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Economic Integration in the MENA: Integrating the Most Disintegrated Region

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Although most of the countries in the region share a common language and religion, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains one of the most ethnically and culturally diverse regions in the world. Unfortunately, instead of taking advantage of copious linguistic, cultural, and religious traits that MENA countries have in common, the contemporary MENA is ravaged by interstate and ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and transnational terrorism, causing millions of deaths and continual displacement of people.

For decades, scholars have worked on researching the catalysts of MENA’s fragmentation. Possible causes of regional disintegration are commonly attributed to violent sectarianism and belligerent political aspirations of regional leaders. On the other hand, more recent studies link regional instability to socioeconomic factors on more localized levels, such as high youth and female unemployment rates. While scholars agree that sectarian, political, and territorial disputes are central to many conflicts in the MENA, there is a lack of consensus whether socioeconomic conditions are as important for the study of regional security and development.

Would economic integration be the right strategy to restore the shattered regional integrity in MENA? This paper delineates current economic conditions on the regional and subregional levels and analyzes previous efforts at integration and causes of their failure. Further, I explain how economic integration would benefit the region,
and, based on available studies, propose mechanisms to foster regional synergy through economic integration. In support of proposed strategies, I review regional integration efforts through economic arrangements in Europe and employ the European experience as the model for the contemporary MENA.

Integration in the MENA or its Absence?

Although many MENA states are rich in natural resources or located in favorable geographical conditions, the MENA’s economic performance can only be characterized as poor. Rouis and Tabor note: “Although home to 5.5 percent of the world’s population (on average for 2008–10) and 3.9 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), the region’s share of nonoil world trade is only 1.8 percent” (Rouis and Tabor, xix). When hydrocarbon exports are included, which constitute roughly three-quarters of total exports, MENA accounts for 6.2% of the world trade (xix). Such contrast primarily showcases the poor degree of diversification within regional economies and their reliance on natural resources as primary sources of income.

The situation is even worse when trade costs are considered. Making trade with neighboring countries costly, high intraregional costs of trade hamper regional integration efforts. Thus, for most MENA countries, trade is cheaper with Europe than with neighboring states (World Bank press release, 2013). Importantly, such a discrepancy explains the low distribution of intraregional export of goods, which averaged fewer than 8% in the period from 2008 to 2010. By contrast, the same indices averaged 25% and 66% in ASEAN and EU, respectively (Rouis and Tabor, xxii). Accordingly, high intraregional trade costs force MENA states to sell their products outside the region. Further implications of high intraregional trade costs are discussed below.

Improving economic conditions through regional economic integration would foster regional integration. In positing economic and regional integration as complementary processes, experts argue that closer economic ties would bring countries together on other policy levels (Rouis and Tabor, 5). For instance, Melani Cammett, a
political scientist from the University of California, Berkeley, advances the definition of regionalization as the process by which “autonomous economic processes . . . lead to higher levels of regional interdependence within a given geographical area” (Cammett, 380). Additionally, economic integration may help policy-makers in dealing with diverse challenges posed by the Arab Spring (Rouis and Tabor, xx). Therefore, economic integration would facilitate the necessary conditions for integration beyond economic sectors and would help restore stability in the post-Arab Spring era. The following sections examine previous regional integration efforts.

First Attempt at Regional Integration in the MENA: The Arab League

Regional and subregional integration arrangements, both political and economic, are not a new phenomenon in the region. The Alexandria Protocol, which resulted from the 1944 meeting of Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria, and Egypt in Alexandria, served as the foundation for the endorsement of the political union of the Arab states. In 1945, the Alexandria protocol expanded to include Saudi Arabia, and the resulting union came to be known as the Arab League. Founded just one month before the April 1945 introduction of the UN Charter, the Arab League is today the oldest operating regional organization (Pinfari, 1).

