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How do we spawn a university environment that encourages undergraduate research?  
By creating a research community.

Dear Readers,

The Undergraduate Research Journal of the College of Arts and Letters (URJCAL) is the first social sciences and humanities undergraduate research publication in the California State University (CSU) system. In 2015, we published the first volume of the Journal, with four student editors, two faculty advisors, and six student contributors. In 2016, with the participation of ten student editors, twelve faculty advisors, and six student contributors, we turned the Journal into an undergraduate research institution.

In order to establish the Journal as an institution, we—the Journal’s co-editors-in-chief—created and instructed a course (GEN S 490: Undergraduate Research: URJCAL) on editing, writing and research skills. We—the student editors and co-editors-in-chief—developed these skills through the editing of submitted papers and a series of educational workshops. These workshops covered the elements of editing, academic writing with style, conference presentations, and preparation for graduate school/careers in research. The students particularly benefited from the workshop presentations of Dean Norma Bouchard, Dr. Roy Whitaker, Dr. James Garza, and Dr. Eniko Csomay. This course was unique as an editorship in a few respects:

1. the Journal is an institutionally supported undergraduate research publication in the CSU and SDSU;
2. the course is undergraduate student-led and credit-bearing;
3. two or more faculty collaborated with two student editors on each submitted paper; and
4. authors and editors were sent to research conferences in their respective fields.

By sponsoring students to attend and present at national and international conferences in addition to the Journal becoming an institutionalized undergraduate research
publication, the course was able to advance the careers of its participants

This year, the Journal attracted some of the best students and undergraduate researchers at SDSU and in the College of Arts and Letters. Two editors and two contributors won awards at the 2016 Student Research Symposium at SDSU, and one contributor received a statewide award at the 30th Annual CSU Student Research Competition. In addition to individual awards, one current editor and one past contributor will attend Harvard in Fall 2016. With excellent authors, student editors, and faculty mentors contributing to this volume, the quality of this year’s publication is in a class of its own.

The Journal has become the premier social sciences and humanities undergraduate research forum at SDSU: a place and project for students, faculty and administrators to come together to generate an undergraduate research infrastructure and community within the university. This research community was possible because of the collaboration and interaction with professors in the editorial process as well as the cooperation of the wider university community. We thank the faculty advisor, faculty reviewers, the administrative staff at the Dean's office and individual departments, as well as Montezuma Publishing and the student editors for contributing their time and hard work. Lastly, we thank the student body at SDSU for funding this project through the Student Success Fee.

Sincerely,
The URJCAL Editorial Board
Noh theatre, an elite art form, was reserved for military officials in medieval Japan’s warrior society, and established by the noh master Zeami Motokiyo (世阿彌 元清, 1363-1443). Noh drama has a humble beginning descending from sarugaku (猿楽, “monkey play”), which is a form of art for the commoners. Zeami successfully elevated and transformed this circus artistry to become a refined entertainment for the social elites. Noh (能) literally denotes “ability,” “capability,” “talent” or “skill.” It is sometimes translated as no (nō); for this paper, I will use the spelling “noh” at all times to avoid confusion. Some titles and quotations have been altered for consistency. The alterations are noted by square brackets. Noh—accomplishment—is a befitting name for the traditional Japanese drama. The elements of noh performance include a combination of song, dance, and poetry. The artists spend years perfecting their skills and adhering to the strict conventions and standards of the noh theatre. Incidentally, much of the academic attention has been given to the physical performance of noh, in the actor’s movements and pronunciations, as well as the songs and instrumental music.

However, Western scholarship faces particular difficulties when it comes to theoretical frameworks aiming to understand the meaning and belief system embedded
in the lyrics and words of noh. This is in part due to the language barrier in translating Japanese into English. According to the general introduction to the selected plays translated by the Special Noh Committee and Japanese Classics Translation Committee, the style and language of noh drama are challenging to audiences unfamiliar with the Chinese and Japanese classics and Buddhist terminologies to which the noh drama makes frequent allusions (Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkōkai xv). While the lack of historical knowledge and context as foundation to properly appreciate the art of noh is indeed a significant obstacle, I argue that intellectual and linguistic understanding of the libretto is not the only way to study noh. Instead, I suggest the audiences and scholars alike alternatively consider noh as a ritualistic system of beliefs.

I ground my argument in the Japanese tradition of kotodama (言霊), or “word spirit,” wherein one believes that there is no distinction between the word and the phenomenon. As Japanese experimental theatre director Tadashi Suzuki insisted in his 2002 lecture at the Donald Keene Center of Japanese Culture, the specificity of the Japanese theatre history creates an environment in which the relationship and the people’s perception of the relationship between the linguistic and physical expressions is not easily separated in performance arts (2). I connect this unity of word and thing (i.e. movement, phenomenon, emotion, etc.) to the theory of kotodama, which has its roots in the Buddhist beliefs. To experience noh and its language, one needs not to understand, but to believe it.

In addition to being performative, Japanese noh is also highly ritualized with a distinct religious undertone. Dating back to the Heian era (平安時代, 794-1185), early Japanese society believed in the mythical power of Buddhist monks to perform rainmaking rites (Ruppert 145). I use the word “power” uniformly—instead of “force,” “strength,” or “ability”—in this paper when referring to the property assigned to the poetic words, to signify the quality of magic: Magic as informed by beliefs and mythology, such as the Buddhist traditions and the legends of Genpei warriors referenced in noh. This power to communicate and influence the natural world is not exclusive to the monks. Poets were also summoned by the Emperor to write rainmaking poems—believing in the magic resided in the poetic words. This attitude linking the art with spirituality and natural phenomenon lends us a way to look at noh drama—a theatre intricately connected with poetic literature and Buddhist religion—and its various elements.

One of the prominent features of noh theatre is its chorus, which is implemented in virtually every noh play as a fundamental component of the noh drama. The noh chorus particularly interests me in the discussion of noh as a ritual informed by Buddhist beliefs because of its role in the noh drama. Japanese noh scholar and
practitioner Kunio Komparu describes that the chorus to the shite (main performer) is like “the ground to figure.” It creates the foundation and sets the atmosphere for the story in which the shite moves through and completes his journey. It is an important function of the chorus’ poetics to convey the Buddhist sense of acceptance. According to Thomas Hare in Zeami’s Style: The Noh Plays of Zeami Motokiyo, Buddhist doctrine regards existence as itself suffering caused by delusive attachment to ideas or objects and the desire to hold onto them, and to let go of these attachments is to be released from the suffering of existence and transcend to the higher level of spirituality and peace (201). It relates to the philosophy which understands the natural state of things as ever-changing, and the way to be at peace is to accept changes in nature’s course.

This paper argues on the basis of kotodama theory, within the Buddhist perspective of the mythical power of poetry, that the chorus aids to the completion of the circle of suffering and enlightenment in noh theatre and delivers a sense of salvation to the audience—similar to the way poets and monks deliver rain to the people through the power of poetic verses. This sense of salvation or enlightenment, then, is essential to the experience of noh. I chose to illustrate this argument with examples from a most distinct category of noh drama: the warrior noh, shura plays.

In shura noh, the shite’s journey mirrors that of the Buddhist concept of samsara, or the cycle of reincarnation. The idea of samsara in Buddhism is the repetition of birth, life, and death—a cycle that the soul is incapable of escaping. One caught in samsara is reborn after death, while their deeds (karma) in one life influences the quality and destiny of their subsequent life. To escape this endless cycle of consequences, one has to renounce the world and earthly attachment in order to achieve enlightenment.

WARRIOR NOH AND THE WORD SPIRIT

Surprisingly, with noh recognized as a warrior theatre, only 16 among the 260 or so noh plays documented in the repertoire No[h] kyogen jiten (“Dictionary of No[h] and Kyogen”) are classified as “warrior noh” in a 2006 study by Eric Rath. Narrowly defined, warrior noh, or shura mono (修羅物, “fighting matter”) depicts specifically suffering spirits of warriors bearing earthly attachments and past misdeeds. The nineteen plays translated in Arthur Waley’s The No[h] Plays of Japan include three shura plays that are listed in the No[h] kyogen jiten: Atsumori, Ikuta, and Tsunemasa, all of which make prominent use of chorus and end with the chorus delivering a closing chant. The chorus even sometimes speaks for the main character, the warrior spirit, in these plays. This could seem to be a peculiar arrangement as some would argue that the characters on stage could speak for themselves. The peculiarity suggests an effect created by the chorus that could not be achieved solely through the actor’s performance.
In *The Noh Theater: Principle and Perspectives*, the author Kunio Komparu describes noh chorus as “ground to figure” in relation to the *shite* (162). According to Komparu, the main objective of the chorus in noh theatre is to progress the plot and describe the intention and motivation of the *shite* (the lead character). However, noh treatises by Zeami and others make explicit suggestion for the *shite* to occasionally follow the chorus’ lead. In *Mirror Held to the Flower*, included in *On the Art of No Drama: The Major Treatises of Zeami*, Zeami suggests the actor to “first allow the audience to hear the word ‘weeping,’ and then, just afterwards, bring the sleeve up to the face and so complete the total action with this gesture” (76). This performance, described by Zeami as “communication first by hearing, then by sight” (76), highlights the emphasis on language over action, the spiritual over the physical, and artistic pride over warring spirit. These features are notable in Japanese society as cited by a number of scholars across disciplines, including American anthropologist Ruth Benedict in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. Meanwhile, Zeami’s suggestion that the *shite* character could sometimes act after the action is described indicates carefully scripted and choreographed interaction between the artist and the poetic words.

Language holds a special place in Japanese culture, which shapes the use of chorus in noh theatre. The idea of *kotodama*, although first a religious concept found in Shinto and Buddhist dialectics, influences all aspects of the Japanese culture from common custom to the modern press (Maeda). The importance of language in Japanese tradition could be illustrated in the belief of the mythical power of poetry, which states that poetry contains “truth” and “reason” which empower poetry to manipulate phenomenon (Kimbrough 1). Noh drama itself is closely related to this belief. Treatises reveal that *shura* plays are attributed mythical power that controls the water element. Eric Rath’s research found: “Late sixteenth-century and Edo period treatises indicate that *shura* plays had some magical control over the element of water. Performances of *Yashima*, for example, might cause rain to fall, and part of the play *Sanemori* should be chanted to prevent fires” (176). While Rath did not explore the ways in which *shura* plays might have practiced and realized the magical control of water element, Ruppert and Kimbrough’s researches on Buddhist rainmaking monks and the miraculous power of Japanese poetry give some insights on the belief system that informs the treatises’ claims. According to Kimbrough’s elaboration, there is believed to be power residing in the poetic words, which, through engaging the “truth,” is able to manipulate phenomenon (1). This spiritual belief is connected with the Japanese Buddhist tradition in both its rainmaking rites, as described by Ruppert, and the spirit of word.
In noh drama, the chorus not only narrates the story but also, through narrating, makes the story happen like the monk's prayers and poet's rainmaking poems make rain happen. This is consistent with director Suzuki's analysis that in Japanese performance art traditions, the spoken words and the movement of the body are a unity. In the kotodama theory of language, the word does not merely describe or represent the thing, but actively brings about the thing; or, as the title of Kazuya Hara's 2001 semantics review on Japanese kotodama belief in communication states: “The Word is the Thing.”

THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF NOH THEATRE

The cultural context in which noh theatre flourished is intrinsically intertwined with the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. William LaFleur argues that Zeami’s noh principles should be read within the perspective of Mahayana Buddhism in which suffering is salvation, and the “tragedy” is freedom and enlightenment (132). To extrapolate on LaFleur’s theory, noh drama itself, established and heavily influenced by Zeami, could be approached from this perspective. The theme of shura noh, in particular, seems to support this argument of Buddhist philosophy. In shura noh, suffering warrior spirits seek salvation by reflecting on the past and going through a certain transformation. Atsumori, by Zeami, being one of the most popular and well known shura plays, is a prominent example of this theme.

Noh playwrights traditionally draw inspiration from classical myths and legends. Zeami’s Atsumori is based on the story of Taira no Atsumori from The Tale of the Heike, which gives fictionalized accounts of the Genji War (1180-1185) between the Taira and Minamoto clan. Atsumori is a young Taira warrior of elite background, who dies in the battle after a confrontation with Minamoto warrior Kumagai on the beach. Zeami’s play Atsumori takes place after the war.

The shite plays the ghost of Atsumori, and the waki (supporting character) plays a priest, who is actually Kumagai retired from his warriorship, taking the priestly name Rensei. In the first act of the play, Rensei returns to the place where he killed Atsumori and converses with a flute-playing grass cutter, not knowing the grass cutter is in fact the spirit of Atsumori in disguise. Together, they say their prayers—“Hail, Amida Buddha”—for Atsumori. It is in the second act, then, that the truth about the grass cutter’s identity is revealed. They recount their battle and both find peace as Atsumori dances to the chorus’ chanting as the chorus delivers the final conclusion of the play. The obvious religious theme is not unique to Atsumori, and is a general tradition of noh drama. The waki character is often a priest while the main plot in shura play is the warrior spirit finding peace through religious enlightenment.
Although in other plays like Tsunemasa, the achievement of salvation is not explicitly uttered by the chorus as is in Atsumori, the chorus nonetheless contributes to the effect in a different manner. LeFleur observes that there is a sense of emotional tranquility being achieved in noh as the play reaches its end, even when there is no textual evidence of such a sentiment communicated in the literal wording of noh literature (130). This tranquility or sense of relief is achieved through the earlier tension in the play being resolved and reconciled. The tension comes from one tragic interpretation of the shite’s situation. Atsumori is presented as young warrior who is wronged, which makes him a restless spirit bearing regret and injustice. However, as the play progresses, an alternative interpretation is presented. The presentation of this through noh performance involves the musical aspect of noh. Fujimura and colleagues, in their 2009 research, describe the powerful emotional effects of noh singing as capable of bringing even foreigners to tears despite not knowing the libretto of the play (157). For those who do understand the language, however, the effect is further intensified as the power of poetics is again at work in singing of chorus. As Atsumori’s chorus exclaims for Atsumori, “No, Rensei is not my enemy” (44), the ghost of Astumori’s warrior spirit lets go of his stress and torment, and is enlightened and released from the unrest.

It is sometimes difficult for a Western audience to appreciate noh drama, for it does not adhere to the Western dramatic traditions where conflict and confrontation between the protagonist and antagonist propel the story. ‘LaFleur cites a group of Japanese scholars in his book who studied and concluded the following about noh drama vis-à-vis Western drama: “In Japan’s classical drama the second actor (waki) is not really an adversary, and the action proceeds because of a story being told rather than through conflict between personalities [italics added]” (131). It returns to the fundamental unity of action and language in Japanese classical theatre. The character’s dialogue and the chorus’ narration of the story are interdependent to the actions unfolding onstage; there is no distinction between the literary and the performance. This interdependent relationship between the words and the movement parallels the relationship between the shite and the waki.

In shura noh, the shite and the waki coexist not as enemies, but as companions in a shared situation. Even when the situation assigns them to be the opponent to each other, there is often mutual respect and gratitude between the characters. This dramatic tendency traces back to classical legends from which noh often draws inspiration; for example, in the story of Tiara no Tandori’s death in Genpei war tales. Just like Atsumori, Tadanori is a martial figure, but furthermore a cultured artist. Following a dramatic battle scene which ended with Tadanori being decapitated by
Tadazumi, it was famously told that Tadazumi, after discovering a poem written by the deceased warrior himself, mounted Tadanori’s head on his sword and held it to the sky, crying praises about how great a fighter and poet Tadanori was, and that he would be “sorely missed” (Varley 108). This story sheds some light on the attitude of “my enemy is my friend,” and the one who prevails in a battle often honors greatly the one who falls. While this might not necessarily reflect the reality of Japan’s wartime attitude and treatment of their cross-cultural enemies, it appears to be an ideal impression upheld in classical literature and art within the culture. The entire premise of *Atsumori* is founded on this sense of respect and intimacy that pushes the story towards the direction of salvation and reconciliation. There is suffering, but not antagonism. Both the *shite* and *waki* character are represented in noh as earthly souls caught in the cycle of suffering due to their perspective of the situation. Through this suffering the characters are able to change their vision and interpretation of their destiny, and rise above their conditions.

In *shura* noh, what comes from suffering is not vengeance, but enlightenment. In *Atsumori*, the ghost of Atsumori relives and reenacts the battle between himself and Rensei, and through rejecting vengeance and reconciling with Rensei instead, is able to achieve enlightenment (*nirvana*). It is through suffering that one obtains enlightenment; suffering is not the opposite of enlightenment, but a codependent identical with enlightenment, as “there can be no nirvana apart from samsara” (LeFleur 127). This non-dualism, or rejection of duality, is the essential premise of noh theatre. Meanwhile, the performance of chorus is a vivid representation of this philosophy. At the end of *Atsumori*, the chorus chants:

[Atsumori] Has obtained salvation for his foe;  
So that they shall be re-born together  
On one lotus-seat (44)

It is with Rensei that Atsumori is able to find salvation for Rensei, who is not his enemy but instead the one who would pray for him and give Atsumori his salvation. In its closing chant, the chorus utters and grants salvation to Atsumori’s and Rensei’s souls. As discussed earlier, the chorus is an inherently reliable narrator and the chorus chants here function similarly to the rainmaking poem, which brings forth the phenomenon it describes. The chorus’ narrative crystallizes the meaning and presents the audience with a new perspective that transforms the relationship between Atsumori and Rensei. Buddhist poetries are believed to possess mythical powers because they contain “truth” and “reason” that in turn summon natural elements such as water and rain. On the noh stage, the “truth” the chorus utters by the end of the play gives rise to the phenomenon, granting the characters a peace and salvation. Just as the salvation of
Atsumori’s soul and the salvation of Rensei’s soul are the same matter, the chorus’ uttering and granting are ultimately one thing.

