontacted. Recently, agribusiness has encroached on their land, despite the land being a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve. If these people are contacted, and there is satellite evidence suggesting they may already have been, they face severe threats of displacement, external diseases for which they have no immunity, and the destruction of their environment on which they rely for food, shelter, livelihood and cultural identity (“Paraguay Grants License,” 2013). In sum, the human insecurity that the indigenous communities face is contemporarily severe, because the communities are targeted by the state, the agribusiness elite and the campesino population. If the targeting continues, the indigenous communities could be threatened with the complete destruction of their people and environment, or ethnocide.

Women in both the indigenous and campesino communities are disproportionately affected by the unequal land distribution. Despite women having the legal right to own property, only 9% of all landowners are women, and they own “only 8% of the land surface” (“Paraguay,” 2014). In particular, pregnant women and children are disproportionately harmed by the spraying of pesticides because their bodies are more susceptible to toxins (“The Commitment,” 2009). Unfortunately, there is little data on the impact of the political economy and the unequal land ownership between the
agribusiness elite and campesino and indigenous women—and between campesino and indigenous men and campesino and indigenous women. However, the country’s strict social structure—evidenced by the dominance of the agribusiness industry, and the women’s social movement, National Coordinator of Rural and Indigenous Women (CONAMURI)—suggests that campesino and indigenous are confined to rigid gender roles and are disproportionately excluded from Paraguay’s social, economic and political spheres through unequal distribution of land (see Appendix 3).

Since the overthrow of the Stroessner regime and the slow transition to democracy, there have been many social movements advocating for reform of the land policies. However, these social movements have had little impact on government policies regarding land reform (Nagel, 1999; Dangl, 2012). Some movements have been able to win small victories, like having their land returned to them by the soy producers, as the Popular Agrarian Movement based in Tekojoja did in 2009 after a bloody conflict with soy producer’s mercenaries and the police. But, even then, the campesino and indigenous populations must cope with the constant spraying of pesticides targeted at them to purposely reduce their food and poison them, orchestrated in collaboration with police repression (Dangl, 2012). Recently, campesino movements have been rebuilding, since President Lugo—a relative campesino and indigenous peoples’ ally—was replaced with the right-wing President Cartes of the Colorado Party. In August 2014, campesinos mobilized around the country in organizations such as the National Campesino Federation (FNC), the National Coordinator of Rural and Indigenous Women (CONAMURI) and the Struggle for Land Organization (OLT) (Zibecki, 2014). The CONAMURI and others continue to protest, demanding land reform, specifically “the abolition of the Law of Public-Private Alliance that facilitates privatizations”—reflecting a global trend in recognizing that neoliberal privatizations of land are “unable to act as a ready solvent for contending interests by automatically alleviating the intergroup tensions and new power struggles” in societies under democratic
transition (“Paraguay Social Movements,” 2014; Lund, 2006, p. 47). Along with massive privatizations that generally only go to the agribusiness elite, the campesinos are also protesting the Law of Militarization, which allows President Cartes to “send the military ‘to face any form of internal and external aggression that endangers the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country,’” and has recently led to the criminalization of protest (“Paraguay Social Movements,” 2014; Pompa, 2013). However, despite the mobilization of the Paraguayan campesinos over the last two decades, little reform has been made at the national level to correct the highly unequal land distribution. Instead, the Paraguayan government has increasingly shown that, despite its claim to democracy, it will not hesitate to violently repress the campesino and indigenous populations.

Having analyzed the social group disadvantages and the consequences they create in Paraguay, this paper will now turn to the violent conflict that the country continues to experience. While the conflict is related to the social group disadvantage previously discussed and the social movements ignited by the social group disadvantage, following King’s (2007) theory on violence and social mobilization, this paper will attempt to explain the three main reasons that protracted violent conflict has erupted in the country.

The first main reason for the protracted violent conflict in the country is the criminalization of protest or organized mobilization. Even under the relative leftist President Lugo, the government began to criminalize protest, prosecuting protestors for “disturbing the public peace” and “sabotage,” the second of which can carry a sentence of ten years (Zibechi, 2011). Today, the application of the Law of Militarization authorizes the president to arbitrarily determine who is a national security threat, the systematic determination of which deliberately is a campesino leader (Pompa, 2013). There are several accounts of police torture of campesino leaders, like the alleged torture of Paulo López in 2014, a reporter
who was covering the treatment of protesters detained by the police (FIAN International & La Vía Campesina, 2014; Knoll, 2014). In 2013, there were 57 torture investigations opened by the Public Ministry’s Human Rights Unit, although reports were still pending at the end of the year and lawyers accused the Ministry of stalling investigations until they could be dismissed with no findings. That same year CODEHUPY, a local Human Rights non-governmental organization (NGO), “reported widespread allegations of police torture and other abuses designed to extract confessions or intimidate detainees” (United States Department of State, 2014). Although the specific targets of the torturers were not mentioned in the report, from the many analytical articles detailing the criminalization of protest, a large portion of the tortures were likely inflicted on campesino leaders and protesters (FIAN International & La Vía Campesina, 2014; Zibechi, 2011; Knoll, 2014; Pompa, 2013). But the outright killing and torture of protesters is only one aspect of the criminalization of protest in Paraguay; another is the obstruction of due process. According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the Paraguayan judiciary is insufficiently independent and impartial in their investigations and rulings, with a .91% rating for judicial independence and a 1.65% rating for judicial impartiality (FIAN International & La Vía Campesina, 2014). These examples and statistics demonstrate how the criminalization of protest has escalated social movements from peaceful protest to state-sponsored violence, and the continuation of these practices, in conjunction with the militarization of the police, contributes to the protracted nature of the generated conflict.