Originally, the League relied on annual meetings to encourage and solidify political cooperation (Pinfari, 3). Since its endorsement, the League’s top priorities have been policy coordination, conflict resolution, and regional integration. As a regional organization, the League facilitates and fosters cooperation between its twenty-two member states. Simultaneously, the Arab League is tasked with upholding the interests of Arab states and guaranteeing their sovereignty (Pinfari, 10).

Despite the League being the only existing regional organization in the MENA and having a wide membership, scholars commonly characterize it as a failed organization. Although one of the League’s core objectives is to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of member states, the organization frequently hedged to intervene both
in small internal disputes and in larger subregional conflicts. In fact, as Pinfari advances, while there were fifty-six conflicts in the MENA in the period of 1945-2008, the League only intervened in nineteen of them. Moreover, the League only succeeded in mediating five conflicts, corresponding to a mere nine percent of the total conflicts (Pinfari, 10). This inability to mediate regional conflicts has earned the League its informal status by many political scientists as a failed organization.

The causes of the League’s failure are attributed to the structure of the organization, its operational principles, and the behavior of its member states. Two political scientists, Barnett and Solingen argue that today it is important to establish whether “a failure of design” is the primary cause of the League’s failure, or rather if it was “designed to fail” (Barnett and Solingen, 180). For instance, while the League’s objectives are ambitious and far-reaching, virtually all collective efforts are undone by its statute that requires unanimous approval for all collective actions (Pinfari). Such operational design is especially ineffective in a setting where, despite the proclaimed aim of Arab unity, countries compete for influence while fearing the limitations on their sovereignty that could result from integration. Zacher’s characterization of the League is perfectly apposite in such context: “The League, in other words, seems to incarnate the ambiguities of the pan-Arab project at its height, trapped between the quest for Arab unity and the centrifugal forces favouring Arab separatism” (Zacher, 161).

Subregionalism as a Cure? Cases of the GCC and the AMU

The League’s inability to manage regional conflicts and foster viable political, military, or economic cooperation has encouraged separate subregional arrangements in the MENA. The foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in 1981 is a prime example of MENA’s disposition toward subregionalism amid the failure of the Arab League. Notably, the Gulf countries moved toward integration on conditions that diverged from the original motivations of the Arab League: it was not the hope of unification that served to propel integration in
the Gulf, but ideology and mutual economic interests (Pinfari, 4).

The gradual integration process by the Gulf countries, with initial focus on cooperation in economic and security spheres, might suggest that Gulf states learned from the League’s shortcomings (Pinfari, 7). Remarkably, while the original charter posits economic cooperation as the first priority and neglects to mention security and defense cooperation, it is security that is at the center of the GCC’s agenda. Pinfari stipulates that such discourse is representative of the perceptions of local leaders and supports this claim with Guazzone’s words: “The legitimacy of the GCC for the Gulf people rests on its being instrumental to the fundamental goal of development” (Guazzone, 134). Importantly, such a careful approach has allowed for deeper integration and trust among the GCC founders (Lawson, 7).

The GCC states have common historical and cultural backgrounds and their past and current development policies signify the desire of the GCC members to diversify their economies and integrate their markets. Structurally speaking, GCC institutions resemble some of the European Union’s institutions. For instance, the operational structure of the Council according to the GCC’s Articles of Establishment is as follows: the Supreme Council consists of heads of states and directs policy of the Council; the Ministry Council is composed of foreign ministers and further stratified into committees; and finally, the Secretariat, which is intended to administrate and execute the operations of the GCC (Rouis et al., 4).

Although all GCC member states are monarchies, they are nonetheless diverse in terms of political systems from the written constitutions and parliamentary electorates of Kuwait and Bahrain (Rouis et al. 2), to Saudi Arabia, which has no written constitution and relies on the sharia law (Global Edge MSU, 2017). Economically, the GCC countries are characterized as high-income yet highly dependent on hydrocarbon resources. As part of their economic diversification efforts, GCC states have promoted reform with a particular focus on business sectors. In 2008, the GCC expanded to the status of a common market. Such procedures introduced equal rights and privileges for citizens of member states. Much like the EU system, the GCC common market allows citizens to travel, work, and live freely while
enjoying social protection and health services, education, and retirement (Rouis et al. 6).