**SPIRITUAL SALVATION IN TSUNEMASA AND IKUTA**

The restlessness the deceased warrior suffers is the main tension of *shura* noh. The plot of noh drama works towards resolving and releasing this tension. While Atsumori’s ghost is bound by vengeance and regret, the warrior spirits could also be bound by love and loss as their forms of earthly attachment, exemplified in two other *shura* plays, *Tsunemasa* and *Ikuta*. In both plays, the *shite* character finds himself trapped in the cycle of eternal suffering due to his unresolved attachments. It is through letting go of these attachments that the *shite* achieves spiritual salvation in the end of the play in the chorus’ chanting.

In the first half of the play *Tsunemasa*, the chorus chants when the ghost of Taira warrior Tsunemasa appears in front of priest Gyokei, who was playing a lute that once belonged to Tsunemasa:

```
Only as a tricking magic,
A bodiless vision,
Can he hover in the world of his lifetime,
Swift-changing Tsunemasa.
But this name we call him, yet of the body
That man named so, what is left but longing?
What but the longing to look again, through the wall of death,
On one he loved? (53)
```

In this passage, the chorus affirms the Buddhist narrative of longing and attachment. The ghost of warrior Tsunemasa, even after his death, is unwilling to let go of the world. He longs for the life he has lost, which is symbolized in his beloved lute. In the play, Tsunemasa loves art and music, and despises battle. He is mortified to be seen trapped in the Realm of Asura—the realm of continuous combat and struggle—and extinguishes the light so others do not see him. A parallel could be drawn between *Tsunemasa* and another play about Atsumori, *Ikuta* by Komparu Zempo, in which the *shite* is bound by both love and hate. In *Tsunemasa*, it is Tsunemasa’s love for his lute and his hatred in battles; in *Ikuta*, Atsumori loves his son, while the demons of war still haunt his spirit. In both plays, the chorus plays a pivotal role in completing the circle of suffering/attachment and salvation/enlightenment.

*Tsunemasa* opens with Tsunemasa’s ghost being attracted by the sound of the priest playing the lute that was once his. Tsunemasa is unable to accept his death, and the lute reminds him of his sadness and regret: “I am like dews that in the morning
"/ Still cling to the grasses” (52). Yet by the end of the play, the chorus narrates a new perspective as it sings in the final passage:

For a foolish man is like a summer moth that flies into the flame.
The wind that blew out the candle
Carried him away. In the darkness his ghost has vanished.
The shadow of his ghost has vanished (56)

In Ikuta, the story is actually about Atsurmori, who returns to earth in the form of a spirit to visit his son Ikuta. He cries and sighs: “Oh pitiful! / To see this child, born after me / Darling that should be gay as a flower, / Walking in tattered coat of old black cloth” (48). Full of sorrow and shame, Atsumori recounts his clan’s glory to his son and leaves when the dawn is near. The chorus ends:

And weeping, weeping,
Dropped the child’s hand.
He has faded; he dwindles
Like the dew from rush-leaves
Of hazy meadows.
His form has vanished (50)

In both plays, the tension exists when the warrior spirit refuses to accept or let go of his fate. The chorus relieves this tension by the end of the plays through presentation of poetry, which sends away the regretful spirits that haunt the world of the living. 

Japanese scholar Herbert E. Plutschow, in his book Chaos and Cosmos: Ritual in Early and Medieval Japanese Literature, identifies the exorcism aspect of the noh drama as the ghost or demon represented by the shite is cast away at the play’s end. The chorus’ narration validates the casting away of the spirit. In its libretto, the chorus announces that the spirit has been carried away and faded, and so has he. The main tension of the drama is put to rest in the chorus’ poetic chanting.

Since the progression and conclusion of the action in noh drama are interdependent on the story being told, the chorus’ passages are not merely commentary, but also mystical poetics that determine the outcome and conclusion of the story. If divorced from the language, nothing seems to “happen” in the plot of shura noh. The warrior spirit remains a spirit, and departs from his brief interaction with the living by the end of the play. Nothing seems to be resolved except according to the chorus’ poetry. The chorus’ language assigns meaning to the shite’s performance, often in dance, and brings about the alternative perspective of acceptance and departure.

In Tsunemasa’s example, Tsunemasa is carried away by the wind after extinguishing the candle’s flame. While Atsumori, after visiting his son, fades like the morning dew. In the metaphor of submitting to nature’s powers such as the wind
and the dawn, the warrior spirit ceases to resist his fate in the chorus’ narrative, and through that acceptance becomes at peace with his fate—now that he is awake to what his fate is. Similarly, the audience perceives the peace of the shite character from the poetry of the chorus, and accepts the suffering as part of the enlightenment. The audience accepts the suffering as part of the “codependent origination” (LeFleur 119) of samsara and nirvana in the chorus narrative when Atsumori drops his son’s hand and lets go, and when Tsunemasa metaphorically dives into the flame like a moth, following the cosmic order of tragedy and enlightenment.

CONCLUSION

At the same time, the audience achieves tranquility and relief, as we too, let go and are purified by the chorus’ chants. In the Buddhist philosophy of noh, what engenders suffering are the worldly attachments of love and hatred. Warrior noh emphasizes this concept of suffering and salvation in its most intense form. The chorus then plays the metaphorical role of the “rainmaker” and brings forth the rain of reconciliation to put out the flames of war that bind the warrior spirits. It does so through the power of poetics, which is supported by the kotodama theory of language and spirituality. Through the mythical power of chorus’ prayer, the suffering spirits are released from their delusive attachments. While this is not to claim that noh drama is a dramatic interpretation of the Buddhist rainmaking tradition, I commit that the Japanese rainmaking rites lend us a metaphorical framework to understand the role of the chorus in noh drama, given the close relation between Buddhist rituals and noh drama.

Japanese art culture has created a great body of work and made significant contributions in art. Noh drama, in particular, represents an unique and exquisite take on theatre in both literature and performance. A lot of attention has been given to the physical aspect of noh theatre—and rightly so for a type performance whose other name is “the art of walking.” In contrast, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the Western audience struggles when it comes to the text and language of noh due to difficulties in translation and contextual understanding. While the language barrier is indeed present between the Western audience and the art of noh, it could be overcome even for an audience unfamiliar with the history and literature of Japanese classic.

I argue in this essay that the heart of noh is spiritual, philosophical, and religious. It evokes a feeling of enlightenment that is not necessarily attached to intellectual conception, as proven in Fujimura and colleagues’ research on the effect of noh chorus songs and music. As Atsumori in Atsumori argues, beauty is not preserved only for those in the position of higher knowledge and education (37-38). While
classical scholars are justifiably concerned with the history and literary roots of noh style and language, I suggest that these aspects are not the necessary requirement for appreciating noh. The core of noh—the spiritual enlightenment—is achievable so long as one is open to the mystical power of noh and allows the meaning of the dramatic situation to be influenced through either literary verses or performance. As I have suggested through examination of the chorus’ function in noh, following the tradition of kotodama and in the culture of Japanese performance art, the noh language and performance are an ultimate unity.

The understanding of noh cannot be divorced from its philosophical roots in Mahayana Buddhist dialects. By extension, this essay proposes that noh theatre is to be considered with respect to the kotodama beliefs in relation to its ritualistic tradition—for noh to be read as performative literature and poetry with a strong unity between language and performance as well as a spiritual practice that has its core deeply embedded in the pursuit of peace and enlightenment. The noh chorus highlights and honors this tradition in its poetic narration throughout the performance of noh drama. The spiritual drought building in shura noh, due to the undying grudges and resentment of the warrior ghosts, is cured by the chorus’ poetry. Like rain finally gracing the sundry land, summoned by the rainmaker’s magical poems, the sense of spiritual enlightenment is achieved through the chorus’ chants at last.

REFERENCES


The aim of my analysis is to critically examine pursuits of objective truth and knowledge, especially as they pertain to contemporary Anglosphere psychology. As the “study of the soul” has evolved to become more closely aligned with the natural sciences, it has also adopted a model of scientific theorizing which needs closer examination. I begin this investigation with a return to Nietzsche’s critique of objective truth and essentialism found in his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” I argue in favor of adopting Nietzsche’s perspectival account of truth in which the particulars of our experiences are emphasized more than universal abstractions. I then explore the consequences of taking abstract concepts too seriously as capturing objective truth, a practice which I argue lies at the heart of contemporary psychology. I specifically direct my concern towards the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) which I argue is a classic example of how psychologists have privileged abstract concepts over individual experiences, a process which threatens the affirmation of life.

The word “psychology” no longer has a clear definition, and understandably so. In the last hundred years, the dominant paradigm in Western psychology has shifted from Freudian psychoanalysis to mid-twentieth century behaviorism, which in turn has been replaced by contemporary cognitive and neuro sciences. These scientific approaches have taken a firm hold over academic discourse and now serve as the legitimizers of psychology as a natural science, one which has distanced itself from its philosophical roots. Seemingly, science and the scientific method have gained privileged relationships with the truth in virtue of their ability to direct us closer to objectivity and avoid the shortcomings of human error. But does such an objective truth exist? And if it does, can a scientific approach hope to obtain a purified view of it? The goal of my analysis is to critically examine such pursuits of objective truth and knowledge, particularly as they pertain to contemporary Anglosphere psychology. I adopt the Nietzschean position that the human intellect is necessarily
confined to its own perspective, and all attempts at theorizing will inevitably arrive at a perspectival account of truth. I hope to demonstrate that when we take our concepts as unquestionably capturing objective truth, and forget their status as perspectival interpretations, we pass over the individual and unique particulars of our experiences. As I explain below, the creation and implementation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is a classic example of how this process is commonplace in modern psychology.

A CASE FOR NIETZSCHEAN PERSPECTIVISM

In order to begin a critique of scientific theorizing, I must first consider the nature of the thing which scientific theorizing hopes to reveal—the truth. What is supposed to distinguish the contemporary approach to psychology from its Freudian past is its shift away from unfalsifiable theories, largely supported by introspection, towards methods which are testable and objective. Attempts at objectivity, however, carry the assumption that there is something “out there” separate from the observer which can be studied “in-itself.” But what would it mean to speak of something “in-itself?” Our perceptions would have to capture an object in its totality of features, accounting for the different perspectives which can engage with it. In his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche rejects the idea that human perception can serve as a stable foundation for understanding objects “in-themselves” and offers the following example:

What is a word? The copy of a nervous stimulation in sounds. To infer from the fact of the nervous stimulation that there exists a cause outside us is already the result of applying the principle of sufficient reason wrongly...how could we possibly be permitted to say, “The stone is hard”, as if “hard” were something known to us in some other way, and not merely as an entirely subjective stimulus? (144)

In other words, the “hardness” of the stone is not something intrinsic to the stone itself, or something which exists independently in nature. Rather, it is a property which emerges from the human perspective. If we were to examine the stone from a different point of view, say at the atomic level, we would see that the stone is composed mostly of “empty spaces” between the atoms, revealing that the stone only feels hard because of the way humans experience it. Our perspective of the stone is vastly different from that of a dog, which can detect smells that are concealed from human beings, or that of a honeybee which (being able to see in the ultraviolet) sees colors in the stone undetectable to the human eye. For this reason Nietzsche says, “[Humans designate] only the relations of things to human beings, and in order to express them, they avail [themselves] of the boldest metaphors (144). Simply put, the concepts which we use to describe the objects of our experiences—or what Nietzsche is calling “bold
metaphors”—are only able to capture our perspectives of what the thing “is.” The concept “hardness,” which we use to refer to the stone does not capture a truth about the stone, “in-itself,” but rather describes our own experience of the stone.

In addition to the limited nature of our perceptions, Nietzsche argues that our concepts fail to capture objective truth because concept formation is inherently an activity of “making equivalent that which is non-equivalent” (145). Despite the fact that no two objects in the world are ever exactly alike—either in their features or in their spatio-temporal dimensions—we use a single concept to describe every object within that category. As Nietzsche says:

Just as it is certain that no leaf is ever exactly the same as any other leaf, it is equally certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by dropping these individual differences arbitrarily, by forgetting those features which differentiate one thing from another, so that the concept then gives rise to the notion that something other than leaves exists in nature, something which would be “leaf”, a primal form, say, from which all leaves were woven. (145)

Simply put, even though no two leaves in nature are ever exactly the same, we use one concept, “leaf,” to describe all of the particular leaves we encounter. In order to form and use concepts, we necessarily have to abstract beyond each particular leaf, ignoring their individual differences.

One might stop Nietzsche here, however, and argue in defense of objective truth by pointing out that our concepts are meant to capture what is essential to a given object. Take, for example, the concept “book.” We encounter books of all different sizes, colors, designs, and content on a regular basis, yet we are able to unite these particulars under the concept “book” because they all have something “essential” in common—specifically, that they can all be read. This essentialist argument in defense of objective truth, however, fails to consider Nietzsche’s first argument, i.e. that there is nothing in the book itself called “readability” which can be understood apart from the perspective engaging with it. Consider a civilization which has a library full of books but does not know how to read. Instead, they use the books as fuel for their fires, and never realize that the books contain information which can be understood by examining the pages. What is essential to the books has suddenly shifted away from their “readability” to their use as a fuel source. What becomes clear is that what is “essential” to an object does not exist in the object itself, but is instead shaped by the perspective engaging with it. Therefore, when we arrive at a so-called “essence,” what we have captured is not something which exists “out there” apart from us, but rather a truth regarding what is essential about the concept to us.
If at this point we recognize that truth is of a perspectival nature, are we forced into denying the usefulness of our concepts? Not at all. Concepts clearly give us a way of commonly referring to the world of our experiences, and their utility is not in question. In fact, Nietzsche argues that it is precisely because of the usefulness of concepts that we have forgotten their status as “bold metaphors.” Concepts serve as the means by which we are able to establish common ground with society, to conform to “the herd.” This conformity, however, comes at a price. As was previously argued, concepts can only be formed by overlooking individual differences. We must forget the particulars of our experiences in favor of the “firmly established” and “canonical” truths which fit the “established convention” (Nietzsche 146). Individual perspectives must become subordinate to conceptual schemata in order for the herd to function.

THE DSM, PERSPECTIVISM, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH

This process of forgetting the individual in favor of the conceptual schemata has become commonplace precisely in the type of scientific theorizing which contemporary psychology has adopted as its method of inquiry. As Nietzsche says, “Originally as we have seen, it is language which works on building the edifice of concepts; later it is science” (150). This “edifice of concepts” which Nietzsche says scientific theorizing constructs can no longer be understood as merely poetic language or flowery metaphor. Psychologists have constructed a tangible edifice of concepts in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The DSM, now in its fifth edition, is the product of over sixty years of scientific theorizing and cataloguing. It is a nearly one thousand page collection of over three hundred different mental disorders, and serves as the “gold standard” for diagnosing mental illnesses in the United States. As Christopher Lane says in his book Shyness, “The fact that psychiatrists often playfully call this reference manual their bible doesn’t offset that they follow its pronouncements chapter and verse” (2). But have the scientific theorizers who have created the concepts in the DSM been able to avoid perspectivism and capture these psychopathologies “in-themselves?” Not at all. As I have previously argued, attempts at capturing “objective truth” are destined to fail since conceptualization is necessarily a perspectival activity. The following example, which is the DSM-5 criteria for “Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD)” serves to prove my point:

A. Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at least 6 months, about a number of events or activities (such as work or school performance)

B. The individual finds it difficult to control the worry
C. The anxiety and worry are associated with three (or more) of the following six symptoms (with at least some symptoms having been present for more days than not for the past 6 months):

Note: Only one item is required in children

1. Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge.
2. Being easily fatigued
3. Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
4. Irritability
5. Muscle Tension
6. Sleep Disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless, unsatisfying sleep)

D. The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning

E. The disturbance is not attributed to the physiological effects of a substance or another medical condition

F. The disturbance is not better explained by another mental disorder (e.g., anxiety or worry about having panic attacks in panic disorder, negative evaluation in social anxiety disorder, etc.) (American Psychiatric Association. (222)

This criteria epitomizes the “edifice of concepts” of which Nietzsche is speaking. What exactly counts as “excessive” or “a number of activities?” At what point can we say it is “difficult to control the worry?” What exactly is meant by “irritability” and “fatigue?” Even if we did have objectively true definitions of these terms, we would still face the problems of matching the patient’s perspective of their experience with the defined term, and then drawing a one-to-one causal relationship. For example, how exactly can I be sure that my definition of “difficulty concentrating” aligns with the DSM’s? How can we tell if a patient’s fatigue and irritability is best explained by Generalized Anxiety Disorder rather than a stressful work schedule, a difficult relationship, or any other number of factors? Any attempt at working through these problems and defining terms necessitates perspectival interpretations.

One objection to my argument which someone might raise is that despite some of these shortcomings I have described, the DSM still serves as a useful tool for psychologists and psychiatrists working in the mental health field. It gives them a general way of establishing common ground and ensures that they are referring to the same terms. Yet, as I stated earlier, I am not denying the usefulness of concepts and conceptual schemata such as the DSM. I am instead arguing that this usefulness comes with a cost—namely, that it requires us to ignore unique differences and privilege the
conceptual schemata over the individual. This “ignoring” or “forgetting” the individual has severe consequences for mental health. First, it describes precisely the type of behavior we engage in when we stigmatize those with mental disorders. Instead of attending to the unique and “wholly individual” person who is presented before us, we subordinate their perspective to whichever concept has been put in place to describe them (schizophrenic, anxious, bipolar, autistic, etc.). Mental health professionals can easily fall victim to this type of behavior as well. People who live with mental disorders are in danger of having their experiences neglected once they have been labeled with a condition. A psychiatrist or social worker can become so focused on the concept which describes a person that they entirely miss the valuable information which the individual is presenting them. When we privilege the conceptual schemata over the individual, we not only prevent the person from receiving proper attention, but we also negate the value of their existence in favor of “the herd.”