The second main reason for the protracted violent conflict in Paraguay is the militarization of the police and the subsequent repression in enforcing the government’s unequal land policies. Drawing from Schirch (2006) and her theory that “structural violence begins a cycle of violence,” the structural violence in Paraguay committed with impunity by the soybean producers—in the form of food and health insecurity with targeted fumigations, evictions and the resulting displacement—began a cycle of
violence (p. 68). The campesinos have fought back, but since traditional social protests have been criminalized, they resort to occupying land they believe is rightfully theirs. Armed with perhaps a few rifles and their farm equipment, they have refused to leave. In response, the police and the soybean producers, often Brazilian foreigners, have joined forces with mercenaries hired by the soybean producers and the police to raid families’ homes, arrest them and burn their houses and crops (Dangl, 2012). However, with almost the entirety of their possessions already taken from them, the campesinos continue to occupy lands. The police have responded with increased militarization—illustrated by the government-authorized Joint Task Force created to combat a terrorist guerilla group known as Paraguay’s People’s Army—on protestors (“Paraguayan Guerilla,” 2014). The violence created by the government’s authorization of the criminalization of protest and the militarization of the police is exemplified in the Curuguaty Massacre of 2012. In the spring of that year, 60 campesinos occupied land they believed was illegally owned by soybean producers. In response, the government sent 342 police, helicopters, and an anti-terrorism squad to evict the protestors, who were armed only with rifles and farm equipment. A deadly fight ensued; eleven campesinos and six members of the government’s anti-terrorism quad died, although a ballistics report showed that only one of the campesino shotguns was fired (Dangl, 2012; Lindsay, 2013; FIAN International & La Vía Campesina, 2014). In the aftermath of the massacre, FIAN International, in collaboration with other NGOs reported “evidence of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, death threats and torture” by the police; they also reported the police’s failure to treat the wounded and the obstruction of due process in the legal proceedings related to the massacre (FIAN International & La Vía Campesina, 2014). The massacre not only angered the campesino population by highlighting the militarization and repression of the police in relation to land: it also prompted the coup that ousted President Lugo and reinstated the rightist Colorado Party controlled by agribusiness (Dangl, 2012). Since
then, the government has responded to campesino unrest with further militarization of the police and the criminalization of protest, escalating the conflict.

The militarization of the police has been heavily aided by the United States because of Paraguay’s rhetoric on a terrorist guerilla group, the Paraguay People’s Army (EPP). Established in 2008, although with roots tracing back to the 1990s, the EPP has consistently maintained about 20-30 members, according to several reports (“Paraguayan Guerilla,” 2014; IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2014). The group’s goal is to overthrow the corrupt democracy dictating Paraguayan society, and institute a democracy of the people in its place. The EPP largely rely on high-profile kidnappings and resource looting; the kidnappings gain large sums of revenue to buy supplies, and the resource looting pays for the everyday costs of running their organization. Despite their small number, they have been able to inflict significant damage:

Since its emergence, the EPP has engaged in more than 100 armed actions, the vast majority in the south of Concepción or the north of San Pedro. These actions have included kidnappings, destruction of property, attacks on isolated police and military posts, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in media outlets and a branch of the attorney general’s office, two attacks on electricity pylons (in October 2012 and July 2014), and a handful of ambushes. There have been more than 50 people killed in these attacks, both security force members and civilians. (IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2014)

The police were initially deployed to combat the group, but their incompetence prompted the military to intervene. Despite the military’s involvement and backing by U.S. aid, which included $475,000 in Anti-Terrorism Assistance in the 2007 fiscal year, the Paraguayan government has been unable to even contain the EPP (IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2014; Rodriguez, 2008). While corruption in all levels of government is largely to blame for the government’s failure to contain the EPP, the campesinos in the region are paying the price (IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2014). The EPP
must rely on a network of campesinos to hide and operate, since the area where the group bases lacks jungles or other natural environments in which they can hide—environments crucial to the survival of guerilla groups. Because of this network, the government has repeatedly accused large campesino communities and leaders of having connections to the EPP and using that as an excuse to persecute the campesinos. In 2009, three operations took place to try to root out the EPP, and in 2010, two such operations occurred, one of which was in a declared state of emergency. However, despite questioning 12% of the population and searching 6,000 people in five of the provinces where the state of emergency took place, the government acquired no lead on the EPP (Zibechi, 2011). The campesinos of the region wrote an open letter to the national government and international community, claiming that the state of emergency was unconstitutional, violated their rights and was an excuse to repress the campesino community (Leiva et al., 2010). After an attack in August of 2013 by the EPP, in which they “captured and executed five security guards at the Brazilian-owned Lagunita cattle ranch,” the Law of Militarization was amended, authorizing the president the power to use military force arbitrarily on anyone the president deems threatening to national security—including campesino leaders (Pompa, 2013). In 2013, military forces deployed to the countryside stormed an elementary school, asking the children if they knew anyone associated with the EPP. A local campesino spoke out against the raid, and was subsequently arrested for being associated with the group (Pompa, 2013). President Cartes has recently demonstrated his unequivocal abuse of this power given to him; in September 2014, the Joint Task Force killed two farmers and injured another, claiming the farmers had ties to the EPP. This incident is just one among many that displays the rampant militarization of the police and repressive consequences of that militarization for the campesino population (“Paraguayan Guerilla,” 2014).

The persistence of the EPP and the continuation of conflicts over land elucidate the corruption-induced weakness of the Paraguayan state.
Corruption can be seen at all levels, from the state’s failure to hold police accountable for their arbitrary use of torture as a tool of repression against the campesino population, to the obstruction of due process in the courts, to the corruption of the military, and to the parliamentary coup that replaced former President Lugo. Consequent to these factors, corruption has severely restricted the state’s ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force within its territory (United States Department of State, 2014; FIAN International et al., 2014; IHS Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2014; Dangl, 2012). This corruption in the government’s ability to hold its public servants accountable, in combination with the human insecurity and the social group disadvantage, which the corruption generates, allows the violence to erupt in the first place. But since the ousting of President Lugo, the government no longer has the same legitimacy as a government transitioning to a democracy, as the people see it resorting to the repressive strategies used under Stroessner. The state’s reversion to repression further contributes to the overall weakness of the Paraguayan government (Pompa, 2013).

The criminalization of protests and the militarization of the police are the main factors that have escalated the social movements to “turn violent” (King, 2007, p. 116). Drawing from Schirch’s (2008) theorization that “structural violence begins a cycle of violence,” King’s (2007) theory that violence is another form of social interaction, and therefore will have different causes than related social movements, was proven true in the case of Paraguay; violent conflict did not erupt in Paraguay until the state began repressing the social movements with the criminalization of protest and the militarization of the police (p. 68). Rotberg’s (2007) theory that a state must be weak to allow conflict to arise was also proven true; the corruption in the state either directly caused or allowed the state to violently repress the campesino and indigenous populations and simultaneously allow the EPP to continue their violent activity.