Many contemporary scholars and economists posit the GCC as the most advanced example of integration in the MENA. Rouis et al. maintain: “GCC has evolved well beyond a focus on free trade in goods to embrace high levels of cross-national labor and capital mobility, and the progressive opening of many sectors within each economy to all member states” (Rouis et al., 1). Nevertheless, while some homogeneity among member states has rendered cooperation and integration possible, most activities of the GCC remain confined to the Gulf region and neglect regional interests. Besides, country leaders remain concerned about sovereignty and oppose supranationalism (Rouis et al., 1). To this extent, while comparatively advanced, the GCC does not further regional integration efforts.

Moreover, integration efforts are often stalled by the competition of Gulf states in the areas of transportation, finance, and downstream energy, when these sectors could be used to foster cooperation. Territorial issues that occur between member states in the planning of bilateral infrastructure projects demonstrate that national political prerogatives perpetuate integration challenges. Furthermore, integration is restrained by economic conditions in the Gulf. Cammett observes: “small internal markets and limited domestic labor forces inhibit Gulf industrial development and largely preclude regional import-substitution strategies” (Cammett, 387). Therefore, although the GCC has adopted a range of progressive policies and achieved a remarkable degree of integration for the MENA, the current economic conditions together with the competition of member states hamper overall regional integration.

Another example of subregional integration in the MENA is the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Established in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, with strong economic emphasis at the center of its creation, the AMU’s priority was to facilitate strong trade relations between member countries. Specifically, the Maghreb states were reacting to expanding European integration and heightened protectionism, which threatened Maghreb trade with Europe (Cammett, 390). Through integration, AMU members hoped to create a North Africa customs union by 1995 and integrate
into a common market by 2000. However, these hopes never materialized (Rouis and Tabor, 110).

Remarkably, considering the history of tense relationships between Morocco and Algeria, the treaty had great political utility. Cammett remarks: “at a time when the North African states were under intense pressure to liberalize their economies, which could only increase external economic exposure, cooperation rather than competition stood to reason” (Cammett, 392). Hence, the rather dismal prospects for economic development — in the context of heightened European protectionism — prompted signatories to omit existing disputes, notably Western Sahara, and cooperate.

As part of the treaty, Maghreb states vouched to further regional development plans to foster cooperation and tackle issues of intraregional competition (Cammett, 390). The initial agreement sought to establish free movement of people, goods, services, and capital inside the union. Simultaneously, the agreement also promoted common political, social, and security policies. Beginning with the establishment of unified tariffs on imports in 1991, the AMU took steps to establish a customs union by 1995. However, political differences eventually stalled the process (Reference for Business, web, 2017).

Like the GCC, the AMU posited economic cooperation as central to its agenda. However, in contrast to the GCC’s somewhat accomplished economic integration, the AMU largely failed to foster conditions necessary for integration. The AMU’s failure can be explained by multiple reasons. Unwilling to undermine their sovereignty, member states objected to larger integration from the very beginning and only aimed to advance “compensatory” trade (Cammett, 394). In addition, the decision of the AMU members to establish the unanimous vote rule for its Presidential Council underscores reluctance to cede sovereignty to supranationalism (Cammett, 391). Unsurprisingly, such reluctance of member states only impeded integration. Eventually, the disparate motivations of the AMU members stalled economic and political integration in the Maghreb region.
Economic Conditions in the Contemporary MENA

Integrating economically would lay the foundation for restoring fragile regional integrity in the MENA. Drawing on the example of European integration, Ernst Haas, a prominent political scientist, writes: “Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe provided the crucial impetus. The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist advanced the movement, not the politician, the scholar, the poet, the writer” (quoted Rosamond, 51). However, this begs a few questions: Are the economic goals of MENA states convergent? And, if they are, are current conditions in the region commensurate with those necessary for economic integration?