Another issue with privileging the usefulness of conceptual schemata over individuals is that when our definitions of concepts change, we tacitly assume that those individuals who fit the concepts have also changed. When a new disorder is added to the DSM, for instance, an individual who was once considered “normal” according to the diagnostic criteria suddenly “becomes” pathological. Despite the fact that no change has occurred in the individual, the diagnosis changes the way the individual is viewed by society, their potential treatment options, and in some cases, their access to pharmaceutical drugs. Prior to the DSM III, for example, an individual who described themselves as introverted, nervous in social situations, prone to spending time by his or herself, etc. might have been considered “shy” by society, but would have been deemed “normal” by medical professionals. Once these types of behaviors were added to the DSM as a part of “social anxiety disorder,” however, this same person’s status within the medical community literally changed overnight, as did their access to medication. As Lane argues in his book Shyness, this was and has been a major contributor to the severe rise in sales of anti-anxiety prescription medication since the 1990s. Prevalence rates since 1993 for “social anxiety disorder” have risen from 3.7 percent to 18.7 percent in the U.S. in response to changes in the DSM criteria and sensationalized headlines (Lane 5). Although a full account of these trends for each mental disorder are well beyond the scope of this paper, the relevant point is that as new concepts are added to the schema, the way we treat individuals who at one time were considered “normal” subsequently changes.

In criticizing the potential dangers of privileging conceptual schemata over individual perspectives, am I necessarily arguing that we should do away with concepts all together? Not at all. Such a task would not only be misguided, but also impossible.
As Nietzsche says, the drive to form metaphors is the fundamental human drive, one which could not be left out without also leaving out human beings themselves (151). I am instead arguing that when we take concepts as unquestionably revealing objective reality, we are in danger of missing the unique perspectives of individuals. This is ultimately what is at stake: the value of the individual. If we truly have the best interests of individuals with mental illnesses in mind, their personal experiences must be privileged over abstract conceptual schemata such as the DSM. Not only does this affirm the value of the individual, but as has been argued through a reading of Nietzschean perspectivism, conceptual schemata have no grounds as a window into “objective reality.” This reprioritization of individuals over abstract concepts further substantiates person-first approaches to psychology, a style which points towards the Nietzschean affirmation of life.

END NOTES
1. For more information on the interrelated history of philosophy and psychology, and psychology’s turn towards the natural sciences in the nineteenth century, see Daniel N. Robinson’s An Intellectual History of Psychology Third ed. 1995.
2. “The herd” is a term Nietzsche uses throughout his works which is most closely synonymous with what other philosophers have called “the masses.” According to Nietzsche, our values and ethical systems have not been created based on what is objectively good or evil, but rather are based on what preserves and advances the interests of the herd. For more detail see The Gay Science 1, 50, 116, 117, and 296.

REFERENCES
This work examines the evolution of Union Soldiers’ beliefs regarding slaves, the institution of slavery, and the prospect of emancipation during the American Civil War. By focusing on increased interracial interactions, the shared experiences between captured Union soldiers and Southern slaves, as well as their dependence on slaves for their survival in the prisons and during their escapes, it can be determined that at the closure of their ordeals, Union soldiers’ views on the above mentioned overwhelmingly shifted prior to their initial exposure to the South. The first hand accounts of captive Union soldiers’ letters and diaries, and the recorded interviews and writings of slaves are utilized to establish the connection of imprisoned soldiers and slaves. This work builds on the more recent studies of common soldiers and race during this period while challenging previously held scholastic concepts that racism was common among Northern soldiers. It is unique in that it studies how personal experiences worked to reshape and influence the beliefs of individual men. With these experiences taken into account, it becomes clear that shared treatment and experience influenced Union soldiers to discard their initial racial tendencies and beliefs of racial superiority, and adopt the belief that slaves were their brothers of the human race. This ultimately led to their desire for the morality of abolition and equality.

In the late afternoon on April 4, 1862, while stationed in Savannah, Tennessee, the forty-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry was startled into action by surprise fire on their pickets from rebel forces. Launching himself into defensive action, Captain John James Geer mounted his horse and raced one mile up the Tennessee river towards Hamburg road for an advantageous position from which to assess the attack. However, this act of patriotism and duty proved fateful for Captain Geer. Upon reaching his destination, he found it lined to the horizon’s edge with rebel soldiers. After engaging in a desperate fight for his freedom, Captain Geer was surrounded by his enemy and taken as a prisoner of war, a title that remained with him over the course of the next two years.
It was not until his imprisonment and during his escape that Captain Geer first experienced close contact with slaves. It was his encounters with this “despised” race that, upon the conclusion of his ordeal, Captain Geer was able to reject his prejudice-based Virginian upbringing, which had taught him to regard African-Americans as “unreliable and stupid.” Attributed to his experiences, Geer rejected all notions of race, realizing that “beneath that dark brow was the mind of a man, and within [the] slaves’ bosom beat a brother’s heart” (Geer 21, 25-27, 122).

**HISTORIOGRAPHY**

Accounts of war and capture, similar to Captain Geer’s, have been described by soldiers who found themselves apprehended by their enemy during the American Civil War. Since the conclusion of the war, these memoirs have served countless historians by providing a unique insight into the personal experiences of these men. One element of study that has recently gained acknowledgement concerns the experiences of common soldiers; a shift in research, referred to by historian Marvin R. Cain as one from the ‘causes’ focusing on political climates of the time to that of ‘consequences’, which serves to explore the human element of war (5).

From the Postbellum years following the Civil War into the early twentieth century, the study of the events of the Civil War largely focused on the actions and behaviors of generals and politicians (Cain 6). In the 1920s, historian Fred Shannon began examining the motives that influenced soldiers to enlist and fight in the Civil War, triggering the exploration into the mind of the common soldier. With scholarly emphasis being placed in the study of daily life of the common soldiers, the “values and beliefs [that] motivated people to fight and die” began to substantially influence the direction of Civil War research (Cain 8).

In the 1940s, several scholars, including Otto Eisenschiml and Ralph Newman, began to explore the previously overlooked firsthand accounts of Civil War soldiers, which shed light on the human side of armed conflicts. Academic study of the Civil War began to transform as historians such as Bell I. Wiley found, through soldiers’ personal accounts, the most common motivations of enlisted soldiers. This shift in academic focus, in which more scholars strive to decode the complexities of soldiers’ attitudes, behaviors and the trauma experienced in war, continues into present day.

In the past, historians focused on the idea that racism proliferated in the ranks of the Union army. However, as the analysis of personal accounts from common Civil War soldiers gained momentum, historians began acknowledging the transformative aspects Union soldiers underwent as the direct result of prolonged interaction with African-Americans of the South. The idea to focus on firsthand accounts of soldiers rather than the careers of military generals, encouraged by scholars such as Joseph
L. Harsh, Edward Hargerman and Russell Weigley, led Clarence Mohr to argue that Union soldiers’ longevity in the South led to their increased exposure with slaves and freedmen. Mohr concluded that the exposure caused soldiers’ original views on slavery, slaves and emancipation to shift to those of understanding and sympathy (Cain 23). Such ideological transformations were caused by direct contact with Southern slaves, and influenced other Northern groups as well. As historian Edward Blum’s research has illustrated, interracial contact drastically influenced the views of the Northern white missionaries and teachers who traveled to the South to aid impoverished communities. The increased interactions with African-Americans altered their perspectives of the race and racial identifications in the same way it had for Northern soldiers (51-86).

Findings indicate that interracial interactions did influence Northern men, in the majority of cases, to sympathize with the plight of slaves and favor emancipation. Yet, of all previous research that focuses on how increasing interracial interactions led to reshaping Northern morality and political stances, one aspect remains neglected: how these interactions, through the shared experiences of captivity, want for personal liberty, and fugitiveness in pursuit of these rights were experienced by both Union prisoners of war and Southern slaves. Desperation for freedom and survival bonded the two groups together, proving to Union soldiers that the only differences between them and African-Americans did not lie in intelligence, courage, or overall humanity, but rather in the disparity of epidermal pigmentation.

The analysis of white-black relationships and the understanding of how their shared experiences of thralldom led to the loss of each race’s rightful liberties and subsequent attempts for freedom form the basis of this work. Comparable with the studies conducted in the changing views that Union soldiers held towards the black population of the Confederate states, this study is unique in that it examines how the alliance and dependence prisoners of war had with slaves in order to survive in prison and escape to freedom changed prisoners’ views. Shared experiences and similar treatment by white Southern soldiers demonstrates how Northern soldiers’ views towards slaves, the institution of slavery, and the issue of emancipation were influenced from ones of negativity and indifference to those of sympathy and abolition.

An examination of personal diaries of Union soldiers who were captured by Confederate forces, placed into prison camps, and later participated in bold attempts for their own freedom will demonstrate how integral the aid of bondsmen became in their survival of these ordeals. Additionally, my analysis of narratives of former slaves contributes to a better comparison of the treatment and conditions which Union soldiers underwent during imprisonment to that of what slaves were forced
to endure for generations. With the aid of these sources, as well as the opinions of several Civil War historians, I argue that the unique experience as prisoners of war of the Confederacy forced the interaction between Northerners and Southern slaves. Budding relationships of understanding led to interracial alliances, which became increasingly important as these prisoners fled towards Northern lines for freedom. As this alliance was continually reinforced, Union soldiers shifted earlier notions rooted in racism to viewing African-Americans as their brothers in humanity.

EXAMINING SOLDIERS’ INITIAL IDEOLOGY

In order to examine the conversion of Northern soldiers into men of abolition, it is imperative to understand the general perception that Union men had at the start of their initial deployments south. Delving into Union soldiers’ stances on slaves as a group of people at the beginning of the Civil War, inherent racism is observed. Slaves were often viewed by Northern soldiers as subhuman, being frequently depicted in their accounts as nothing more than another element of the Southern landscape. In a letter to Well Wyman, Private Eason W. Bull of the 154th New York infantry wrote that the landscape consisted of “chestnut, walnut, shell and grape [artillery projectiles], and log cabins and niggers, and lots of ground to sleep on” (Dunkelman 97). By analyzing correspondences between recently deployed Union soldiers and their loved ones about the South allows historians to peer into the uncensored opinions held toward slaves. For example, private Samuel R. Williams of Company F in the 154th New York Infantry relayed to his girlfriend that he was forced to deny her request that he “fetch a black lady home with [him],” as he hoped to have “nothing to do with [slaves]” (Dunkelman 98).

Although several Union men held negative views towards slaves, they considered the institution of slavery to be deplorable. This opinion was held to such an extent that most Northerners believed it to be the explanation to the poor condition of the South, and interpreted the war as being waged against the Confederates as a punishment from God for utilizing such an institution. In his published diary documenting his time as a prisoner of war, Captain Geer maintained that it is the responsibility of any man loyal to the Union to “strip from the hideous skeleton of Slavery all its gaily painted and deceptive cloaks and masks, and to exhibit it in all its ghastly repulsiveness” (3). Northern disgust towards slavery was conveyed by many soldiers upon their first observances of the institution, which they interpreted as the reason that the South was so severely dilapidated. Soldiers of the 154th New York Infantry felt that southern ignorance, illiteracy, poverty and overall “backward[ness]” was a direct result of slavery. As Geer’s exposure to the system of slavery progressed,
he realized that he found himself growing “more and more hostile to the slave system” (202, 225, 232).

The complexities between the attitudes towards slaves and slavery continually grew as the possibility of emancipation drew an additional layer into political belief. When the Civil War began taking on a greater identity as a war which intended to liberate the oppressed race, some Union soldiers found themselves less committed to their military duty. Yet others with a hatred for slavery embraced the notion of ending what many felt was an unjust institution. As desire for emancipation grew stronger, many Union men hoped it would obliterate such an immoral institution. These men “fervently prayed for the day to hasten” (Geer 57, 124, 197), when the war would “abolish the institution [of slavery] every where and forever” (Girardi 414). A major factor that influenced Northern men to rethink their political views towards issues such as emancipation, as well as their opinions concerning both slaves and the institution of slavery, was largely due to introductory encounters with the horrors of human bondage. Thus, firsthand exposure to slavery undoubtedly appealed to Union soldiers’ morality and humanity.

**INTERACTION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SOLDIERS**

The experiences prisoners of war underwent during their captivity and escape as well as the loss of their basic human right of freedom are relative to what many Southern slaves experienced. An additional contributor to the transformation of political, social and moral thought of the prisoners of war regarding attitudes toward slaves and opinions of slavery and emancipation stemmed from prisoner-slave communication. Union prisoners’ perspectives were altered by their firsthand interactions with slaves throughout their ordeals, creating an alliance between the two groups.

Through these interactions, a dependence on slaves for survival in the prison camps and during their escapes North began to be nurtured and cultivated. The ordeals of Union prisoners often included both internment and escape, a factor that led to the increase of prisoners’ dependence on slaves for their own survival and created a newfound respect from Northern soldiers toward slaves. With that came prisoners’ altering views of slaves, the institution of slavery, and emancipation to ones of support.

Interaction between Northern prisoners of war and slaves led to an alliance rooted in sympathy between these two groups. How this brought genuine change to Northern men’s opinions of Southern slavery consists of two major elements. The first explores the increasing interactions between prisoners of war and slaves. After Captain Geer’s initial interactions with the slaves working at his prison, his determination to
better understand them led to a series of interviews with these men. While conducting one such interview with a slave named George, Geer discovered a great contrast to his prior belief that slaves were ignorant and uninformed. George conveyed to Geer that he knew quite a lot about freedom and what the war meant, explaining that “if you’d whip ‘em up dar, us colored folks ‘ud all be free” (36). Surprised by the aptness of the prison’s slaves on matters concerning the war, Geer soon became perplexed as to how Southern whites allowed themselves to be blinded by racism, unable to recognize that slaves were actually “more intellectual and virtuous than the majority of whites in Secessia” (56, 87). Therefore, Captain Geer’s opinions regarding slaves changed drastically to those of interest and understanding, a direct result of his interactions with Southern slaves. As with Captain Geer, Sergeant William Charles’ prolonged interactions with the slaves working at his prison influenced him to later teach black children during his off-duty hours. With these interracial interactions, Charles held the radical realization that “they learn as quick as white children...Many of them have no shoes [for] their feet but...will come no matter how cold it is because they wish so much to learn their books” (Dunkelman 101).

As interracial interactions grew amongst captive Union soldiers, they began to rely on slaves in several different ways. Some soldiers felt that it was now their duty to accept slaves fleeing to the Union army because the soldiers not only experienced “the slaves’ destitution and suffering, but their friendship and support for the Union cause” (Dunkelman 104). Similar to the support that Geer had encountered at the prison when speaking with George about the slave’s hopes of Union victory, it is not surprising that most Southern African-Americans, whether of human bondage or freedom, left their Union counterparts with momentous impressions.

The second aspect consists of examining how the result of the increasing interracial interactions developed into the growing dependence prisoners of war had on slaves, both for camp survival as well as survival and success as fugitives. The searching and looting of all personal possessions during prison admittance, coupled with the inadequate economic means being sent to the Southern prison camps for the expenses of food, clothing, and medical care, nurtured a system of reliance between the prisoners confined in the camp and the slaves who worked there. When the availability of food was lacking in the prisons, slaves would pass food to suffering inmates through the cracks of the wooden walls and floors. During a particularly dreadful period of starvation, Captain Geer recalled how as “our supply of food grew smaller...and horribly less...[we were] regaled by some delicacies smuggled to us by [slaves] Tom and Pete” (61, 204).
Inadequate provisions at the prisons reduced its victims’ abilities to fight illness, causing diseases to become especially common in prison camps (Anderson 257). Lacking medical personnel at the camps resulted in large numbers of men lying unattended on bare floors awaiting death. Able-bodied prisoners longing to help the afflicted sought the assistance of camp slaves. Prisoners of war discovered that slaves tended to practice natural remedies to treat their own wounds inflicted by their overseers on plantations, and thus proved great aid to the prisoners turned caregivers. One such person was Virginian slave Ms. Holmes, who believing to be the only person able to help an injured Union soldier, dug up roots and created an ointment for his wounds (Rawick 180).

Physical injuries were just one element of individual hardships in prison. The struggle of psychological distress that Union captives had during their imprisonment meant that the importance of men to “never for a moment allow [themselves] to think of being homesick and [instead] keep constantly busy” became a realization amongst some prisoners. In his published prisoner of war diary, Cuban-born colonel Federico Fernandez Cavada repeatedly mentioned this factor, and states that it was motivation for Union men at Libby Prison to continually concoct ideas for escape, forcing interactions with slaves and subsequently creating prisoner-slave alliances. The ability for slaves to identify with the prisoners’ hardships influenced them to offer assistance to Union prisoners by smuggling different instruments of escape, such as hammers, small shovels, and files. Therefore, the escape plans that were carried out by Union prisoners owed much of their success to the aid of Libby’s slaves. Slaves also provided the prisoners with directions for the beginning of their journey, the fastest and most ideal routes to get to regions optimal for hiding, and which direction to venture to in order to reach the closest Union lines (Cram 23, 25, 27-28). Interactions and the subsequent support from slaves experienced by Union prisoners strengthened their gratitude and respect for the chattel of the South.