Having analyzed the causes and mechanisms of the conflict in Paraguay, it is important to conclude with several broad recommendations
for policy. Contemporarily, the primary goal of the Paraguayan state should be to improve its strength by ameliorating the corruption at all levels of government, particularly in the police, military and the judicial departments. Ameliorating the corruption will allow the state to govern more efficiently and effectively, and will ultimately end the use of force on all sides—that of the state, the campesinos and indigenous protestors, and the EPP. However, with this strengthening of the state must also come a liberalization of the Paraguayan democracy; repressive laws, such as the Law of Militarization, and other policies used to inhibit civil and political rights that are common in liberal democracies (e.g., freedom of speech, assembly, the press, etc.) must be repealed. All people, including the campesino and indigenous peoples, must be represented equally in government, and agribusiness can no longer be allowed to control government policies. Finally, the root causes of both the social movements and the conflict—human insecurity and social group disadvantage—must be addressed. It is imperative that the human insecurity and social group disadvantage be ameliorated in the country, or violent conflict will become cyclical in Paraguay. The amelioration of human insecurity and social group disadvantage will necessitate land redistribution. There are many countries that have successfully redistributed land, like China and Vietnam; Paraguay should look to them for a framework on how to redistribute the traditional farmland extorted from the campesinos and indigenous peoples (Ravallion & van de Walle, 2008). However, simply redistributing land and allowing for equal representation of all people will not completely solve the threatened human security of Paraguayans; the country’s entire developmental model must be replaced. Paraguay simply cannot sustainably rely on soy export to raise its Gross Domestic Product. Export-only economic development models, by nature, do not benefit anyone but the socio-political elite, because they rely on capital investment and low-wage or machine labor. This developmental model forces large portions of the population, in Paraguay’s case the campesinos and the indigenous peoples, into extreme poverty and landlessness. Because of this,
Paraguay must invest in economic development that includes human development—development that creates an environment in which all people are able to achieve their needs and interests. An inclusive model of development ensures that poverty is reduced across all levels of society and that everyone has a fair opportunity to apply their capabilities and achieve success. Without the implementation of such reforms, Paraguay will likely face continued and intensified violent conflict in the near future.

In the case of Paraguay, there are necessary scholarship recommendations, broad in scope. Scholarly research is needed for virtually every aspect of the human and food insecurity; all social group disadvantages—of campesinos, women, and indigenous people; the social movements; the violence used by protestors; and the state’s policies regarding land, social movements and protestors, and the indigenous people in Paraguay. These are all very broad topics, but almost no contemporary research exists on anything in the country, much less the diverse causes and dynamics of the ongoing conflict. Paraguay is an important case study because it illustrates the problems that arise from global phenomena like the neoliberal economic development model, democratic transitions, social movements, state repression and corruption, and intrastate conflict. Because Paraguay is an exemplary case study, and also merely because the Paraguayan people, as people, are important to include in scholarly analysis of human dynamics, more resources should be invested to studying the country.

REFERENCES


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Sierra Marcelius


## APPENDIX

### TABLE 1: PARAGUAYAN LAND INEQUALITY (TAKEN FROM: GUEREÑA, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of farm</th>
<th>Number of farms</th>
<th>Total area (ha)</th>
<th>Variation (%)</th>
<th>Average farm size (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>289,649</td>
<td>307,221</td>
<td>31,086,684</td>
<td>23,817,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of farm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have none</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>7,962</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 ha</td>
<td>15,566</td>
<td>21,977</td>
<td>6,894</td>
<td>8,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1 and &lt; 5 ha</td>
<td>101,643</td>
<td>92,811</td>
<td>231,118</td>
<td>222,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5 and &lt;10 ha</td>
<td>66,218</td>
<td>66,605</td>
<td>416,702</td>
<td>430,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10 and &lt; 20 ha</td>
<td>57,735</td>
<td>66,223</td>
<td>685,361</td>
<td>806,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 and &lt; 50 ha</td>
<td>22,865</td>
<td>31,519</td>
<td>619,968</td>
<td>857,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 50 and &lt;100 ha</td>
<td>6,879</td>
<td>7,577</td>
<td>499,555</td>
<td>502,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 100 and &lt; 200 ha</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>699,257</td>
<td>569,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 200 and &lt; 500 ha</td>
<td>5,251</td>
<td>3,503</td>
<td>1,600,537</td>
<td>1,050,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 500 and &lt; 1,000 ha</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>1,810,119</td>
<td>1,010,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 1,000 and &lt; 5,000 ha</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>7,200,534</td>
<td>4,982,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 5,000 and &lt; 10,000 ha</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>4,702,034</td>
<td>3,644,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 or more ha</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>12,654,779</td>
<td>9,730,940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock of Paraguay, 2008 National Census of Agriculture and Livestock.
### TABLE 2: THE MARGINALIZATION OF PARAGUAYAN INDIGENOUS (PERO FERRIERA, 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>% of Indigenous Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme poverty rate of children</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% without access to potable water</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% without a proper sanitation system</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of children that die before 1 yr. of age</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of households infested with Triatoma infestans</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of tuberculosis</td>
<td>10x national average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population</td>
<td>~2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“do not have legal rights to their communal land as established… [by] the constitution”</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of men’s completion of primary school</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women’s completion of primary school</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of men employed</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women employed</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3: THE MARGINALIZATION OF PARAGUAYAN WOMEN—ACCESS TO RESOURCES (PARAGUAY, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Scale (0 = equal, 1 = unequal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restricted resources &amp; assets value</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted resources % assets category</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure access to land</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure access to non-land assets</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to financial services</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4: THE MARGINALIZATION OF PARAGUAYAN WOMEN—DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (PARAGUAY, 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage experienced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Of all married women*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal abuse</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical abuse</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual abuse</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*except last row, rape, which was out of all women
Murakami Haruki: The Rising of Terrorism in the Absence of Myth, Tradition, and Placement

Brandon Brookes

The aftermath of the Tokyo Gas Attack in 1995 introduced terrorism on a scale that had never been seen before in Japan, and invoked the essential fears of its society. The darkness, despair, loneliness, and death that enveloped the country was stifling, not unlike that of post-9/11 in the United States. Murakami Haruki, through his novels IQ84 (2009) and Kafka on the Shore (2002), does his best to relate why these incidents of terror arose. His book Underground (1997), a nonfiction of testimonies and interviews, gives a sense of what has transcended upon the victims. Japan, in a post-World War II (WWII) state of identity crisis, forsook tradition in favor of a Westernized society. Murakami's works point to this Westernization, which has led to the destruction of individuality in the East. In my essay, I will show the reader the way in which Murakami expresses that, through the desecration of tradition and the dethroning of the Emperor Hirohito, Japan, and society in a global sense, gives rise to the need for terrorism. The terrorism expressed in Japan has become the violent crutch as individuals forcefully try to find their place in society. The voice of terrorism is never silent, but the Westernized-assimilated Japan refuses to listen to it clearly. Terrorism, in this sense, has become the cure for Japanese society's inadequacy of tradition, sense of belonging, voice, and identity.

EVENTS

Before going into criticism on both IQ84 (2009), Kafka on the Shore (2002), and his nonfiction work Underground (1997), it is best to look at a
number of events that led Murakami to write his novels based on tradition and terrorism. *Chikatetsu Sarin Jiken* (Subway sarin incident) happened on March 20th, 1995. The terrorist attack took place on multiple subway rail lines around the Tokyo area during the morning rush of commuting businessmen and students, resulting in an increased number of victims. The attack led to thirteen deaths, fifty critical injuries, and afflicted thousands with vision and breathing problems. The attack focused on the morning trains for the maximum amount of casualties it could inflict; it stood as a statement against the industrialization that had arisen due to Western imperialism that spread in Japan after WWII. Even long after the attack, many have been left with a form of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Individuals from the Aum Shinrikyo (represented as Sakigake in *IQ84*) targeted four subway lines. These events led to the demonization of that religious organization by the media, but oddly enough not by the individuals that were affected.

These attacks have been depicted in a multitude of ways, just as the events of 9/11 in the United States evoked controversy. In Western society, both the country of origin and its culture are considered to be at fault. Edward Said states this in his work *Orientalism* (1978), making clear that the West uses the term Orient to categorize the East and, in doing so, applies its Westernized logic, rules, and further assimilates them into their culture. The 9/11 event, in this way, reflects the direct difference between such assimilation of the East and West. In turn, the West deemed that the East became a demonized nation of terrorists in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack. When comparing these events to the Subway Sarin Incident, the Japanese involved reflected mostly upon the why and did not lash out in anger against the attackers. They could understand wanting to become a part of a group, wanting to belong, realizing the lack of identity within their own society and the identity that a religious occult, such as Aum, while negative, does possess. This realization gives credit to the notion that the Japanese lacked a concrete identity after their Western assimilation. This is seen in the
novel *IQ84* (2009) with the parallel between Asahara Shoko (leader of Aum) and Emperor Hirohito.

**TERRORISM AND IQ84**

In *IQ84* (2009), the terrorist leader Shoko and the late Emperor of Japan Hirohito gave an identity to their subjects through religion and tradition. The leader of the religious and terrorist occult, Aum, gave an identity to his followers by providing a place to belong outside of Westernized society. Aum formed both physical and mental boundaries, through which practicing individuals fostered their own ideas, research, habits, and carried on traditional practices of the Aum religion, distancing themselves from all of society that had been assimilated through Western imperialism. Hirohito himself practiced a similar practice to Shoko in his declaration to have ties with the Goddess *Amaterasu*. His divinity granted him the ability to shepherd his sovereign subjects by giving them both a tradition based on their myths and a cultural belonging. As Natsume Soseki states in his *Theory of Literature* (1907/2010):

> I am a sovereign subject of the nation of Japan. Simple unhappiness is not a reason for leaving Japan. I, who possess the honors and privileges of a sovereign subject of Japan, inhabit this land together with some fifty million others and desire, at the very least, to uphold my fifty-millionth share of those honors and privileges. (p. 48)

This notion of not only belonging but also being needed in order to fulfill a duty to the country and its tradition is the very basis in which Shoko and Emperor Hirohito were able to cultivate a place in society where people wanted to belong. The individuals of Japan wanted to belong to something outside of Western assimilation; they desired to belong to their own culture and to have their own unassimilated traditions outside the imperialistic view of Western law and society. This strong need and desire to be away from the imperialistic view of Western law and society is the very means of how and why terrorism in Japan arose. In this sense, the death of the nation through
Hirohito's abdication caused a niche for terrorism to arise so that a new identity could develop outside of the culture that had fallen under Western control. Reiji Andō makes the parallel between Hirohito's abdication and the nation's death apparent in his article '1Q84' O dō yomu ka (2009) (How to Read 1Q84).

**RELIGION AND TERRORISM**

Andō depicts the death of a nation from the death of the emperor. This depiction plays off the idea that at Japan's surrender in August 1945, the resigning Emperor Hirohito abdicated his family ties with the Goddess Amaterasu. This desecration is described in Kafka on the Shore (2002) by the character Colonel Sander: "God only exists in people's minds. Especially in Japan, God's always been kind of a flexible concept. Look at what happened after the war. Douglas MacArthur ordered the divine emperor to quit being God, and he did, making a speech that he was just an ordinary person" (p. 286). Flexibility of religion makes the concept of identity also flexible, as religion is a part of identity. This plays into a globalized perspective when looking at terrorism in the post-9/11 scenario. The supposed terrorist, Shoko, in this case used fundamentalist theology as a basis for control over his subjects. Likewise, Hirohito used his "divine" power to control and rule over Japan. When Hirohito denounced his own divinity, he denounced what it meant to be Japanese at the time of post-war Japan. This same argument is made by Shibata Shōji and voiced in his Nakagami Kenji to Murakami Haruki: Datsu 60 nendai teki sekai no yukue (2009), which describes how WWII left the Japanese with a sense of emptiness. This emptiness comes from the lack of having a concrete identity and place where they, as individuals, can belong outside of the Westernized country of Japan. This cultural belonging falls under the rule of the patriarchal lines, firstly by Hirohito and his divine right to rule and secondly by Shoko in his parallel to the Emperor, recreating the patriarch in his attempt to give a place and identity to his followers.
A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY

This attenuation is directly seen when the mentally disabled Nakata murders Johnny Walker (who is also Kafka's father) in the novel; it denotes the death of patriarchal rule over Japan. This death then implies that Japan no longer has an identity once the traditional patriarchal rule has been dissolved. However, the parallel that Shibata fails to remark upon is the fact that patriarchal rule continues in 1Q84 (2009) with the presence of Aomame's unborn child. Through her unborn child, the patriarchy will continue, begotten from the contact Aomame has made with the occult leader of 1Q84 (2009), she is to bear a child that will continue on the tradition of Japan. This is a direct relation to Shoko who wishes to rebirth himself as Emperor. While contact is made between them, her pregnancy is a miraculous conception, as sex never occurs. Rather, it is referred to as a gate opening. This gate opening represents a path that can be taken to reintroduce traditional values outside of Westernization. The gate also represents the actual physical barrier erected by the occult of Aum, showing their secretive seclusions by cutting themselves off from society, in an attempt to rebuild what they had lost in a post WWII Japan. The sub-quasi 1984 in which Aomame finds herself, miraculously pregnant, corresponds to the Izanagii-Izanami traditional myth.