When the time came for escape, the friendship and alliance between the Union men who interacted with the slaves working in camps, and the Southern slaves imprisoned in camps grew substantially. Account after account of fugitive Union prisoners depicts their reliance on slaves, and describes how assistance was the “greatest outside support to a fugitive prisoner of war came from bondsmen” (Davis 1079). Geer noted that he and his comrade “dreaded the sight of white men...[and] as we traveled...hoped we might find some negro, for none else in that region were human beings” (110, 120). Slaves often told the fugitive prisoners who approached them working in the fields to hide for the day and meet at the slaves’ cabins after dark. Here, they were provided dinner and exchanged ideas about fugitives’ manner
of “proceeding on our journey...telling us how to escape to our home and friends” (Geer 125, 135). During these furtive interactions with slaves, escaped prisoners were provided with tips on how to survive their fugitive journey, including educating Northern men how to mask their scent from bloodhounds. Informing Union fugitives of the status of their pursuit and to be cautious of Confederate-guarded perimeters along the routes they were traveling were also common (Geer 128,134).

Another type of aid provided to Northern fugitives by slaves is found in the experiences of Irish teenager Thomas Hinds. Close to recapture and suffering from starvation, Hinds reached out to the “kind services of our ever-faithful and unwavering friends of the race despised,” from which he received food, shoes, weapons, medical help, and a map for his route from several slave families. In one instance, a black man carried Hinds in order to help cover any trace of Hinds’ scent from bloodhounds, an event that exemplifies the way in which white-black interactions helped form alliances between the two groups (Davis 1079).

A final aspect of slave assistance rests in the contrasting views between scholars of the early twentieth century and the accounts of slaves and the fugitive prisoners they helped. Walter Lynwood Fleming argued that loyalty toward their masters was dominant amongst slaves, claiming that the only active role slaves played during the Civil War was protecting the family valuables, food and livestock of their white masters from Union soldiers (Mohr 181-3). However, as the analyzed primary sources indicate, both from slave narratives and northern fugitives, this was rarely the case. Captain Geer, Ferdecio Cavada, Captain Simeon V. Pool, Private Sidney Moore, and Sergeant Charles A. McIntosh were just a few of the Northern fugitives whose interactions with bondsmen taught them that slaves would aid Union escapees in their mutual desires for freedom.

When Geer approached a slave working on a plantation for food, the man explained that he was willing to help him, and assured Geer that he would not tell anyone of his presence, expressing that “all I’s got in dis worl’ depends on ye” (123). Southern whites believed that their slaves were unaware of the true reasons for the Civil War while overestimating the devotion that their bondsmen held towards them. Disloyalty against owners and the abetting of Union fugitives became common amongst slaves. Despite Southern plantation owners creating “elaborate ruses to hide their food and valuables, [they were] instantly and generally betrayed by their chattels” (Dunkelman 102). Northern fugitive James Quilliam experienced one such alliance, recalling how a slave family betrayed their owner and showed the escaped prisoners where to find hidden items such as bacon, preserves, flour, milk and even bottles of alcohol (Dunkelman 103). Interracial interactions created a dynamic in the
prisoner-slave relationship that led to an understanding for slaves and the issue of emancipation in the political and social viewpoints of Union prisoners of war.

**SHARED EXPERIENCES: THRALLDOM, NOSTALGIA, AND ESCAPE**

Excluding Union soldiers who fought alongside black regiments, the soldiers who had the most encounters with slaves were those like Captain Geer, who had been captured by Confederate forces and placed into prison camps. Imprisonment became the catalyst to the shared experiences between captive Northern soldiers and Southern slaves, particularly concerning the areas of captivity and lack of liberty; homesickness and nostalgia; as well as escape and fugitive status. These three categories nurtured a mutual understanding between the slaves and prisoners that resulted in a greater sympathy regarding slaves and their plight amongst Northern prisoners of war, spurring the change in prisoners’ moral and political viewpoints.

**THRALLDOM**

The first shared experience to examine between Union soldiers and Southern slaves is found throughout various diaries documenting the ordeal of prisoners of war. Specifically, one element that is often described is how their captivity and lack of freedom was relative to the life and experiences of slaves. In his diary Geer explains how he had taken interest in the slaves being forced to work at the prison. His observances led him to conclude that the slaves were “well acquainted with our position”, which consisted of subjugation by the same “hateful power [of] rebel oppression” (Geer 34, 56, 103). Just as similar feelings were held between slaves and Northern prisoners of war towards their lack of freedom, many Union prisoners were similarly exposed to the unadulterated hatred of Southerners. This fostered increasing empathy toward slaves, as prisoners began to experience similar feelings of indignation that slaves held.

Captivity meant that availability of food, shelter, clothing and medical attention were nearly nonexistent in Southern prisons camps, with unbearable conditions being comparable to the experiences of Southern slaves. Former slave Richard Toler recalled how terrible provisions on the plantation were, and how all they had to eat was “bread, meat and water,” which was fed to them “in a trough, jes’ like the hogs.” Mary Reynolds, a woman born into slavery on the Kilpatrick Family Plantation in Louisiana, described how the slaves were only “half fed,” and that the food and water supplied to them in the fields “never was as much as we needed” (Rawick 239).

As with rations of food, lack of proper housing and shelter also became hardships experienced by those who were devoid of freedom. Shelter unavailability within prisons was another common experience between prisoners of war and slaves that fostered the feelings of degradation and inhumanity. Cavada described being
forced to create a makeshift home by transforming shelf-boards and blanket racks into stools, and had no option but to sleep on the floors (74). Several slaves described similar experiences under bondage. One account from Virginian slave Fountain Hughes depicts how “colored people didn’ have no beds when they was slaves. We always slep’ on the floor...Jus’ like uh lot of wild people” (Rawick 112).

An unfortunate aspect of thralldom was the inhumane treatment inflicted by the oppressor, with captives being no exception. Often interpreted by Northern prisoners as being punished for the simple reason that they were Union men, many soon felt the injustice of their detention. Upon his capture by Confederate soldiers at the Battle of Gettysburg, Cavada commented that many felt the unjustifiable acts of torture and starvation innocent soldiers were forced to endure by Southern guards for no other reason than that they were the Confederates’ Yankee prisoners (152). The same feelings of injustice were felt among Southern slaves who received unthinkable treatment for the slightest mistake. For example, Mary Reynolds recalled a lifetime of abuse from her overseer. In one case she was hung by her wrists from a tree and beaten until she fell unconscious and rendered infertile for no other reason than the flight of a fellow slave. Overzealous and disturbingly harsh punishments endured by slaves demonstrated that the slightest wrongdoing was capable of warranting such unthinkable treatment. During her interview, Reynolds’ statement that she would have taken death over the beatings (Rawick 16, 238, 241) conveys just how hopeless hers, and countless other slaves’ situations were under slavery. The treatments of slaves and Northern prisoners of war, as well as Southern motivations for administering punishments, stemmed from Confederate soldiers’ belief that beatings and confinement were deserved for reasons which the victims could not control: citizenship and race.

Just how similarly Confederate soldiers perceived Union men’s social and political standing in the South to those of slaves is perhaps the most evident in one particular recollection of Captain Geer’s. In the early weeks of his capture by Southern forces, he was placed in a “rickety old warehouse” full of prisoners, approximately twenty of whom were slaves. The confinement of Union prisoners of war alongside Southern slaves placed both groups on the same social level in the minds of Confederate soldiers, allowing a connection to be made that explains why slaves and Northern prisoners received similar treatments and endured similar experiences under Southern white oppression. In addition, Union soldiers being “confined and guarded” by white Southern men parallels the same type of surveillance slaves experienced while working in the fields with an overseer. Examining primary sources from slaves and prisoners of war creates an interesting parallel in the experiences...
slaves and prisoners had, fostering an unspoken understanding that led to the changes in Union prisoners’ political and moral beliefs.

**NOSTALGIA AND HOMESICKNESS**

A second aspect to captive soldiers’ experiences was how the absence of liberty from captivity created perfect conditions for rampant homesickness and nostalgia among prisoners. Specifically, nostalgic aspects of captivity tore away Union prisoners’ core of humanness and mentally crippled even the strongest of men. Known as a sentimental longing for the past or a place with happy personal association, nostalgia caused men to succumb to depression-like symptoms. Historian David Anderson studied the meaning of nostalgia and the affects this psychological condition had on the men involved in the Civil War. Through his research, Anderson concluded that knowing “loved ones [are] now far away familial linkages [become] crucial” to an individual’s mental state, often possessing the power to “deflate spirits and puncture morale” (250).

The monotony of prison life, with little to do and virtually no way to distract oneself from its hardships, largely contributed to the developments of nostalgia. Cavada recalled the frequency in which prisoners succumbed to the tediousness of prison life, essentially becoming victims of their own existence (61). Such monotony was believed to be why the nostalgia that proliferated throughout the prisons had odd effects on the men. George A. Putnam, a fellow inmate of Cavada’s at Libby Prison, reported how drastically the depression and lethargy of nostalgia affected the prisoners, noting how many men “would sit twirling their thumbs or stand looking out of the windows with a vacant stare and with eyes that saw nothing” (47).

During his captivity, Cavada described how from nearly every man, including brigadier-generals and colonels of cavalry, listlessness stripped his soul and purpose. Prisoners were transformed into “pale, wan inhabitants [who] gaze vacantly out through the barred windows...as if they were peering from the mysterious precincts of another world...A host of shoeless, shirtless, shameless specters” (26, 41). According to John Worrell Northrop, a member of the 76th New York Infantry, and later prisoner of war at Andersonville Prison, his fellow prisoners of war who sat “with their backs against the wall and their gaze fixed on the floor” were dying from nostalgia, having given up hope of ever having their freedom or seeing their families again (69). Descriptions of prisoners with vacant stares who felt they no longer had anything to live for were repeatedly used to describe how captivity cultivated the onset of nostalgia in prisoners.

Missing family and home, as well as the uncertainty of reunion with family, links the experiences that the majority of slaves underwent during their servitude to
those felt by prisoners of war. The buying and selling of slaves in auctions, a crucial element in the slave system, tore thousands of families apart like war tore soldiers away from home. Both scenarios provide little assurance on any familial reunion. Slaves affected by nostalgia would be so overcome with sadness that performance on chores declined, often increasing the frequency of beatings. Even if slaves had achieved their freedom, they still had to worry about “nigger traders” that would capture and sell them. Ex-slave Clayton Holbert recalled the illegal capture and sale of free slaves happening to his own family when his mother and grandmother were both recaptured and sold back into slavery after buying their freedom. Holbert described how the permanent separation of the two women caused profound heartbreak for his mother, who “never saw his grandmother again” (Green 286). The dreadful conditions of the prison and the high death rate of the inmates further decreased the likelihood of a homecoming, which allowed large percentages of prisoners of war to understand the heartache felt by the majority of slaves.

Captain Geer related his feelings about captivity to both those of slavery and homesickness while reflecting on his oppression and desire for home. Caught in a day-dream about life in Ohio, he remembered his home being “all fair and free in the spring sunlight...[Then I] thought of the poor Southern conscript, and the despised and fettered slave of the cotton-field” (53). In this excerpt, Cavada captured the importance to keeping one’s mind away from thoughts of hopelessness and fend off nostalgia:

The mind lacking occupation turns inevitably into thought...The daily contemplation of suffering and misery, of helplessness and want...Cut off from comforts and tender sympathies; from the daily intercourse of friends...doomed to the tedium of a solitude which is the heaviest to bear: the solitude of the heart; and to a melancholy which is the saddest: in which day after day, and month after month, the same gloomy scenes are contemplated...He is lost indeed, who loses hope. (155)

As stated earlier, the heartbreak and despair for home and family felt by the men described by Cavada and Northrop constitute the same sorrow slaves experience when forcibly separated from family. With this realization, many Northern soldiers began to empathize with slaves and shift their opinions about slavery and emancipation, having now had firsthand experience as to some of the hardships slavery brought to its victims.

THE FUGITIVE: ESCAPING CONFEDERATE POWER

The treatments, mental states, and injustices experienced by prisoners of war frequently drove many into bold attempts for their liberty and freedom. According to
various letters, diaries and other primary accounts, the freedom of nature to describe the longing for their own liberty was commonly used amongst prisoners of war. Cavada often spoke of there being no worse predicament than a captive of war, a similar state of mind that several slaves held about their own thralldom. According to the majority of slave interviews that have been analyzed, many felt the way Mary Reynolds did, describing slavery was the “worst days ever seed in the world...[I’d] rather rot in the ground than have the beatin’s” (Rawick 239). Similar to the feelings Cavada held towards captivity, J.D. Green remembered the hatred he had towards his slave status, exclaiming “Oh! How dreadful it is to be black!...It would have been better had I not been born at all” (Rawick 4). With such desperation and hatred toward their situation, it becomes obvious as to why so many felt risking their lives was imperative to securing their freedom.

Observances of the freedom and purity of nature on a captive’s psyche seemed to have provided a great deal of influence for many men who attempted escape from prisons. Cavada found himself using the desire for the open, unfettered wilderness to convey the prisoner’s want for freedom and escape from prison life:

There is, here, something delightful in letting a ray of sparkling sunshine fall upon one’s face...the pleasure which it affords is not difficult to account for: this sunlight comes from the sky, pure and untainted; it comes, free and unshackled, from without; it is a golden bridge over which his thoughts, rendered morbid by gloomy reveries, pass out through the prison-bars, and go forth into the free realm of space, to wonder wheresoever they will. (28)

Recalling that the “barbarous torture [in the camp caused us]...to seriously deliberate the propriety of escape...[with] the hope of liberty...we determined once and for ever to abandon the scene of so much horror and misery” (Geer 102). When considering the experiences of Mary Reynolds, the starvations, beatings, and familial separation certainly qualify as scenes of horror and misery, and would have influenced anyone subjected to such cruelty to strive for freedom. The commonalities between captivity and human bondage went beyond the realm of the absence of liberty, carrying over into the experiences escapees had during their fugitive status and search for freedom. This further linked slaves and prisoners together, influencing the prisoners’ moral and political opinions of slaves. During his escape, Captain Geer composed a poem to articulate his fugitive experiences:

In dark fens of the dismal swamp,
   The hunted Yankees lay;
We saw the fire of the midnight camp,
And heard at times the horses’ tramp
And the bloodhounds’ distant bay.
Where hardly a human foot would pass,
Or a human heart would dare,
On the quickening turf of the green morass,
We crouched in the thick and tangled grass,
Like wild beasts in their lair. (119)

Being able to liken their experiences to the same ordeals slaves endured under servitude consequently generated Union soldiers’ sympathy for the race.

Fugitive prisoners also learned of certain Southern organizations that would ensure their freedom. Geer recalled how from one slave he “first learned of a complete organization among the negroes [that] aid[es] fugitives in making their escape...The officers of the Southern Underground Railroad...were the slaves of different plantations...[that] would arrange the matter [if we] submit ourselves to their guidance” (128). The way the Underground Railroad was utilized for prisoners of war was similar to what J.D. Green experienced. Using the Underground Railroad to gain his freedom, Green was smuggled into New York, and at the guidance of several railroad officials, ended his journey in Canada. Union fugitives and slaves being tracked by Confederates for recapture made it possible for the two groups to understand the others’ struggle as one of their own.

While elaborating on the experiences of his recapture, Captain Geer described being forced in “negro chains” and placed into common jails. J.D. Green also experienced this same situation when he was arrested after having fled his master’s plantation, being “taken back to Maryland [and] placed in prison with a collar round my neck” (18). Geer also commented on how being hunted by bloodhounds forced him to remain in the Southern swamps for weeks in order to avoid recapture, causing his clothing to disintegrate, an experience comparable to the nearly naked slaves he later saw in a field (135). Fugitive experiences described by Geer are eerily reminiscent to those of Green, who had to run into a swamp for safety, where he remained for five weeks. In his book, Green describes how during his time sequestered in the swamp he constantly feared and fled from the sound of bloodhounds (16). During a childhood escape attempt, Mary Reynolds remembered the terror she felt after hearing the bloodhounds and horses chasing after her and her family (Rawick 16, 241).

What can be concluded from the recollections of prisoners of war and former slaves concerning the experiences each group had during their thralldom and escape is that their shared experiences with Southern slaves influenced Northern prisoners of war to begin shifting their views toward slaves and slavery. Realizing that an entire group of people had been exposed to inhumane treatment and forced to live a life
of fear, pain, and longing for freedom in the same way they were now experiencing, caused prisoners to sympathize with, and better understand the struggles of a slave. What these shared experiences did was help to solidify an understanding of Union soldiers towards the plight of slavery, personal feelings towards slaves, and political views towards emancipation. From shared experiences of captivity and a newly found interaction with African-Americans, countless prisoners of war in the South who had “previously been ‘conservative’, now realized a modification of their sentiments... [and] a universal conviction that this system of human bondage [end]” (Geer 8). Now recognizing slaves as “ever-faithful friends” and “brothers in common peril and oppression”, Union soldiers understood through their newfound commonalities with slaves, realizing that race did not matter (Geer 110). Captain Geer composed a poem reflecting his budding transition and reflections on slavery, asking:

Was man ordained the slave of man to toil  
Yoked with the brutes, and fettered to the soil  
Weighted in a tyrant’s balance with his gold  
No! Nature stamped us in a heavenly mould  
She bade no wretch his thankless labor urge  
Nor, trembling, taking the pittance and the scourge. (60)

EXAMINING SHIFTS IN IDEOLOGY AND SLAVERY

What interactions and alliances ultimately engendered was a change in the personal and political views that Union soldiers had originally held toward slaves, slavery and emancipation during the onset of their services in the South to those of sympathy. It can be determined that the escape narratives available today describe the aid by African-Americans as the single most common factor experienced by each Union prisoner, and perhaps the most influential in their survival and success. This may be the reason as to why so many men who found themselves prisoners of war under Confederate power felt compelled to publish their ordeals. Several have specifically emphasized the help received from slaves as a reason to “educate the public that emancipation had been an effort by the enslaved too” (Davis 1079).