Izanagi and Izanami are the original representations of Japan in the Yomi no Kuni myth. In these myths, the father Izanagi gives birth to the Goddess Amaterasu, Tsukuyomi, and Susano-o. This idea of a father giving birth leads the reader of 1Q84 (2009) to question these patriarchal lines. Aomame's non-sexual contact with the occult leader recreated the patriarchal line needed for Japan to regain an identity. It is through myth that tradition is continued, reinstating an identity that is relatable to the Japanese, away from the Westernization and its desecration of such tradition caused by Hirohito's forced abdication of his divinity. It is through terrorist activities, both in the novel and reality that gave tradition a chance to resurface. Shoko's Aum occult tried to fight against the imperialism that has
consumed Japan. The demonstration against a commuting train filled with businessmen elucidates Shoko's desire to destroy capitalism, while instilling the reconstruction of traditional values. In this sense, Shoko indicates several historical factors: First, Japan's isolationist period, where foreign influence was kept to a minimum in an attempt to preserve Japan's heritage and cultural identity. Secondly, Shoko's desire to rid Japan of industrialism and capitalism, removing the businessmen and replacing them with more traditional roles in society, as seen in his own sanctuary, where people lived in a way Shoko felt was a more natural way of life by farming, researching, meditating, and focusing on the removal of Western society. The Aum occult in this way uses terrorism as a rebirthing of both religion and tradition to bring about change in Japan.

**THE NEW EMPEROR**

It is only through Aomame becoming pregnant that she is able to finally move forward with Tengo (her childhood love), "hand in hand, [making] their way out of the forest" (Murakami, 2011, p. 1136). Her pregnancy reinstates the traditional myth that was lost by Hirohito's abdication and recreates a position for the new Emperor, her child, bringing Japan back to its natural order. However, the little people of the novel, who embody the West, wish to use the new child as a means to continue their imperialism, recreating a puppet Emperor as Hirohito had become after his abdication of his divine heritage. The forests in Murakami's novels are described as "labyrinths," as also seen in *Kafka on the Shore* (2002). Leaving this forest means that the two of them have overcome the obstacles set before them: the loss of identity. Sakigake, *IQ84*'s terrorist organization that wishes to perpetuate their control through the literary device that Murakami names as "the little people," constructs this labyrinth. The little people's labyrinth obstructs the process of finding their identity. The West, through industrialization, has obscured the route for Japan to navigate its way back to their tradition. Terrorism, such as Aum's Tokyo Gas Attack, breaks the
imperialist spell placed by the West and allows society to reflect upon the why of the terrorist incident.

ANALYSIS

Murakami’s story could have taken place in nearly any culture and any city. From Toshi shōsetsu kara sekai bungaku e (2010) (From Urban Novels to World Literature):

Such fictitious occurrences that explore the relationship between religious cults and lost freedoms, not only do they occur in Japan, that are events capable of happening in any city all over the globe. In this sense, Murakami perhaps has attempted to create an urban novel that could be considered world literature. (Matsumoto, p. 211)

What Matsumoto Kenichi means is that this narration in Underground (1997) could occur anywhere, and so could the Aum terrorists attack. The occult Sakigake of IQ84 (2009) is neither a representation of the culture nor the backlash seen towards it. In this way, neither Aum nor Sakigake are representatives of the society, but instead a creation of society. Kenichi feels that the terrorist events are not specific to only Japan. The subway attack that Aum designed could have occurred in any country that had lost its cultural identity through assimilation. Such similarities are seen with 9/11 or the Munich Massacre of 1972. Both attacks were motivated by the notion that each culture had been imposed upon by Western imperialism. Through this assimilation, the identity of the culture had become attenuated and by such the use of terrorism was needed as a way to state their dissatisfaction with Western influence and their cultural heritage having been lost.


In IQ84 Murakami has added a more global perspective to the central thesis of Underground, namely that it is both dangerous and self-delusional to view terrorism and religious fanaticism in the
simplistic terms of "evil people doing bad things to good people. (p. 865)

In other words, IQ84 (2009) has expanded the Aum incident to a global stage. In addition, IQ84 (2009) also touches upon the traditions that led towards this globalization of terrorism. The destruction of tradition itself led to the increased "need" for both control and security. This same idea is reflected in Daniel Metraux's Religious Terrorism in Japan: The Fatal Appeal of Aum Shinriko (1995). He states the believers:

Form part of an ongoing historical process and what is new about them is not to be found in their content so much as in their emergence as socio-religious organizations with the aim of reworking and revitalizing of traditional beliefs and practices for the purpose of ensuring their relevance to daily life at a time of unprecedented change in all spheres. (Metraux, 1995, p. 1141)

This can be broken down in several ways in comparison to IQ84 (2009) and Kafka on the Shore (2002). The aforementioned historical process is that Japan was once under rule of Hirohito, and his abdication from the position of God left the nation in flux. New Religion like Aum Shinrikyō appealed to younger generations because they broke the social norm and gave purpose to their everyday individual lives. New Religions, like Aum Shinrikyō, rose out of social necessity to give a place to individuals dissatisfied with the Westernization that Japan had undergone. Additionally, Japan's economic depression of the 1920s and the Western occupation post WWII attributed to the rise in need for a traditional belonging, a need for individual and small-group identity. Such factors isolated the Japanese, and their need to assimilate under Western pressure drove individuals to look elsewhere to belong. In this way, individuals came together under the theology of New Religions.