Although some Union soldiers commented that as their interactions increased with African-Americans they “admitted grudging sympathy for the unfortunate blacks” (Cain 23), most were far more radicalized in their transformations. Northern soldiers have attributed the alliance that prisoners of war created with Southern slaves as the sole cause for complete alterations in their political and personal views toward slaves and emancipation. One soldier observed how several men had been democrats upon their initial deployment south, who “had no intention of interfering with slavery” are “democrats no longer...[rather] abolitionists.” Corporal George P. Brown,
originally a staunch democrat and avid objector to abolition, described his conversion to abolitionism after experiencing the humanity of slaves. He penned to his wife that after stumbling upon a house of ex-slaves, he learned how they fed Union fugitives and helped plan their getaways, declaring that he “went away a Democrat but I have come back an abolitionist...I shall vote the [Democrat] ticket no more” (Dunkelman 101). Perhaps the best example of how increased interactions and dependence with, and on, slaves for survival led to an abolitionist spirit is captured in Captain Geer’s reflections. Frequently feeling “sickened by slavery”, Geer recalled how one evening he was “unable to banish the thoughts that came flashing into my mind concerning the bondsmen of the South; and I pondered deeply whether I could not do something toward benefitting them” (167). He claimed that the “actions the various States [were taking] against slavery” brought him great satisfaction (Geer 232).

To conclude, the examination of prisoner of war diaries, slave interviews, and other primary sources clearly draws a correlation between Union captives and Southern slaves, outlining how their experiences and subjugation under the same oppressive Southern power nurtured an understanding between each group. The added exposure of Union soldiers’ opinions of Southern slaves, the institution of slavery, and the political issue of emancipation at the onset and closure of their journeys south further demonstrate how their shared experiences and increased interaction and alliance with slaves contributed to prisoners’ of war transformation to abolitionism. It is the parallels in prisoner-slave experiences and the overwhelming aid provided by slaves that led Union soldiers to cast away their preconceived racism, and regard the Southern conscript as much of their brother as any of their friends back home.

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Doppelgängers, an apparation or double of a living person, have been a unique mythological figure in creative works. One constant aspect that is shared between the various versions of the motif is the fear that is attached with the name of doppelgänger. By reading and analyzing ten prominent works with the doppelgänger theme, starting with the novel Siebenkas by Jean Paul who coined the term doppelganger, and ending with a realistic episode of the popular show Doctor Who, I was able to discover a similar pattern through each one. In each story, the doppelgänger does not preform a task that is beyond the human ability. Even if the act is violent, repulsive, or otherwise not aligning with what is considered to be human, it is an act that is within human limitations. Typically, the doppelgänger is preforming an act that is seen as vile, which is why we as observers are able to view the doppelgänger as monstrous or separate from ourselves. This being said, there is a reason that the doppelgänger takes on our own shape. Using books dating back to the eighteenth century as my basis, I have drawn the conclusion that the motif of the doppelgänger was conceived and persists because of the unwavering fear that humans possess of their own nature.

In 1796, the German author Jean Paul published his novel Siebenkäs, in which he invented a new word defined only by a note at the bottom: “Leute, die sich selber sehen,” or “people who see themselves,” was the footnote defining this new word “doppelgänger.” After this definition, the doppelgänger motif was used in various works and continues to be used into the present day. The details of the doppelgänger’s role changes according to author and time period; however, a theme the stories overwhelmingly have in common is the fear in association to the doppelgänger character. The negative connotation associated with doppelgängers has appeared in creative works since the 18th century and has steadily developed over time to spill off the page and into our reality. The fear we hold onto remains stable because of humans’ unwavering fear of themselves.
Something that is unique about the motif of the doppelgänger is its centrality to Germany. In English, for example, we are reliant on borrowing the German word rather than having a similar myth of our own. In Russian, speakers utilize their own word, ‘dvoynik’, which is nevertheless rooted in German mythology. It is important to see that this myth probably arrived into Germany. Looking at the inhabitants north of modern-day Germany prior to the defining of the word in 1796, the Vikings were rampant in this region because of their conquests. Conquests not only meant expanding land, but they also meant inadvertently sharing their ideas and mythology. Their stories included phenomena called vardøgers which are apparitions in Norse mythology that resemble the idea of a doppelgänger closely enough to suggest a link: “In Norway, many stories are told of vardøgers or doubles who often arrive at a traveler’s destination before the traveler does” (Novella par. 8). The vardøger does not carry a sinister tone the way a doppelgänger does, but it does include this idea of a separate being resembling an original being.

Even closer to Germany, people from the Orkney Islands of Scotland believed in creatures called changelings and trows. Because the occupation of this area by the Vikings started in the 9th century, it is easy to conclude that this period “would have involved a phase of co-existence, or even integration, between the native [Orkney Island peoples] and the earliest Norse settlers” (Graham-Campbell). Norse mythology had a huge influence on the belief of trows and changelings this region held later on thanks to this integration of natives and settlers: “The term ‘trow’ is usually applied... the name has been explained as being from the same source as the Norwegian troll. But the term ‘fairy’ is also used to describe similar creatures. It seems to be a mixture of Old Norse and Celtic beliefs” (Muir). Trows were creatures believed to replace human babies with things called changelings. These changelings would be lookalikes of the baby and grow up in the place of the original human. It is easy to piece together a picture of how a doppelgänger idea sprouted from these two ideas, and it is also easy to find where Germany had contact with these myths.

Trade routes during the middle ages allowed Germany to have commerce with new areas like the Orkney Islands, indicating that ideas such as changelings and vardogers could have been shared ‘through the extensive contacts with German and Dutch sailors and merchants, particularly between 1400 and 1700’ (Melchers). That brings us right up to the time that Jean Paul published Siebenkäs in Germany. Assumedly, the idea of doppelgängers had formed in this region as an oral tradition and Jean Paul was just the first to designate a term to define the idea. It is also very possible that the myth was influenced by other factors that have not been outlined here. However, vardøgers and changelings seem to be the most dominant predating
myths closely related to the doppelgänger, and also have an easily traceable route to how their influence could have wound up in Germany.

Once doppelgängers had a definitive name, it was easy to express the concept in literary and artistic works. The works of Jean Paul opened up the variability of how doppelgängers would be presented in works. His stories are perplexing and hard to follow especially taking into account how Jean Paul uses his portrayal of the doppelgänger to comment on the philosophical works of Fichte. For the purpose of this thesis, only the superficial role of a double in his works will be analyzed and the satirical role it played in disputing Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s philosophy will be absent.

In the *Siebenkäs* saga from 1796, Firmian Stanislaus Siebenkäs needs to be out of his marriage after becoming penniless, but is not sure how to go about it. He seeks out the advice from his good friend Leibgeber, who in actuality is his doppelgänger. Leibgeber encourages Siebenkäs to fake his own death to be able to live a happy life free from his marriage. In this jaunty story, Leibgeber and Siebenkäs are portrayed to be interchangeable, and are often confused for one another especially since they swap names: “Leibgeber and Siebenkäs are real doubles: they look exactly alike, and Siebenkäs even exchanges names with his friend” (Rank). Once Siebenkäs fakes his death, Leibgeber renounces his use of the name Siebenkäs, and gives Siebenkäs use of his name, Leibgeber as they part ways: “Even though they are going their separate ways, Siebenkäs and Leibgeber are still united, like a wanderer and his shadow” (Vardoulakis). In a way, the reason Siebenkäs and Leibgeber were interchangeable demonstrates that Leibgeber is an extension of Siebenkäs. Like a shadow quite literally extends from a person, Leibgeber extended from Siebenkäs. Siebenkäs seeks out his advice from this good friend when in reality he is seeking advice from himself. Often in stories, people need validation from an outside source; therefore, Leibgeber acts as this encouragement for Siebenkäs. Siebenkäs then assumes this role of Leibgeber, a different version of himself, because he prefers him to his original self.

In contrast to the light hearted tone used to write *Siebenkäs*, Jean Paul’s *Titan* from 1803 is a story focusing on a different protagonist all together, but all the same verifies the connection of Siebenkäs and Leibgeber. The protagonist Albano and his friend Schoppe suffer under impending doom of doubles pursuing them throughout the story. In a fateful event, the deuteragonist, Schoppe, runs into Siebenkäs after escaping a mental hospital where he was staying because of his rantings concerning something called “Der Ich.” Schoppe instantly dies of shock upon seeing him. Siebenkäs is then revealed to have recognized Schoppe as Leibgeber in disguise which reintroduces the original storyline into Jean Paul’s work in a less than lighthearted manner: “Der Ich has appeared before him and Schoppe dies of shock, with the
words ‘Ich auch, Ich gleich Ich’ escaping his mouth... This statement can be translated either as ‘Me too, I resemble myself’ or ‘Me too, I equals I’ (Vardoulakis). It is such an interesting way of presenting the doppelgänger motif. Other than being wildly confusing, the motif has taken on an ominous presence by instigating a death in a counterpart. The story in its entirety also blurs the lines on who is the original and who is the doppelgänger. Because Siebenkäs and Leibgeber exchange names, it could be ambiguous as to who actually perishes. Jean Paul was able to define what traits a doppelgänger would have in the future, but ambiguously enough that future authors could mold it to make it uniquely their own version. What Jean Paul accomplished so well is emphasizing the link between original and doppelgänger, which is a trait that unrelentlessly hangs on to the word which he defined.

E.T.A Hoffmann was directly influenced by Jean Paul’s works and it is evident in his book from 1815, The Devil’s Elixirs. In this story, a man named Medardus is a monk who, while in charge of the monastery’s archives, drinks a forbidden elixir. This devilish elixir compels him to do strange things, including pushing a man named Count Viktorin who was disguised as a monk at the time as a ruse to see his lover, off a cliff. Medardus is then mistaken as the Count while the real Count goes insane in response to his fall and becomes Medardus’ harebrained doppelgänger: “Viktorin, who has become insane after a fall, thinks that he is Medardus and so identifies himself to all. His identification with Medardus goes so far that he utters the latter’s thoughts: Medardus believes that he hears himself speaking and that his innermost thoughts are being expressed by a voice outside himself” (Rank). The two look eerily similar because they happen to be half-brothers, but they are both ignorant of this fact. Most simply, the story follows Medardus’ love for a girl named Aurelie, but he kills the girl’s step-mother and brother, almost jeopardizing his chances with her. His doppelgänger fortunately takes the wrap for him, so he is free to marry his beloved Aurelie. On their wedding day, Medardus has a fit, stabs Aurelie, frees his doppelgänger before execution, then goes on to hide out in the wilderness where he fights his doppelgänger for months. Eventually, he wakes up once again wearing his frock with “Medardus” stitched on the front. He returns to his life for repentance and sees Aurelie, who survived her attack, take her vow to be a nun. She does not complete this feat, however, because the doppelgänger emerges from the wilderness and stabs her fatally. At the end of the story, the librarian who is telling this story to the reader makes a point to inform the reader that the circumstances surrounding Medardus’ death cast doubt that he was ever redeemed from the elixir he drank. This entire story presents a delicious twist on the motif brought by Jean Paul. This story transmits the association of doppelgängers with the devil that will become more prominent
later on in literature. Moreover, by saving his doppelgänger from execution, perhaps Medardus was trying to save himself. Because the two are linked, Medardus might have felt impending doom that compelled him to rescue his doppelgänger. The death of one may have meant the death of the other. The ending also suggests a certain obscurity. When Medardus returns to the cloister wearing his robe, he reads his name and accepts his identity, but the story's ending suggests he never fully recovered from the elixir. It can be read with uncertainty that, while the lunatic doppleganger was returned mistakenly and continued to believe he was Medarus. Nonetheless, the theme of fear is undeniable in this story.

Dostoyevsky published his story *The Double* in 1866, which shows the doppelgänger motif expanding outside of Germany and arriving in Russia. The story focuses on the protagonist Yakov Petrovich Golyadkin, a government worker who is paranoid and unsure of himself. After passing by the head of his department in a carriage, Golyadkin must reassure himself by pretending to be someone else instead of the awkward man he is in reality: “Shall I recognize him, or should I act as if I were not myself at all, but rather some other person who is confusingly similar to me? Yes, to be sure, I am simply not myself...quite simply, I am a completely different person, and no one else” (Dostoevsky). After a series of discomfit encounters at a party for Klara, the woman he loves, Golyadkin wanders the streets of St. Petersburg where he encounters his double. Keeping his distance, he follows his double into his own home. Golyadkin is at first friends with his double despite being concerned that people seem undisturbed at their resemblance. The two work in the same place and slowly the double replaces Golyadkin in all aspects of his life, but is an improved replacement. This makes Golyadkin increasingly paranoid, even mistaking his double standing in a doorway to be a mirror multiple times throughout the story. The story ends with Klara convincing Golyadkin to come to her house by taunting him with the notion she will be running away with him. Once there, he is greeted warmly by his double, but things quickly turn sour when Golyadkin's doctor appears to cart him off to an insane asylum. Following Golyadkin through the few days in which the story takes place really makes the reader feel the terror that the protagonist himself is feeling. The double represents everything that Golyadkin wishes he could be. The double is confident and well received while Golyadkin is meek and ill fitted to society:

a different Mr. Golyadkin, completely different, and yet at the same time one who perfectly resembled the first–of the same stature, of the same physique and bearing..If the two of them had been placed next to each other, no one, absolutely no one, would have been able to say who was the real Mr. Golyadkin and who was
the imitation, who the old and who the new, who the original and who the copy. (Dostoyevsky)

By first befriending Golyadkin, the double lulls him into false trust in order to gain access to Golyadkin's life. The double, at the very end, succeeds in overtaking Golyadkin's life for motives undefined by being the version of himself Golyadkin wishes he could be. This double can again be seen as an extension of the original, but in this instance, the extension consumes the original in a survival-of-the-fittest manner.

The 18th and 19th century perceptions of the doppelgänger can best be encapsulated by the watercolor painting from Dante Gabriel Rossetti entitled *How They Met Themselves*, finished in 1864. A man and a woman run into their doubles while walking in a forest. The man draws his sword while the woman faints from shock. The doubles have intense looks on their faces. The two men look each other in the eyes as if they are having a silent standoff. Speaking generally, the doppelgänger was greeted with nervousness because of the ominous presence associated with them: “Doppelgängers are often seen as one’s reflection; sometimes their appearances are believed to foreshadow bad luck, illnesses and even death. These ghostly images are often reported to look like the original person, act like them, mock them or harm them...” (Buthut). Whether the negative aura surrounding the motif is something that was spawned from the works I have discussed above or part of an oral tradition myth is not certain, but it is certain that fear was lingering around the doppelgänger motif in the 18th and 19th centuries. This painting is a wonderful visual representation for the premonitory mood that is felt while reading the works previously discussed from these two centuries.

Entering the 20th century in terms of representations of doppelgängers, the silent film *Student of Prague* is a brilliant start to the century. A poor student named Balduin is propositioned by a man named Scapinelli. Scapinelli offers him immense wealth in exchange for something from Balduin's apartment. Not owning many possessions, Balduin gleefully agrees, but is shocked to discover that Scapinelli chooses to take Balduin's reflection. The reflection removes itself from the mirror and immediately becomes the double that will torment the original Balduin, the rest of the film. In a desperate move to rid himself of his double, Balduin shoots his reflection in a mirror, but only succeeds in killing himself. Scapinelli, who is a representation of the devil, dances on his grave. Once again, the devil is closely associated with the creation of a double. The desire that Balduin has to kill his double is something that his literary predecessors likely held, but refrained from carrying out perhaps because they felt their connection more closely than Balduin did: “The impulse to rid oneself of the
uncanny opponent in a violent manner belongs, as we saw, to the essential features of the motif; and when one yields to this impulse-as, for example, in the Student of Prague...it becomes clear that the life of the double is linked quite closely to that of the individual himself” (Rank). If the lives of a doppelgänger and the lives of the original are linked, then it could verify the scene in The Devil’s Elixirs; where Medardus, while saving his double from being sent to death, was intuitively saving himself from death. Likewise, in Dostoyevsky’s novel, Golyadkin’s double sees to it that Golyadkin is confined to a mental institution rather than just disposing of Golyadkin in order to assume his role in life. If the life of the double is reliant on the original, it suggests that a double is less than an original. This theory is nulled if one looks back to Jean Paul’s original works where the doppelgänger departed life while the assumed original continued living. Nonetheless, the doppelgänger perishing when the original does is a repeated idea that is best originally exemplified in Student of Prague.