NEW RELIGIONS

New Religions allowed for a greater focus on groups with only a small number of members and differed from Christianity which was
promoted after the Shinto State of Japan had been dissolved. These new religions relied heavily on religions of Shinto and Buddhism, allowing for a practice of traditional religions through their new adaptations. This circumvented large and ambiguous religions that had no sense of individuality but rather were a collective group. Within New Religion, the smaller number of members gave a greater sense of individuality and accomplishment. The reinvention of traditional beliefs transcends the boundaries of mere cultural tradition, and branches off into the sociological aspect of culture. In Japan, there is an order in society that revolves around completing certain tasks before another can be undertaken. For example, a university degree is often followed by low-level entry positions, followed by years of work before individuals are allowed to express their own views, create projects, or design experiments. The New Religion called Aum Shinrikyō, shortened to Aum, let many young, prestigious, and promising individuals into their group with access to technology, money, and the freedom to complete their own research. A part of the appeal of Aum was the ability to quickly rise and be recognized within a group. Their "relevance to daily life," as Metraux (1995) states, refers directly to the fact that individuals felt constrained by the capitalistic and industrialized West. The ability to rise inside the work force became contingent on their acceptance of not having an identity, becoming a single unthinking entity of the industrialized West. While some joined Aum to break free from the conformity of Western society, others joined to replace or supplement the lack of tradition that was evident in their lives.

Metraux (1995) continues, declaring that "it became a haven for a few members of a younger generation...it offered members a way out of the anomie of modern Japan...[and] thrived because of the perceived need of some Japanese for a degree of spirituality in their lives" (p. 1149). It is plausible that they wished for New Religion since others, such as the government and industrialized society, were too conformist in thought. Benjamin Dorman brings to light in his SCAP's Scapegoat? The Authorities, 114
New Religion, and a Postwar Taboo (2004) the generalized idea that New Religion was not policed, and that the authorities "were virtually blind to, or disinterested in, the possibility that a religious group such as Aum could initiate terrorist acts" (p. 107). Dorman fails to admit, however, the need for such religions. These New Religions were, at the time—and possibly still—needed to cope with the fall of the countries' own tradition. This can be seen not only in Japan but also in a globalized perspective, such as in the rise in power of the Irish Republic Army, and in the continual war between Israel and Palestine. Each faction involved in these conflicts is fighting for a home and an identity. Each fought or continues to fight against the assimilation that Westernization has imposed upon them.

Their traditions are displaced in the same way that Japan's are. Through imperialistic conquest, the country being conquered turns to terrorism in an attempt to fight against the occurring assimilation. Japan, in the same regards, created New Religions in order to protect their individuality and identity. However, while most New Religions were non-violent, some like Aum wished to send a much louder message to the nation rather than dissimilating from society entirely. Terrorism—which in itself can be fluid in definition—can be aroused by the notion of nationalism, belonging, and identity. Such nationalism has been replaced by a more Western notion. The dissolution of tradition has entrapped these individuals; the need for tradition and identity outside the normal confines of modern society has led to the rise of occults like Aum.

Creation of an identity can be seen in several instances in Murakami's Kafka on the Shore (2002), where Kafka himself abandons his name and takes on the pseudonym and title of the novel. This abandonment of social constraints leaves Kafka without an identity but also free to explore his own sense of nationalism and identity. He confronts these actions without violence and without religion in both the labyrinth of his mind and the physical labyrinth of the forests of Japan. Kafka states, "a lot of things were stolen from my childhood. Lots of important things. And now I have to
get them back. In order to keep living. I nod. I have to. People need a place they can go back to. There is still time to make it, I think" (Murakami, 2002, p. 295). The things stolen are the traditions and basis for the culture itself. The displacement of tradition leaves emptiness in cultural identity. This emptiness gives rise to a powerful voice and a push to bring back tradition. As Kafka states, there is a need for people to have a place in which they belong. In a society that focuses on capitalism, industrialism, and its assimilation into Western culture, it has lost its ability to allow its citizens to be individuals. Terrorism supplements this by creating a signifier that allows for the fighting back against society and its demands. The religion of Aum would not have been successful had it not given people a place where they felt they belonged. By creating a supplement to the nation that deserted its own traditional values, the individuals of the occult fought to keep this identity and through the occult expand their enlightened state to those outside of Aum.

Kafka realizes the need for these and knows that "people need a place" to call home; a place that is grounded with their own identity and not with a globalized (westernized) or industrialized sense. "Many people," as Metraux (1999) states

especially younger Japanese and middle-aged women, began to lose a clear sense of purpose in their lives. This created a spiritual void in many of their lives that often led to a fascination with mystical and occult phenomena often associated with "New Age" religious practiced. (p. 70)

Aum Shinriko and the Japanese Youth (1999) points out that people needed grounding, a thought echoed directly by Kafka. Terrorism in this sense came out of necessity for assimilation into a society in which the individual could feel socially and traditionally connected. Japan's lost identity gave need for the rise of terrorism in order for society to reconnect with its tradition. The terrorist attack by Aum allowed Japan, if only for a moment, to reconnect to its past tradition, to look carefully at what Aum as a religion was trying to elucidate. In doing so, the terrorist attack gave individuality back to Japan
before its re-assimilation into Westernized society. Many individuals, in
Murakami's *Underground* (1997), were fascinated with the why and
explained that Shoko wanted to make a declaration against capitalism and
industrialism. They could not only understand but could also relate to
wanting to be a part of something outside of Western society. In this way,
terrorism brought about the past for further explication by the viewer.
Through looking at their history, the Japanese are able to get a better sense
of what has happened to their tradition and why terrorism has
supplemented the loss.

**IDENTITY THROUGH HISTORY**

Mark Pendleton (2011) expresses that without an understanding of
their past, the Japanese as a culture are unable to find their identity as well as
their place in the world: "the process of engaging with history [is] not
therefore a simple search for origins, but instead a subjective construction of
a relation to the past, a construction that can change through the
substitution and surrogacy of performance" (p. 363). The first half of
Pendleton's argument that looking at one's own history is not only to find
one's origin (or identity), but also to construct a relationship to that past is
apt. However, his notion that history can be surrogated by performance does
not account for the fact that performance infers the current moment or
industrialized nation itself. Such performance is the demonstration of
Japan's history being Westernized, and its nation undergoing
industrialization. If a nation such as Japan has been usurped by Western
ideology, then, has not its history also been changed? If the majority of the
society destroys a history beyond the point of recognition, then, there can be
no establishment of origin. Without this establishment of origin, people feel
a sense of emptiness. This emptiness is filled by the "surrogacy," not of
performance, but of any gap-filling device that can give the society an
identity or individuality.
Aum's simplistic ideology allowed for the possibility of individuals to escape from the "rat race" that Japan had become under Western assimilation through money and by providing resources to its followers. Aum provided the means to escape from a Westernized society and its capitalistic foundation. It provided religious freedom in the fourth generation of "New Religions" titled shinshinshūkyō (New New Religion), which continues to this day. Aum itself is still prevalent and practiced under the new name of Aleph with offshoot Hikari no Wa (Circle of Light). On December 1, 2014, The Japan Times released an article stating that "the [Public Security Intelligence Agency] said the two groups remain dangerous. They retain antisocial traits and teach their followers that the sarin gas attack was justified" (para. 5). While this last statement may have accurately represented Aum previously, nowhere does the new group state that they believe the sarin gas attack was "justified." Propaganda, like the statements from the Japan Times, can be seen in any culture that has been attacked—the hatred, confusion, and demonization of a group in whole. Just as the outcry from Maya Lin, who designed the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, was the subject of controversy, these new religions are viewed with the same leery eye. In many parts of Underground (1997), interviewees stated "either way, I couldn't stand the media coverage of Aum. I don't even want to look at it" (p. 58). The media created a spectacle of the situation and called the trial of Asahara Shoko (the engineer of the Aum terrorist attack and leader of Aum), "the trial of the century."