Continuing with the theme of film, further into the century we see the production of the Twilight Zone. Their first season premiered an episode entitled “Mirror Image” in 1960. In this episode of the anthology series, Millicent Barnes is waiting for her train when people keep questioning why she is repeating her actions. Frustrated and confused she insists she has done nothing but arrive and sit quietly. A man arrives and she explains her predicament citing a story she read about how doubles from parallel universes can sometimes wind up here to overtake a person’s life. As the couple approaches their train, Barnes faints as she sees her double sitting on the bus. Subscribing to his suspicions that Barnes is crazy, the man calls for her to be taken to a mental hospital. As she is driven away, the man is faced with the same predicament Barnes found herself in, and the episode ends with him chasing his smirking double through the streets forcing us to question our solidarity in the universe, our importance, and our individuality: “The recognition of oneself, which implies a paradox in itself...also implies an exorcism: the exorcism of the double, which presents an obstacle to the existence of the only one and demands that this one is not only himself and nothing else” (Rosset). The shock of realizing that you are not a unique individual is a theme practiced in science fiction using the idea of parallel universes, and that is exactly what happens to Millicent Barnes. Projecting the idea that doubles will come to our world in order to overtake our lives is a concept that is based in the mythology and one I have mentioned with previous works. Moving away from the myth, though, this episode roots its depiction of the doppelgänger in a real sense. Having a more rational basis for the doppelgänger through a scientific explanation presents the very real possibility of it occurring in real life. Although it is based in science, the common themes associated with the myth are projected because
Dopplegangers in Creative Works

It is what we have come to know to be expected.

There is another phenomenon of the doppelgänger, and that is creating one's own doppelgänger through the writing of their literary works. Sylvia Plath created a divided self within her works and formed a doppelgänger through her writings. Plath divided herself into two separate beings twice in her life, the first separation while dealing with the death of her father. She saw her original self as being buried with her father and her doppelgänger as having taken possession of her life, living on while the original self is in a casket: “This tension between false and true selves, initially determined by her relation to her father, is the basis for further development, and consequently pervades all future manifestations of self, whether in relation to others or in her image of herself” (Kroll 10). More interestingly is the division Plath creates later on in her life, which I believe to be the division of whom she knows to be her true self and her psychosis that she cannot escape. In other words, Plath had a division between her true self and her lunatic doppelgänger. In her poem “In Plaster” published in 1961, her recognition of this division is undeniable:

I shall never get out of this! There are two of me know:  
This new absolutely white person and the old yellow one,  
And the white person is certainly the superior one.

This new “white” version of herself is swiftly overtaking her life and she seems to be able to do nothing to stop it from happening. Referring to the color white is also reminiscent of the color of paper suggesting that her writings are taking over her life: “The late poems are really exploratory attempts to release the true self and to establish an authentic existence” (Kroll, 12). I consider her psychosis emanates through her works. Her works are a doppelgänger of herself, and her works are the window into her struggle with her psychosis:

I used to think we might make a go of it together--  
After all, it was a kind of marriage, being so close.  
Now I see it must be one or the other of us.

She may be a saint, and I may be ugly and hairy,  
But she'll soon find out that that doesn't matter a bit.  
I'm collecting my strength; one day I shall manage without her,  
And she'll perish with emptiness then, and begin to miss me.

Her living doppelgänger is her written works that she has created herself. One thing Sylvia Plath is most famous for is killing herself in 1963 after making her kids breakfast. As is true with many artists, Plath’s success and influence increased after her death, therefore readers associate the poems with Plath the woman who died by sticking her head in an oven. This is not an authentic version of Plath, for Plath was a wife,
a mother, and much more than merely her poems. The doppelgänger she created of herself, her works, succeeded in overtaking her life, which is a recurring element of a doppelganger. We as readers know Plath's doppelgänger, which are her works, not her original self. The doppelgänger has consumed her life and spit out its image of her instead of the true version of Plath. “In Plaster” is Plath's direct statement of this. She speaks in fear of her doppelgänger overtaking her life. Her works consumed her in the end and succeeded in paving her path to suicide. She believed that she could live simultaneously with her works, but alas it was her work that received praise and not herself. She makes a point in her poem to declare that her doppelgänger will miss her and begin to perish without her. This turns out to be true, for with the death of Plath came the end of her works. The doppelgänger is alive, but cursed to be frozen in time since Plath can no longer create new works or give life to the doppelgänger. This brings the doppelgänger into the real sense. Sylvia Plath was a real person who brought the myth to life. It may feel out of place to apply this myth to Plath and her writings, but in fact Plath was extremely well versed in the idea of the doppelgänger. The motif fits well because of “her readings, which included Jung, Frazer, Rank, Freud, and Graves, and her college thesis on the ‘double personality’ in Dostoevsky” (Kroll 13). Since she was so familiar with this motif it makes a lot of sense to apply this motif to her works and to her life.

A nice way to round out the 20th century depictions of the doppelgänger is to mention a widely accepted conspiracy theory regarding a doppelgänger replacing a young man in the spotlight. In 1969, a rumor exploded that stated that the real Paul McCartney of the famous band The Beatles had died in a car accident three years earlier. In order to not miss a beat, McCartney was replaced with a doppelgänger, who many online theorists refer to as Paul: “An interesting example of the social construction of a mystery occurred in the late months of 1969, when a strange surge of excitement spread across the country, fomented, apparently, by persistent rumors relating to the nature and circumstances of the alleged death of Beatle Paul McCartney” (Suczek). The scientific facts regarding this theory are sparse. One of the main examples of this switch is a picture of the “real” Paul compared to the “fake” Paul with writing over it, exposing a difference in their ear lobes. The “Paul Is Dead” theory has been denied and debunked countless times, but whether or not the theory has any validity has no purpose for this paper. The fact that people came up with such a theory in the first place is evidence of the myth of a doppelgänger fully escaping the literary and artistic realm and that it entered into the existent world. With the previous works I have mentioned in the 20th century, I think the "Paul Is Dead" conspiracy theory is a
nice way recapitulate the era in terms of how the doppelgänger motif progressed. The 20th century was met with the doppelganger infiltrating reality with depictions of the doppelganger occurring in reality, some of which even partnered with some scientific basis.

With a rise in our ability to produce creative works because of the progress in our technology, the myth of the doppelgänger has persevered and changed with the advancements. The sitcom *How I Met Your Mother* offers a humorous portrayal of the doppelganger that reached a wide audience of people because of the show’s success. The show is based around one of the main characters, Ted, telling his kids stories of his premarital life to inform the kids on how he met their mother, as the title suggests. Ted’s stories are off track a lot of the time, and one of his anecdotes is that each of the principal characters—himself, Lily, Marshall, Robin, and Barney—all have a corresponding doppelgänger. As Ted explains, “There was Lesbian Robin, Mustache Marshall, Stripper Lily, and Mexican Wrestler Me...and so we were all eager to find The Fifth Doppelganger: Barney’s. Turned out, it was more important to some of us than others” (Bays). The doppelgängers portrayed in this show have no interactions with the characters; their main purpose is to look like the original characters for the comedy of seeing alternate versions of the characters so ludicrous. The doppelgängers are a recurring scenario throughout the series, but in one particular episode from 2010 entitled “Doppelgangers,” the gang finally encounters the doppelgänger of Barney. Until this point, the group had found a doppelgänger for each other their members except for Barney. Lily and Marshall, the married couple of the group, had previously agreed to not begin trying to have a baby until they had seen a doppelgänger for each group member. In the episode, Marshall and Lily finally see who they believe to be Barney’s doppelgänger, a cab driver. They take this as their sign from the universe, and begin trying for their first child.

The interesting approach to depicting the doppelgänger is in the writer’s decision to make the doppelgängers harmless and humorous. There is a nod to the beginnings of the myth since the group’s doppelgängers are all opposites of the originals—even though they are far fetched, outlandish opposites in terms of personality. Likewise, there is an allusion, albeit an evolved one, to the doppelgänger being an augury to an event. As previously mentioned, people saw the doppelgänger as a harbinger of bad luck or death. In this episode, however, Lily and Marshall see the doppelgänger as a positive sign from the universe. The omens that doppelgängers traditionally bring have been flipped upside down for this show, and here their presence confirms the start of new life for a young couple. It can even be seen as an allusion to the first depiction of the doppelgänger in literature with Siebenkäs where his double was not
someone he feared initially, but rather his friend that offered advice. This show also strays from the tradition in that there is fear in not seeing the doppelgänger rather than in seeing it. If Lily and Marshall never came across the final doppelgänger then their family would never begin. The fear association is opposite than the way it has been traditionally presented. The entire *How I Met Your Mother* episode demonstrates a shift in not being afraid of doppelgängers, and instead it associates the absence of a doppelgänger with a bad omen.

Thanks to science fiction, the doppelgänger can now be seen through future eyes. We are able to look at real scientific projects and construct an idea of what humans will be capable of in the near future. *Dr. Who*, for instance, is a widely popular show that was able to take the myth of the doppelgänger and apply it to our future. The series follows a man named The Doctor who is the last Time Lord (time traveler) from the planet Gallifrey. With his TARDIS (time machine) and a few human companions, he goes where he is needed across space and time. In the episode “The Rebel Flesh” from 2011, The Doctor and his current companions, Amy and Rory, crash on an island tasked with acid removal in the 22nd century. While taking cover from a storm inside the factory, The Doctor learns more about the acid removal process. In order to safely remove acid from the island, the workers there used “programmable matter” to produce things called “gangers.” Gangers are doppelgängers of each of the workers created from the programmable matter that the workers can control from a safe distance. Unfortunately, the storm hits the factory and causes the gangers to be free from their constraints. The gangers instantly run into hiding and a war commences between the gangers and the originals. The gangers not only look identical to the originals, but they also possess the same personality traits and memories as them. These memories confuse and agitate the gangers as they do not understand the difference between themselves and the originals. As The Doctor points out to the originals, “You both have the same childhood memories. Just as clear, just as real” (Graham). The episode beautifully touches on the unforeseen complications that arrive when humans take on tasks such as cloning. Cloning is a real life way that a doppelgänger could take form seeing as a clone, specifically in this case, is a double of a living person. Here, humans have willingly produced doppelgängers of themselves for work purposes, not fully realizing the doppelgängers would hold more similarities than just physical likeness.

Conforming to the myth, once the gangers escape in the episode, they try to kill and overtake the lives of the originals. The episode provides an insight to the world of the doppelgänger that we have not seen in previous works, and that is the emotions and confusion felt by the doppelgänger itself. During the episode, Rory stumbles upon one of the gangers, Jennifer, and he demands to know where the real version of
her is: “I am Jennifer Lucas. I remember everything that happened in her entire life. Every birthday. Every childhood illness. I feel everything she has ever felt and more. I’m not a monster. I am me! Me! Me! Me! Why did they do this to us? Help me, Rory. Help me” (Graham). This episode blurs the lines of who is authentic and who is not. It is also one of the more compelling cases for doppelgängers appearing in our reality: a case in which humans create them themselves without realizing the consequences, which in turn causes hysteria. It is similar to the way Sylvia Plath created a fictional version of herself through her writing, only in this instance the doppelgängers are actual physical manifestations. The episode is a wonderful fusion of the common themes linked with the myth of the doppelgänger and a feasible situation that could happen in the near future. The doppelgänger has now escaped the myth, completely off the page, and wormed its way into our everyday lives—or at least they will soon.

So why are we holding onto fear of our doubles? Each of the examples provided for this paper have demonstrated some element of fear in connection to the doppelgänger. Some of the fear manifests itself from the connection to the devil as was the case in *The Devil’s Elixirs* and *Student of Prague*, and some have fear that stems from our heightened understanding of science as seen in *The Twilight Zone* and *Doctor Who*. The underlying issue for all of these is humans’ fear of themselves. In these presented works, doppelgängers do not do any task that is beyond human ability. Doppelgängers represent every aspect of human nature that we wish to repress. In the case of the early works, lust, murder, jealousy, betrayal are things that the doppelgängers are seen doing, but the original himself could have easily been capable of. Later on, the doppelgänger represents loss of faith, loss of sanity, and loss of a consistency—all things that are unbearable for humans to deal with. In modern and future representations, doppelgängers bring us cosmic reassurance and loss of individuality. These themes are not just respective to their century, but have been brought up repeatedly since the introduction of the motif. The reality of the matter is that humans do not like dealing with the dark elements of human nature. We as a species will do anything to avoid instincts or emotions perceived as “bad.” The doppelgänger evinces the parts of our human nature that we cannot bear to carry on our shoulders. We think we are above these things so we must separate ourselves and create a monster to perform and to think things that would otherwise be unacceptable to humans. However, there is a reason doppelgängers have the exact physical appearance as the original. The doppelgängers and the originals are one and the same: the doppelgänger is merely a tool we use to carry out actions that we see as above ourselves as humans. We are afraid of the doubles overtaking our lives because we are afraid of our repressed instincts and thoughts overtaking our minds. It is true
that the doppelgängers are violent in many cases, but it is also true that humans are violent. We just want to turn a blind eye to our negative human elements and create fictional monsters to personate them. The future depictions of doppelgängers offer a forewarning, for if we ever meet our doubles from outer space or create them with our own technology, we will instinctively apply to the myth to reality. Whether coming from a parallel universe, from a cloning machine, or by other means, the doppelgänger should be greeted with understanding, not fear, since how can we be certain we are originals and not doppelgängers?

REFERENCES


Homosexuality in Qur’anic and Islamic Scholarship

Sierra Marcelius

In today’s global political climate, what Islam teaches about violence is very important, and often not very clear. This paper seeks to understand Islam’s teachings in relation to homophobic violence, and in doing so, poses three research questions: 1) What are the differing perspectives within Islam on homosexuality and people who identify as homosexual? 2) Is there a movement within the Muslim community to push for more tolerant views of people who identify as homosexual? 3) How do these differing perspectives impact homosexual Muslims (e.g. violently or nonviolently)? The paper investigates the first question by analyzing Islamic texts in their original, classical and contemporary interpretations in relation to same-sex acts and homosexuality. In this analysis of viewpoints, the paper describes how some Muslims, especially in Western democracies, have founded support and advocacy groups for homosexual Muslims. The paper then explains how different contemporary views impact homosexual Muslims, specifically through psychiatric and physical homophobic violence. The paper concludes with the assertion that although the prevailing interpretation among the world’s Muslims is that Islam views same-sex acts and homosexuality as sinful, and this interpretation has lead to homophobic violence carried out by heterosexual Muslims and Islamic states against homosexual Muslims, there are Muslims who identify as homosexual and interpret Islam to be accepting of their homosexuality and homosexual relationships.

INTRODUCTION

God created the human being as male and female...so natural attraction is between the two sexes, because the Qur’an mentions that this cosmos is based upon pairing (izdiwaj) not upon sameness (mithliya). The principle of mating (zawjiya) is the principle of the cosmos: Glory be to the One who creates all the pairs, from what grows in the earth and from among yourselves and from that of which you know not. (Qur’an 36:36) (Kugle & Hunt)
The above quotation is from an interview of Shaykh al-Qaradawi on his popular television program, *al-Shari'ā wa'l-Hayat*, broadcasted to the world by *Al Jazeera* in Arabic. A Sunni Muslim born in Syria, but educated in theology and law at al-Azhar in Cairo, and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh al-Qaradawi now lives in Qatar where he is involved in the Islamic Movement and the European Council for Fatwa and Research. Although he has recently been delegitimized as what some may call a progressive or reformist Muslim, he is still one of the most respected Sunni scholars with great influence on Muslims around the world. His views on homosexuality in Islam represent the predominant viewpoint among the vast majority of Muslims around the world: homosexuality and homosexual acts are sinful (*haram*) and must not be tolerated (Kugle & Hunt). This paper analyzes the different interpretations of the Islamic texts on homosexuality, arguing that although prevailing interpretations of Islam forbids homosexuality and homosexual acts, historical Islamic societies have employed the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy to maintain harmony within their community. However, contemporarily, local organizing by Muslims who identify as homosexual and Western imperialism have challenged this tradition, which in many cases has led to increased homophobic violence.

This paper will begin by analyzing the single most important text in the Qur’an regarding homosexuality: the Story of Lot. It will then explain how this story influenced classical Islamic jurisprudence and how medieval Muslims viewed and dealt with homosexuality in their societies. Jumping ahead to the contemporary era, the paper will discuss the three views that modern Muslims hold regarding homosexuality: neo-traditionalist, conservative, and reformist. It will conclude with the implications of these viewpoints for modern Muslim homosexuals and a summary of the main points in the paper.

**HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE QUR’AN**

The traditional understanding of homosexuality in Islam comes from the Story of Lot in the Qur’an and is specific to its time, which means that there was no understanding of homosexuality per se, but rather same-sex acts—particularly sodomy. In the Qur’anic story of Lot, Lot is portrayed as being a faithful believer in a city of nonbelievers whose sins include, but are not limited to, “approaching other men ‘lustfully (shahwah) instead of women’” (Jamal 18). The Qur’anic version differs slightly then from the version of the Hebrew Bible, but nevertheless, God punishes the nonbelievers and sinners and delivers Lot and his family, except his wife, to safety. By analyzing the roots and contemporary connotation of keywords used in the story of Lot during the time of Prophet Muhammad, it becomes clear that same-sex acts are considered *haram* just like fornication and adultery. Specifically, words using the
Arabic root SHHY and FHSH were used to morally qualify same-sex acts as *haram*, as well as abominable opposite-sex sex acts and non-sex acts. This analysis illustrates the Qur’anic teachings of same-sex acts as actions that distance one from God by giving in forbidden earthly desires—therefore morally and spiritually weak. On punishment for this weakness, the Qur’an is not straightforward, but it most likely suggests if the acts were done out of wedlock, the punishment should be the same as fornication (scourging), or if they were done in wedlock, the same as adultery (death). There is always the option of repentance, in which case the sinner should be forgiven (Jamal). However, this is a modern analysis of the Qur’an and its teachings, albeit using vocabulary connotation from the contemporary period, not the classical interpretation. That discussion involves more than a simple analysis of the Qur’anic story of Lot—it must also include the hadith and Muslim jurisprudence.

**HOMOSEXUALITY IN CLASSICAL ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE**

The classical understanding of Islamic same-sex acts is taken from the hadith which uses the term *lūtīyah* to reference same-sex acts as an abomination. The hadith literature and subsequent jurisprudence has diminished the Story of Lot to emphasize the nature of same-sex acts as *haram* and to sideline the other acts of evil the city dwellers were punished for (Jamal; Ali). However, “the explicit condemnation of same-sex sexual activity in medieval Islamic legal thought… has been tempered by tacit toleration for its practice, provided some degree of discretion is observed” (Ali 85). This can be explained by understanding classical Islamic ideas about sex in relation to power and medieval societal regulation of morality. Medieval Muslim jurists were not concerned with sexual identity, love, or consent in regards to sex acts; they were concerned with the illicit or licit nature of them. Therefore, sex between a married man and woman and between a man and his concubine was always licit, except sodomy, and any sex act between any other person, animal or corpse was illicit and therefore an abomination to God (Ali). This negated all sexual autonomy for women, illustrating their inferior status (Ali; Shannahan). Sex was based on power and defined by penetration, so same-sex acts between men were then enacted either as the penetrator or the penetrated, and women could not have sex with each other, but could express lewdness or other sexual activity considered *haram*. Although illicit and sinful, same-sex acts between men were accepted as normal when the penetrated was a boy or young man (denoted as ‘beardless’ or *amrad*) or a slave, because the penetrated was of inferior status, which conformed to the expected power dynamic. It was incomprehensible that a man of equal status to another would want to be the penetrated, because intimate relationships were not based on love, but on power.
Because of this power dynamic, if same-sex acts did become public knowledge, the penetrator would be seen as shamelessly immoral, but the penetrated would face much more stigma for having accepted penetration (Ali; Dunne).

Yet, because social norms of medieval Islamic societies maintained, one should not expose the sinful behavior of oneself or a fellow Muslim. This was an implicit “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy when it came to same-sex behavior that reduced persecution and prosecution of those involved in same-sex acts by shaming Muslims who made public their fellow Muslim’s homosexual behavior (Ali). This policy appears to continue in at least some parts of the Muslim world, like Somalia, where speaking about any sexual relations, publicly or privately, is simply not done (Mahamud-Hassan).

THREE CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS

Today, while the vast majority of Muslims believe that homosexuality is immoral, there are three main viewpoints on the nature of homosexuality and how a Muslim should confront homosexuality in themselves (“The World’s Muslims”). The first is what Scott Kugle defines as a neo-traditional viewpoint, which posits that homosexuality is not innate and homosexual acts are haram. The Shaykh quoted in the introduction provides a definitive description of their beliefs:

The human being is created with innate disposition to feel attraction to the other sex, with man attracted to woman and woman attracted.... I mean, this is a matter of biology (amr tabi‘i) ... That is the meaning of ‘nature.’ The religion of Islam came to preserve the original human nature not to oppose this nature by rebelling against nature. (Kugle & Hunt, 269)

Neo-traditionalists, as exemplified by al-Qaradawi, advocate not for the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy for dealing with homosexuality as medieval Muslims did, but for punishment by an Islamic state for violating Islamic law regarding homosexual acts. While there is wide disagreement among them, generally the punishments entail death or torture in some way¹ (Kugle & Hunt).

The second viewpoint within Islamic thinking is the conservative viewpoint, which posits that homosexuality is innate (and therefore God-given), but that same-sex acts are haram. People who subscribe to the conservative viewpoint accept modern (Western) psychiatry that insists homosexuality is not a mental illness, but a natural and normal aspect of their character. However, because Islamic marriage can only be between a man and a woman, and because all licit sexual activity must be in the confines of a marriage contract, homosexuals must either attempt to find sexual gratification through a traditional marriage or live a life of celibacy. Many homosexuals reconcile their sexuality with Islam in this way; their homosexuality is a test from God, they must not succumb to the temptations of homosexual acts just as
they should not succumb to other acts considered haram (Ali; Shannahan). It should be noted that the prominent advocates of this view mostly reside in the West, and the research is unclear how prevalent this view is in Muslim-majority countries.

Finally, the reformist viewpoint, which is held by a very small minority of Muslims who live mostly in the West or South Africa, argues that homosexuality is innate (God-given) and therefore same-sex acts in wedlock are licit (halal). This viewpoint is very difficult to justify textually, however, because there are no examples of homosexual marriages in the Qur’an and all Islamic texts refer to a marriage contract as between a man and a woman (Ali).

**IMPLICATIONS: DISCRIMINATION, HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE**

While it is difficult to textually justify the halal nature of homosexual relations, Muslims in Western, secular democracies with constitutionally protected freedoms have done exactly that and have created Islamic learning, support and advocacy groups for fellow homosexual Muslims in their community and on the Internet. One such group, The Inner Circle in South Africa, was founded by an ‘alim by the name of Muhsin. A homosexual Muslim born to an extremely religious family in Apartheid South Africa, Muhsin has reconciled his homosexual relationship with his husband and his identity as a pious Muslim by interpreting the Qur’an as not having an explicit statement about homosexuality, but acknowledging that “there are people [men] who were not attracted to women” [Qur’an 24:31] which allowed them to access the women’s quarters of a Muslim house and that the Prophet Muhammad allowed such men to “serve his wives in his home” (Kugle 32). He also emphasizes that Prophet Muhammad never punished anyone for same-sex acts (Kugle). Finding specific Qur’anic texts like this has helped Muhsin reconcile his faith with his sexuality, but others have gone a broader route.

A different path towards reconciling Islam and homosexuality is illustrated by Tamsila, a lesbian Muslim of Pakistani descent living in the UK. She resolves the assumed contradiction between her Muslim and homosexual identities by looking to the values of the Qur’an, which emphasize love, justice and equality. To her, these values should be used when interpreting the Qur’an to create Islamic law in order for homosexual relationships to be halal. However, whichever way homosexual Muslims go about reconciling their faith with their sexuality, they must reinterpret the Story of Lot, a story that has explained the illicit nature of same-sex acts for centuries in three different world religions. For Tamsila, this means recognizing that the Story of Lot did not address female-female relations and that the same-sex acts were punishable within a very specific context of immorality among nonbelievers (Kugle). For others, the sexual abomination exhibited in the Story of Lot was not same-sex acts, but was
the intent to rape. This interpretation is problematic because the Qur’an finds all male-female sex within a marriage contract and sex between a man and his concubine licit, whether or not consent was ever given. Regardless, it is one interpretation that contemporary homosexual Muslims use to reconcile their faith and sexuality (Ali).

Despite these support groups and constitutional protections against discrimination, harassment and violence, homosexual Muslims in the West and in South Africa still struggle with homophobia in their families and communities that can result in psychiatric and physical violence. Muhsin faced public disgrace at the hands of a radio show host and Tamsila was disowned by her mother when she came out to her. Often, these reactions from family and community are much worse. Nargis, a lesbian Muslim of Indian descent living in South Africa, was beaten by her mother, shamed by her entire family, temporarily pulled out of her university, and was restricted to her house when her friends told her family she had a girlfriend. Tayyaba, a first-generation UK citizen whose parents had immigrated from Pakistan also faced restriction of movement and finances which resulted in depression; she dealt with her family’s control by running away and pursuing economic independence before attempting to reconcile with her family—an ongoing process. While these are only a few stories, they are representative in a limited capacity to the backlash homosexual Muslims living in democracies face when they come out to their families (Kugle). In countries with little or no constitutional protections from homophobic violence, the backlash from families can be much worse. The documentary, Gay Life, Gay Death in Iraq, featured a man who hung his own son for being a homosexual as a warning to his other sons. While this is only one example, it may be somewhat representative of the backlash homosexual Muslims face from their families in similar contexts (Green & Ward).

Much of the Muslim world has been colonized and remains the victims of Western imperialism resulting in autocracies, dictatorships, or failed states, in turn resulting in communal persecution of homosexual Muslims. One of the most extreme of these was and is Iraq. It is there that homosexual men, mostly Muslims, face systematic kidnapping, torture and murder at the hands of extremists. Following the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, two militias emerged by the name of Badr and Mahdi (Green & Ward). Previously used as community police after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, they were replaced by state police when the American forces turned over control to al-Miliki’s government, and consequently to religious policing (Von Mitterlstdt & Steinworth; Sarhan & Burke). This included administering the hadd² punishment to homosexuals, something for which both the supposedly moderate Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Ayatollah Abul Qassim Khoei
issued fatwas\(^4\) (Green & Ward). More recently there have been many news reports of the Islamic terrorist organization \textit{Daesh}\(^4\) murdering Iraqi and Syrian men for being homosexual (“Islamic State”). However, while the homophobic violence in Iraq and Syria is religiously based, it is important to note that there are a host of other reasons that combine with Islam’s textual claim that homosexuality is \textit{haram} including political, economic, social and personal crisis’ that can also be used to explain the rampant homophobic violence in these areas, but is beyond the scope of this paper.

Vigilante homophobic violence is not the only religiously-based homophobic violence homosexual Muslims face; twenty-nine states\(^5\) with a Muslim majority (out of forty-eight) have criminalized same-sex acts, and five of those (Mauritania, Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen\(^6\)) have codified \textit{and implemented} the death penalty–Afghanistan, Pakistan and Qatar have codified the death penalty for same-sex acts but have not been known to implement it (“Table”; Carroll & Itaborahy). The five states that have implemented the death penalty in punishment for homosexual acts are of particular importance because they do it under proclaimed Sharia or Islamic law; either their laws are explicitly Islamic or they have Islamic law codified parallel to their civil codes under which same-sex acts are prohibited and punishable by the death penalty (Carroll & Itaborahy). These states clearly prescribe the neo-traditionalist viewpoint that homosexuality and Islam are incompatible and that same-sex acts are an abomination against God that should be punished by an Islamic state. As for the twenty-nine Muslim-majority states that criminalize same-sex acts and the nineteen that don’t, the difference can be explained by two factors: European colonization and Islam. European colonizers often codified laws prohibiting same-sex acts that Muslim-majority states merely preserved after gaining independence. However, colonization does not explain all Muslim-majority states’ laws on homosexuality; controlling for colonization, states with Islam as the official religion, or Islamic states were still more likely than not to criminalize same-sex acts (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood).

**CONCLUSION**

Islam and homosexuality have a complicated relationship. While most Muslims believe that homosexuality and Islam are incompatible and often believe that homosexuals are an abomination to God and therefore must be punished—sometimes with the death penalty—others interpret their homosexuality as being God-given and therefore \textit{halal}. When the text of the Qur’an is analyzed objectively, using the meanings and connotations of the Arabic contemporary to the writing of the Qur’an, it is clear that God finds same-sex acts to be an abomination, but not necessarily more than other unlawful sex or non-sex acts. Still, there are a growing number of homosexual Muslims, mostly in the West, who do not agree with this interpretation.
and understand the Qur’an to be allowing of same-sex acts within a licit marriage contract. These differing beliefs have had varied impacts on Muslims worldwide, although they all have generally been negative. For homosexual Muslims living in the West, they often have to face the disappointment, violence or disownment of their family. In the Muslim world, or Muslim-majority countries, the impact is often much harsher, even fatal. But despite the consequences, homosexual Muslims continue to “come out” to their friends, family and community, to create support groups and raise awareness about the homophobia they face.

END NOTES

1. It is important to note that neo-traditionalists are often reacting to Western political, economic and cultural neo-colonialism and imperialism, and therefore their viewpoint stems from threatened masculinity and self-identity. Since homosexuality is most accepted in the West and most international human rights organizations that promote the acceptance of homosexuals are Western, homosexuality is often seen as a Western phenomenon, and work to end homophobia by the West in non-Western cultures is interpreted as cultural imperialism. In response to the havoc wrecked on their society by Western powers, many Muslims have turned to what they believe is traditional Islam to fix both their personal identity and state crisis; including the rejection of modern and/or Western ideas of homosexuality. However, as is shown in the example of their beliefs about homosexuality, they are selective in what they choose as traditional Islam, hence the term neo-traditionalist (Kugle & Hunt).

2. The hadd punishment refers to the fixed (cannot be changed by an Islamic court) punishment of death by stoning or 100 lashes for illicit sexual behavior.

3. A legal decree made by an Islamic leader.

4. I use Daesh instead of ISIL/ISIS to differentiate between the non-state terrorist organization and legitimate states that are Islamic.

5. Excluding the Occupied Palestinian Territory of Gaza and the Indonesian province of Aceh, both of which have criminalized same-sex acts.

6. It should be noted that Sudan and Yemen are currently conflict zones with no legitimate government.

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The Reinvention of International Law: Discipline and Punishment in an Age of Human Security

Bandar Alsaeed

ABSTRACT

The post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals marked the beginning of a decisive shift in the conduct of international law and how it constitutes and is constituted by politics. I attempt to examine its relationship to political power, not only in terms of its attainment, but more emphatically, in its attenuation or dissolution. This trend toward humanitarian legalism shifts the locus of concern from the state to the individual, and thus has been assigned an invariably positive valuation by some academics. This essay challenges such a valuation and argues that a global preoccupation with individual criminal accountability is undesirable since it diverts attention away from the systemic nature of the issues and the urgency for social alternatives—thereby stifling meaningful political resistance.

In his analysis of the historical and sociological origins of the prison system, the French philosopher Michel Foucault specified the disappearance of torture as a turning point in the history of human punishment:

Among so many changes, I shall consider one: the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle. Today we are rather inclined to ignore it...perhaps it has been attributed too readily and too emphatically to a process of “humanization”, thus dispensing with the need for further analysis...in any case...the fact remains that a few decades saw the disappearance of the...body as the major target of penal repression. (8)

Foucault saw the public performance of torture in the early modern period as a political act intended to foster collective deference to the absolute monarch. While few would raise objection to the literal accuracy of the author’s assertion, perhaps the final decade of the twentieth century, and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), would challenge the totality of Foucault’s asserted disappearance of “the body as the major target of penal repression.” The post-World War II trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo globally transformed how scholars and legal experts perceived and constituted international law. In this extant paradigm, the constitution of international law has expanded far
beyond its initial discursive demarcations—its doctrine and rule-making largely restricted to broad definitions of legality with the state invariably as the locus of its concern—to deal with particular contemporary issues of mass atrocities, war crimes, and human rights abuses. While various commentators have labeled this shift under different names (e.g. the largely optimistic variety preferring “humanity’s law” over “juridification of conflict”), they all generally recognize the veracity of its occurrence, but disagree concerning the extent of its political effect.

This essay proposes that international law’s transformation from a broad state-centered discourse to a punitive mechanism capable of punishing individuals is, to a quite complete extent, political in its ramifications, not only in the sense of being concerned with the use of power, but more emphatically, in how it approaches the dissolution or attenuation of political power. In that regard, war crimes tribunals appear to be the most emblematic representative of the limitations and dilemmas of the new international humanitarian law framework. The reappearance of Foucault’s ‘penally-repressed’ body need not be taken literally, since it is the figurative and unified political body of the defendant that receives the greatest injury. Humanitarian legalism, or humanity’s law, refers to the broad discursive changes in the function and conduct of international law, from a state-centered system to one where individual citizens occupy centrality in directing both its principles and mechanisms of retribution. Gerry Simpson contends that “something happened, then, to political consciousness in the twentieth century to make law seem more suited to the resolution of international disputes (e.g. Kellogg-Briand, The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907) and more attractive as a tool of political retribution…after war” (3). The expanding legalization of the humanitarian order, a phenomenon unheard of prior to the twentieth century and most clearly manifested in war crimes tribunals, marks a shift toward the conception that certain wars may be deemed illegal by the international system. The expansion implies that individuals, rather than states, begin wars—typified in 2003 when Tony Blair and George Bush were seen as the sole instigators of an unlawful invasion of Iraq—and that the consequences of humanitarian legalism involve an emphasis on individual culpability, punishment, and retribution. The new legal discourse blames individuals for atrocities, but ignores the societal conditions that beget the atrocities. As such, this essay proceeds from the claim that this tendency is not desirable for international politics in the long run, since it diverts political attention both away from the systemic nature of the issues and from the urgency for social alternatives, thereby stifling political resistance.

Some of the major historical developments in the growth of humanity’s law demonstrate the international collective tendency towards punishment, accountability,
and ‘measurable’ results. Arguably the two most pertinent manifestations of this global propensity are humanitarian-based intervention and war crimes tribunals, both relatively new inductees into the arena of international diplomacy. The Concert of Europe, which existed from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War, appears at first glance a seemingly apropos precursor to the contemporary trend of humanitarian-based intervention. One would do well to remember that the Concert involved a small coalition of European nations that used military intervention only as a means of protecting regional state sovereignty and often to restore the political status quo and quell the spirit of liberalism and democracy that the 1789 French Revolution had spread throughout the continent. This is, in theory though not in practice, different from the contemporary trend of humanitarian-based intervention, wherein one nation or a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ intervenes in order to alleviate a humanitarian crisis (e.g. genocide, famine, mass displacement). One might say that the contemporary regime of humanitarian legalism emerged after World War II, and congealed with both the ratification of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the occurrence of the first international criminal tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Upon closer scrutiny, the specific context of eradication of Nazi fascism, not to mention spelling out German or Japanese accountability in the most intelligible manner, preoccupied the victorious powers in the postwar period (Mansell and Openshaw 127). Since its inception, the trend toward international criminal tribunals has embraced a distinct political character, in the sense that victorious and powerful states have used tribunals as a tool to eliminate political enemies—both individuals and ideas—and preclude the possibility of their reemergence in the global arena. Hence, both the Concert of Europe and the trend of humanitarian legalism, though different in their declared aims, share an unconcealed political function—the maintenance of power at all costs.