Metraux (1995), on the topic of the need for organizations such as Aum and how such religious organizations replaced tradition, states that "religious organizations have the main characteristics of revitalization movements" (p. 1141). This revitalization is in essence the revival of tradition and thereby the continued need for tradition. In IQ84 (2009), Murakami describes Aomame's prayer—her meaningless mantra—as only an "action" that comforts her. This symbolizes Japan's deep need of comfort, not only in the wake of post WWII, but also for the decentralization religion.
The culture of Japan was heavily influenced by religion, and as Peter Clarke and Jeffrey Somers state in their *Japanese New Religions in the West* (1994), "[the reworking and reshaping of] traditional beliefs, rituals, and symbols in such a way as to make them relevant to the social, cultural and spiritual needs of the present" (pp. 3-8). Those traditions are mocked by Murakami's characters, who both feel that there is a necessity for tradition and a lack the knowledge of how to rebuild a traditional society. Post-WWII Japan, under the influence of both occupation and westernization, forgot part of its traditional beliefs. Cults like Aum or the fictitious Sakigake led the people back to the country's roots while incorporating technology and science. Their reintroduction of tradition allowed for a more gradual transition from the old to the new, rather than the sudden knee-jerk reaction that was Hirohito's surrender at the end of WWII.

The aforementioned globalization and universality of *IQ84* (2009) and Murakami's other works fits it in with any culture, any city, any religion. Terrorism is not region-specific, and the definition remains relatively constant. However, few have tried to understand the real reason for terrorist actions. Terrorism is rarely quiet; from the Gun Powder Plot of 1605 where the accused directly stated their reasons for treason to the post 9/11 *Letter to America* from Osama Bin Laden—terrorism speaks. Worldwide, terrorists have always wanted to let those on the receiving end of the attack know their reasons. Several interviews with the Aum religious occult leader, Asahara Shoko, show that his "supreme enlightenment" stemmed from the relinquishing of material wealth, although his statement was hypocritical due to the way that he lived. His ideology behind his doomsday approach was to awaken the world to their greed and to the salvation that he could provide. A biography of Shoko cites that he wished to overthrow the government and to become the new emperor of Japan. His greatest desire was to lead people to the salvation that only he could bring by becoming a Christ figure. Many of the individuals attracted to Aum stated, "All the time I knew I was eventually going to renounce the world" (Murakami, 1997, p.
278), as Mitsuharu Inaba described in an interview with Murakami. *Underground* (1997) serves as a testimony of the individuals involved; the survivors, the witnesses and the members of Aum that were willing to be interviewed.

Shoko's speech parallels that of Bin Laden's *Letter to America* (2002). Each leader states that there were very specific reasons for their attack, each citing Westernization, attenuating identity and cultural heritage, and lastly the industrialization and capitalism that has changed the foundations of their home. On the other hand, the individuals involved were simply looking for understanding and a place to belong. Mitsuharu also went on to state his desire to withdraw from contemporary society. Shoko stated that the industrialization and material wealth created was the reason for his attack. Like others have speculated before, many of these desires come from anti-western sentiments. Anti-western sentiments resulted from the loss of tradition, in turn giving way towards New Religion to supplement this loss. The supplement then became the notion that wished to bring around an overall national change. This change led to terrorism in an attempt to highlight the wrongs done to Japan.

The attraction of cults and religions stems not so much from people’s very valid desire to live a peaceful life, but from the fact that they feel threatened and backed into a corner. Murakami, in his commentary of why he undertook the project of *Underground* (1997), declares that "what I really wanted to know for myself was the violence that must lie hidden in our society, just below our feet" (p. 89). While obviously a play on his nonfiction work and commentary on his other contemporary works, Murakami acknowledges the buried feelings that must lie just beneath the surface. Many of the Japanese interviewed were reserved, respectful and to quote "I’d just like to know what they thought they were doing. I’d demand a full explanation and an apology. I’d absolutely insist upon it" (Murakami, 1997, p. 44). Tomoko Takasaki relates that she was not truly angry for what they had done—she was simply confused as to why. Tomoko was a victim of the
sarin gas and had continual problems with headaches and breathing. Despite her disability resulting from the attack, Tomoko did not wish for the death penalty for the attackers or the kind of war that arose from the hatred in post-9/11 United States. Much of this rises from the notion that the occult of Aum was understood and accepted. The Japanese were able to identify real applicability and need for the want to be a part of a grounded foundation that allowed for individualism.

Tomoko's case is not singular. As Hideki Sono relates, "with society the way it is, everyone just chasing after money, I can sort of understand how young people might be attracted to something more spiritual like religion" (Murakami, 1997, p. 54). Hideki, in his testimony, does not excuse the attack, but can understand that there is a need for something besides the material wealth that has replaced traditional beliefs and religion. Throughout the entire book runs a trend of similar instances, with a scattered few individuals who felt that those at fault should be punished with more than mere prison sentences. Most felt that those who had actually planted the sarin on the trains were innocent, and the leader Aum was the one who should be held accountable. Murakami does not give his own opinions on the incident, except to express his condolences to those involved. It is clear he feels that there is something missing; however, because in IQ84 (2009) where the incidents of Aum are repeated, he juxtaposes the cult leader, Big Brother, to the "little people" (or fairies) of the novel. In congruence with these sentiments is Pendleton (2011), who states "the subconscious shadows carried around with 'us', the bitter aftertaste, the face we want to see, the seeping evil emerging from under foot—and in them something underpins, but simultaneously haunts, all of contemporary Japanese society" (p. 366- 367). This haunting is the still present need to replace something lost: the notion that tradition, religion and culture once dominated a capitalistic society—a society that Hideki had stated he could understand. Terrorism surrogated this loss in the form of New Religion. In the rise of capitalism in post WWII Japan, tradition was displaced;
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Murakami’s novels capture this loss in the fictional works of both Kafka on the Shore (2002) and IQ84 (2009). The individual that has been repressed searches for a surrogacy to fill the emptiness, this emptiness becomes terrorism in an attempt to break free from the binds placed upon them by society.