It is this political function that must be critically dealt with in order to better appreciate the emergence of this newfound legal narrative. Even largely optimistic commentators, such as Ruti Teitel, admit that “the current ascendance of humanitarian legalism shares affinities with developments during earlier periods that are associated with the pursuit of empire…the return to the ‘just war’ concept relates to a revival of imperial or imperialistic political discourse” (22). Here, Teitel refers to ‘imperialistic political discourse’ in the sense outlined above, that is, nations pursuing intervention, military or diplomatic, for the realization of their own political interests. The emergence of the novel and slightly oxymoronic phenomenon of ‘humanitarian intervention’, a peculiar development in the trajectory of international law, has often been presented as immune from the capricious interests of powerful actors. Generally,
humanitarian intervention is defined as the use of military force by one nation against another with the overarching purpose of alleviating a humanitarian crisis. Up until the 20th century, it is fair to say that some moral concern was nevertheless invoked in the ‘Just War’ doctrine, yet there were no legal prohibitions precluding a nation from going to war. The post-Cold War period, however, witnessed a revival of humanitarian intervention after the precedent-setting excursions to Kuwait, Somalia, and Bosnia in the early to mid-1990s. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian government to respond to Kofi Annan’s impassioned plea at the United Nations podium, published its “Responsibility to Protect Report” (R2P) in 2001, which marked a linguistic shift from a rhetoric of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to ‘responsibility to protect.’ It expanded the traditional framing of sovereignty from an exclusively state-centered consideration to one that included the potential for individual sovereignty. In other words, states had a responsibility not only to protect the sovereignty (territorial borders, right to self-determination) of other states, but also to protect the sovereignty (human rights, basic needs) of the people within those states.

Yet, the concept of humanitarian intervention did not become a harsh imprint upon the psyche of the international community until the NATO operations in Rwanda and Kosovo, 1994 and 1999, respectively. They are noteworthy not only for their supposedly noble moral justifications, but also that they preceded the establishment of international criminal tribunals in Rwanda (ICTR) and Yugoslavia (ICTY), both legal institutions intended to investigate war crimes or mass atrocities committed in those nations prior to the NATO military operations. While many legal critics remained skeptical of the efficacy and productivity of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, due to their conspicuous political proximity to a vindication of ‘victor’s justice’ (that is, a selective justice that is determined by the victors of war and often not applicable to any crimes the victors may have committed during war; a justice devoid of objective measure), the Rwanda and Yugoslavia tribunals were generally well received by scholars and legal experts. Optimists like Ruti Teitel not only applauded the truly international and anonymous identity of the prosecutors, but saw the tribunals as indicators that powerful states were able to pursue the rule of law even when a clear political advantage could not be discerned. While this essay distances itself from such an assumption, it must nevertheless be noted that the political underpinnings of these historical developments demonstrate, in the first place, an unhealthy preoccupation with punishment and a tangible compulsion for accountability. This preoccupation is unhealthy primarily because it seeks to measure certain evils, such as the human agency involved in the outbreak and perpetuation of war, as more deserving of punishment
than other structural manifestations, such as child labor or famine. One must ask what shortcomings does our justice system have if this humanitarian legalism is only capable of punishment when a human face can be attached to a crime, and rendered impotent at addressing any of the other deeply embedded structural inequalities that often cause the perpetuation of evil for decades—silently and without the benefit of the international spotlight?

It is important to isolate the claimed virtues of humanitarian legalism in order to better appreciate its perception in the minds of many liberal advocates of the internationalist order. Professor Jonathan Graubart’s terminology—“pragmatic legalism”—in his article “Rendering Global Criminal Law an Instrument of Power” is particularly instructive in this case. Pragmatic legalists are best defined as those who commend the post-WWII tribunals despite the indubitable presence of ‘victor’s justice.’ Pragmatic legalists can be considered a particular subset of the commentators and experts who view humanitarian legalism as beneficial for both law and politics in the long run. Their mindset is best delineated as an oscillation between legalism and political pragmatism: “as legalists, they applaud the tribunals for introducing a legal model of global justice. As pragmatists, they endorse the allied decision to hold the tribunals in a political setting controlled by victor states because it [enables] global justice to take place” (Graubart, "Rendering” 411).

Thus, pragmatic legalist supporters of the turn to humanitarian legalism would likely begin by invoking the undeniably prominent status of humanitarian law today, such that even skeptics of the legal order would concede to its prominence. Gerry Simpson, for example, concedes that most of the appeal of the international criminal legal process is that its results are immediate and part of an observable social reality. He notes the fact that the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet was subject to extradition proceedings (that Britain failed to prosecute him only serves to highlight the political character of the legal system), that Milosevic was tried at The Hague, and that NATO did intervene in Kosovo (Simpson 46). In other words, it is perceived by advocates of the legal process that these events point to the prominence of the humanitarian-legal framework in actual political life. Furthermore, they locate its emergence within the harmonious convergence of socio-historical forces, seeing it as a somewhat natural consequence of the social conditions of our age: “one might see the present developments in the emergent humanitarian-law regime as being bound up with the contemporary loss of political equilibrium, political fragmentation, the presence of weak and failed states, and the phenomenon of globalization” (Teitel 86). Indeed, the human rights regime’s commitment to generalizable norms and principles is arguably vital for establishing an international consensus on where the line will be drawn, so
to speak, in terms of what a state can do to its citizens. At the very least, supporters of international law’s reinvention claim that the institution of war crimes tribunals proves that bringing generalizable principles of justice to international politics is possible. When juxtaposed with crude and self-interested diplomacy, few would argue that humanity took a collective step backwards in juridifying humanitarian norms. War crimes tribunals are equally regarded, from this perspective, as a reliable method for discovering truth in addition to providing international accountability and deterrence. In its concrete legal methodology and procedure, some tribunals could shed historical light on what really happened during these contentious events. Liberal internationalists, though skeptical of the victor’s justice aspect, would likely elevate the Nuremberg trials here to highlight how those legal investigations uncovered numerous documents and primary sources that were essential to academics in gaining a clearer historical understanding of the Nazis.

It was not until the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the late 1990s that many of the preliminary criticisms of the post-WWII tribunals were satisfied for some. Legal skeptics perceived the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as unabashedly political; they argue that since the trials were conducted by the victorious WWII powers, the only possible outcome was that Germany and Japan would bear the brunt of the punishment. By contrast, the International Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were hailed for their alleged truly international nature, the diversity of prosecutors, ratification by UN convention, and above all, the fact that the erstwhile critique of “victor’s justice” now became invalid since the tribunals and its prosecutors were not linked to either warring side. These “successes” were seen as signals that the international community had truly outgrown the temporary dilemmas of the post-war period. The ICTY and ICTR are likewise conceived by pragmatic legalists as facilitators of justice in the realm of politics, for which “the collective benefit…for ICTY supporters has been the development of international criminal law…this has entailed the institutionalizing of the liberal legal features of transparency, due process, careful deliberation, and adversarial scrutiny” (Graubart and Varadarajan 446). In terms of individual accountability, there is an appeal to supporters of the global criminal legal system in the fact that specific people become accountable for grave war crimes as opposed to a generalizable culpability of the society as a whole. They argue that the best means to preclude the occurrence of future atrocities is to set a penal benchmark applicable to all parties so that potential perpetrators, even powerful states, would think twice before doing so in fear of receiving a similar fate. Yet even sophisticated optimists of the humanitarian legal order raise concerns with this aspect of the emergent humanity’s law regime: “humanity law’s concern with accountability
may well continue to risk overshadowing and dominating other more state-centric projects, such as nation-building and democratization” (Teitel 221). It is not for the sake of the perpetuation of ‘state-centric’ projects that this preoccupation with accountability is undesirable. There is, arguably, a greater political value in indicting a society as a whole instead of conveniently assigning blame for mass atrocities, by definition committed on a large scale with the complete utilization of state resources, upon select individuals. In all, however, supporters of the humanitarian legalism shift would likely argue that the long-term benefits of furthering the aims of global justice go beyond the short-term inconsistencies of punishment and immediate culpability.

Despite the prevailing orthodoxy that humanitarian legalism is largely innocuous and indeed progressive, the dilemmas that this expanded juridification poses for the fate of the international community far outweigh the perceived benefits. One of its supporters’ central claims is that the shift from a state-centric legal order to a humanitarian legal order must be viewed as progressive in light of the trajectory of international criminal law; indeed, the basis of ‘humanity’s law’ is that “the normative foundations of the international legal order have shifted from an emphasis on state security – defined by borders, statehood territory, and so on – to a focus on human security” (Teitel 4). Yet, the lingering political residue from such an emphatic departure to individualism must necessarily be considered part of the equation. What pragmatic legalists, and supporters of expanded juridification more generally, misrepresent is the extent to which legal doctrines and tribunals constrain objective political forces. They view law and politics as distinct entities, each occupying its own separate discursive realm. Certain objective forces, such as mass unemployment, the lack of access to clean drinking water, the control of vast swaths of land and people by a barbarous terrorist group, and other pertinent social issues appear unanswerable within the framework of humanitarian legalism. Instead, its keenest proponents regard these as natural consequences of globalization. Neither humanitarian-based interventions nor subsequent war crimes tribunals appear capable of resolving these issues in permanence. In contrast to that perspective, this essay endorses without qualification the comments of Gerry Simpson: “law could have no meaning in the absence of politics. Law is politics transformed. In this sense, law can neither be reduced to politics nor can it be incubated against politics” (23).

Landmark events in the development of international criminal law, namely humanitarian intervention and war crimes tribunals, must be entered into a political calculus, since these are reflections of the tension between objective social forces at the time of their introduction into the global diplomatic arena. The timing of the R2P report, occurring on the heels of the controversial intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
cannot be dismissed in face of the fact that its content largely vindicated the moral grounds on which the military operation was waged. The danger of this tendency is that it appears a politically malleable justification by which military strength can be used, or legal institutions instrumentalized, for the maintenance or pursuit of political power; Graubart’s assessment is useful in that regard: “elevation of R2P as a legal doctrine is thus likely to make a difference in emboldening states to use force in situations where they think they can raise a plausible moral cause” (Graubart, "R2P” 76). Thus, one of the most persistent detriments to the stability of the international order is likely to be such juridification of political power, wherein a legal system is established not to further justice but instead to accommodate and sanitize the capricious actions of powerful military states. The contemporary form of the international legal system appears to accommodate war, serve political interests under the guise of upholding values, and attenuate political resistance by persuading disillusioned multitudes to place their faith in a legal system rather than pursue revolutionary means of change.

Dilemmas also arise in the general perception of war crimes trials and in the misrepresentation of its virtues. Many supporters of the emergent humanity’s law framework contend that the newfound capacity of international law to enforce prosecution marks a progressive step forward from critiques of the pre-Nuremberg order for being toothless and incapable of measurable results. However, this assessment does not consider whether such a turn is indeed in the best interests of humanity. Claims that “the law of war crimes somehow completes international law by giving it teeth, by putting bad men in prison, and by imitating domestic law’s concreteness” miss out on the disturbing propensity the global community displays towards internalizing the notion that “the success or failure of international law now seems more bound up with its capacity to secure convictions in criminal trials than in the everyday of diplomatic engagement” (Simpson 137). While, at first glance, this may not seem to be particularly problematic, even a cursory estimation of the long-term effects of equating legal success with criminal conviction would likely render undeniable the extent of damage done to the global legal apparatus.

Since the question of whether a trial will be held or not is necessarily correlated to the efforts and desires of the powerful states, it is doubtful at best that such tribunals actually further the aims of global justice. Even advocates of war crimes tribunals do not deny that a critical purpose of the tribunal is the elimination of political enemies: “Akhavan has argued that one of the purposes of the ICTY trials is the removal of political enemies from the post-war Balkan state…again, at Nuremberg, the Allies were keen to purge elements of the Nazi elite around whom a Nazi revival might convene” (Simpson 123). It is difficult to see that granting such leverage to powerful states, that
they are able to pursue tribunals for the convenient elimination of opponents, can at all be considered a progressive development in international criminal law. Slobodan Milosevic’s trial, for example, brought to the foreground plenty of valid critiques of the international criminal legal process, often by the words of the defendant himself. The most pertinent of which gets at the heart of our dilemma, “the claim to be advancing an impartial system of legal justice is gravely compromised when the principal architects have a decided stake…in the narrative produced by the tribunal” (Graubart and Varadarajan 445). By retaining a firm control over the outcome of the trial and the evidence presented, the United States and its allies ensured that global scrutiny was diverted towards the atrocities of a few local scapegoats, and not toward the legality of US or NATO officials’ actions. In all, supporters of the shift towards humanitarian legalism overestimate the durability of international legal institutions to withstand political pressures; by endorsing the status quo, they also indirectly encourage the tendency for the elite to criminalize opponents through a brand of selective and inadequate justice.

While scholars’ and legalists’ claims to international law’s supposed capability to function outside of political context are based on weak analytical foundations, many of the most damaging consequences of humanitarian legalism to the common person stem from its self-portrayal as apolitical. It becomes difficult to argue that the powerful interests within the international states, those interests that actively pursue the punishment of war crimes, would have any intent to apply the same standard of international criminal law to its own rulers or military personnel. Consequently, one must ask whether such a system can ever be more than merely the expression of these interests. In the final analysis, the expanding presence of humanity’s law is most prominently marked by its overemphasis on punishment, culpability, and retribution, directing the energy and efforts of the international community towards these goals at the expense of harnessing ubiquitous political dissent. By positing law and politics as entities capable of functioning in isolation from each other, this turn to “juridification diplomacy”, as Simpson terms it, could potentially romanticize tribunals for many victims of international politics, thereby instilling a naïve and misguided confidence in the capabilities of the system to enforce justice. On a microcosmic level, this is prevalent “in American political life where it seems natural to think in terms of impeaching the President rather than going to the bother of defeating him at the polls” (Simpson 138). To be sure, this essay does not argue that conventional political responses (elections, awareness campaigns, institutional dependency) are a better option to the legal process. On the contrary, these have been exhausted by the same system of social relations that produces the structural inconsistencies of international
law. It is therefore necessary to redraw the discursive parameters assigned to law and politics so that we may find in their reconstruction an instructive aspect of their coexistence. In other terms, if we understand that there are no parameters, that both law and politics blend into one another more fluidly than supporters of humanity’s law would suspect, the new parameters would yield a better and more efficient legal system.

While alternative citizens’ tribunals have been utilized in the past to alleviate the frustration directed at the impotence of international law to constrain and render accountable the actions of powerful states or their allies, the efforts of their instigators hardly make a lasting impact upon the modern regime. This is because, in a sense, they are preaching to the legalistic choir. Kampmark informs us that such tribunals have a history stretching back to 1967, when the Russell War Crimes Tribunal was convened at the behest of Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, British and French philosophers respectively (6). The original tribunal investigated the American military intervention in Vietnam and many Russell tribunals have convened since then, with the aim of addressing socio-political issues that the international legal system appears unable to rectify. Alternative citizens’ tribunals seek to challenge the current system of international law, but are driven by the same logic of incremental progress employed by pragmatic legalists. Supporters of the alternative tribunals concede flaws in their system, but argue that it is better than the current system of international law; pragmatic legalist supporters of the current system also concede imperfection, but argue that it is better than the pre-Nuremberg anarchy. Supporters of both tribunals fail to consider the possibility that law is a “false hope for social justice because it lacks meaningful autonomy from broader political and economic forces” (Graubart, “Rendering” 421). Such an approach re-conceptualizes the relationship between law and politics, because it would necessarily align the aforementioned political and economic forces within the ambit of legal institutions. Pragmatic legalists would likely dismiss this alternative as utopian and counterproductive to international stability. The former charge is somewhat anachronistic; indeed, the historical development of humanitarian legalism itself, in its metamorphosis into a framework of human security from one of state security, represents a dialectic evolution. Simpson implies that the humanitarian system did not completely abandon its statist archaisms in the manner many pragmatic legalists hasten to attest: “the 1990s…was a decade in which the idea of individual responsibility certainly underwent an astonishing revival…in international relations. But at the same time, and less visibly and self-consciously, the system was also embracing again the Versailles Model of state criminalization” (66).

In response to the notion that the pursuit of a radical alternative to the
current legal system is counterproductive to stability, it can be counter-argued with a fair amount of historical accuracy that a certain threshold of political violence is necessary for the introduction of a new and often glorious epoch. At times, unconventional political responses (civil disobedience, social protest, revolution) pose more potent and deep-lying ramifications to the injustices and inconsistencies of humanity’s law than appealing to the criminal process’ administration of discipline and punishment. Thus, arguably the farthest-reaching consequence of expanded juridification is the obfuscation of politics for the common person, the concealment of objective social forces behind a dizzying array of legal doctrines and institutions, with the corresponding result of the attenuation of revolutionary fervor. Whereas the pre-Nuremberg model directed the locus of success and failure always to the state, the revival of individual culpability in the late 20th century potentially diverts an otherwise healthy skepticism against state practices, towards a desire to criminalize individual perpetrators, a Milosevic or an Eichmann who can stand-in as a singular scapegoat for a complex event of great political magnitude. In one of his publications, Karl Marx portrays history as incapable of action, an objective and impotent social force, “history does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth, fights no battles. It is rather man, real living man who does everything, who possesses and fights” (625). In the end, this essay argues that the contemporary responsibility of international law has outgrown mere self-attachment to an abstract conception of global justice. It is imperative that humanitarian legalism is instead measured by the extent to which it elevates and aggrandizes Marx’s ‘possessing’ and ‘fighting’ man.

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