The individual must react to the totalitarian rule placed by the West; however, in doing so the individual becomes alienated. "Modern civilization," Soseki (2008) starts:

...uses every possible means to develop individuality, and having done so, tries everything in its power to stamp it out. It allots a few square yards to each person, and tells him that he is free to lead his life as he pleases within that area. At the same time, it erects railings around him, and threatens him with all sorts of dire consequences if he should dare to take but one step beyond their compass. (p. 181)

Society encourages individualism; however, individualism is not allowed to spill out from the strict boundaries created by Western society. In somuch, individuality cannot exist without the expressive will of the West. In doing so, the West controls tradition, culture, and heritage in an attempt to dominate a nation. The boundaries that Soseki speculates on are broken by New Religion and occults like Aum. These boundaries alienate the practicing individuals, but this alienation gives the group the strength necessary to perform acts of terrorism. Through terrorism, the individual group is able to rise to recognition in the eyes of society. Whether alienated or accepted the group's role is to present its problems to the group assimilated in Western society. Aum, in this respect, succeeded. Their purpose was to bring about change to reintroduce tradition and make known the dangers of Western capitalism. The nation understood, however, it was unable to respond.

This same essence is seen globally in the Irish literature of Beckett and Joyce, the European literature of Shakespeare, Milton, Spenser, the literature of the Far East and contemporary literature in all cultures. These
writers all deal with the notion that continued capitalization diminishes the society, and that the repression of individuality causes terrorism not just by madmen but by people that are searching for something, a place to call home, a place to belong. Aum gave a place to belong; in return, they asked its dedicated members to fight against the power that had led them to join—capitalism and industrialization. Shoko's intention was to demonstrate that Aum could replace the loss that was created through Western imperialism through terrorism. This terrorism is a direct cause from the loss of identity. Without Western imperialism, Aum would have had no power, it is the colonization and assimilation that has given a rise and need to these terrorist organizations. In this way, the West was the cause of terrorism in Japan through Japanese society's desire to have a place of their own.

Mathew Strecher in his \textit{(R)evolution in the Land of the Lonely: Murakami Ryū and the Project to Overcome Modernity} (2008) describes Japan's social problems and finds the root cause of Japan's "project of modernization." He also describes how Japan's current social structure needs to enter a new stage of development. Strecher echoes many others in his take on the evolution of Japan's "social problems." Namely, Western influence post-WWII left Japan with little sense of identity, and the subsequent era, featuring either New Religion or other forms self-elucidation, is, while relevant, beginning to wane. There is a need for tradition and originality—a need to become part of the old Japan before Hirohito destroyed that image. \textit{Newsweek} writer Michael Hirsh (1995) remarks again on such imagery, stating:

Despite Japan's vaunted social regimentation, proper behavior is enforced not by absolute sense of right and wrong...but by devotion to social unity and harmony. Morality is "relativistic," shifting with time and circumstance and often built around a social purpose, like the postwar rebuilding effort. For a while the economic ride was enough for some people, but there isn't a whole lot you can hook into Japanese society if you're looking for something to give your life meaning. (p.52)
What Hirsh says is indeed correct, that the Japanese are even now trying to find something to hold onto. In a terrible tragedy, "the incident if one of 'memory', and particularly the perception that memories of the incident are fading in Japanese society" (Pendleton, 2011, p. 360). While Japan struggles to find its footing in the post-WWII globalization of Western imperialism, religion and cults are taking advantage of this confusion; even if an incident is tragic and an act of terrorism, it is quickly lost in the frenzy of media coverage.

Hirsh states that there is no meaning in the kind of life that currently exists, or at least that the meaning of materialism is not enough for the majority of the people that joined the occult Aum or similar terrorist organizations. It is through materialism, inequality of wealth, and discrimination in job opportunity that created an occult like Aum and its appeal to individuals. By escaping the capitalistic world of the West they would be allowed to explore their individuality through meditation, advanced their career through research and budgets unattainable in assimilated society. Terrorism grew from the dissent of individuals towards the Westernized, capitalistic approach to life. It is from this imperialism that terrorism was able to manifest, to combat the attenuation of identity.

**SUMMARY**

Objective analysis of the aftermath of the Tokyo Gas Attack of 1995 depends not only on reading the accounts of those who were involved, but also on examining its relationship to terrorism on a globalized scale. Tradition, specifically religion, has taken a back seat following the Westernization of the East. What was once viewed as sacred is now no longer viable. People are aware that "something" is missing from their lives, but as Murakami demonstrated in his contemporary works, religion is not a large part of people's lives. Although religion did not have to be the main focus that replaced Hirohito in 1945, religion does have a place in giving individuals a sense of belonging outside of the capitalized society that has
run Japan and much of the world for years. Religion in this sense stems from
the need to belong, filling the gap materialized by Western assimilation.
Terrorism then rises from these new religions in an attempt to recreate the
tradition that has been destroyed through capitalism. As critics have pointed
out, the lack of this "something" does not excuse the event of terror nor the
lives that it disrupts. Rather, what should be conveyed is the sense that if no
replacement for tradition is found, groups such as Aum (Aleph, 2001) and
other sects of religion or occult will arise to help those who long for a
substantially different identity. Hirsh mentions the social conformity that
Japan adheres to, but while social etiquette has its place, there is also a need
for individuality among its people. I believe that without this individuality,
the identity of Japan and other such countries cannot be defined. Terrorism
is a product of the capitalistic Westernization that has beset Japan, and
through its rise, supplements tradition and heritage, giving a place where
individuals are allowed to think freely. Through Murakami's fiction and
nonfiction it is clear that through the attenuation of tradition, terrorism is
given birth to, and perpetuated by, the imperialism of Western capitalism
and industrialism.

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