Many models of cooperative regimes suggest that intraregional trade and financial interaction facilitate the creation of regional blocs (Cammett, 380). Although such models are largely based on the experiences of industrialized countries in the Global North, this could explain the absence of cooperation in the MENA. Specifically, most trade of MENA countries is associated with non-MENA states. Hence, according to Cammett, trade in MENA is “biased externally to an overwhelming degree” (Cammett, 381), which explains the low intraregional economic output and the failure of regional blocs, such as the AMU.

Such an external bias of intraregional trade is the result of the extremely expensive costs of trade within the region. For instance, Maghreb countries are oriented towards trade with Europe because the associated costs of trade are significantly lower than trading costs inside the Maghreb region. On the other hand, trade in Western Europe is generally much less expensive than trade in MENA (Rouis and Tabor, 66). To be precise, costs associated with trade between MENA countries are often 150% higher than the original price of an item, and even 400% higher in certain industries of trade (ESCAP World Bank, 2017). For example, Morocco and Lebanon’s costs of trade in agriculture, manufacturing, and total trade are 409.4, 156.7, and 169.1, respectively, indicating that costs associated with the trade of any good between these countries are approximately 410% higher.
than the original price of a good in agriculture, 157% in manufacturing, and 170% in total trade\(^1\), respectively. Thus, high costs of trade result in an external trade bias, which discourages trade within the region.

A closer look at the World Bank’s indices reveals that the trend is similar for many countries throughout the region. For example, Turkey and Morocco’s costs of trade range from 93.9 in manufacturing to 299.9 in agriculture, and the same trade costs with Oman are 136.6 and 551.1, respectively (ESCAP World Bank, 2017). Meanwhile, the trade costs between Turkey and Germany are 62.5 in manufacturing, 103.5 in agriculture, and 65.6 in total trade, which reinforces the claim that trade costs within countries in MENA are significantly higher than with the European nations. Additionally, these data also signify that intraregional costs of trade remain exorbitantly high for the majority of states in the region.

The MENA possesses significant geographical advantages that would contribute to increased intraregional trade. However, according to the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) and the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) developed by the World Bank economists, poor regional logistics performance and trade facilitation negate these advantages. While some MENA countries, like the UAE, have modern and sophisticated logistics facilities, most require substantial improvements in logistics to decrease the costs of cross-border trade (Rouis and Tabor, xxiv).

Together with high trade costs, poor logistics performance limits the ease of doing business in MENA. As seen in Table 1 below, only nine MENA countries are in the first hundred of the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking, and only one, the UAE, is in the top-50 list. Even more dire, the value of the regional mean for the MENA is 57.39, which corresponds with the 118th place in the global ranking. Further disaggregating data shows that the mean for the AMU is 52.11, which is associated with the 131st place in the ranking. Notably, the GCC has fared much better than the AMU and the MENA in general: with the mean value of 66.23, the GCC can be placed as 70th place on the

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\(^1\) Measurement method according to the official UNESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database.
ranking, primarily due to its better degree of economic integration and more developed logistics facilities of its member states. Accordingly, high trade costs cause MENA countries to seek markets beyond the region, while poor logistics performance further aggravates conditions for integration, and results in unfavorable conditions for doing business in the region.
### Table 1: Ease of Doing Business in MENA, 2017 Ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MENA Intraregional Ranking</th>
<th>Global Ranking</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>68.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>61.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>59.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>57.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>56.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>47.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>45.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>41.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>39.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>33.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MENA Regional mean</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>57.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GCC</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab Maghreb Union</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>52.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated using the standard sample mean formula: $\bar{x} = \frac{(\sum x_i)}{n}$; see table methodology section.
Stimuli for Integration

Integration is necessary to solve existing problems in the MENA, both of political and economic nature. The overwhelming reliance of some MENA states on hydrocarbon resources renders these states susceptible to fluctuations in international markets. Additionally, the fact that oil is traded in dollars indicates a dependence on international currency variations. Moreover, experts project that oil will run out by 2050 (Chandler). These pressing factors should motivate MENA states to invest in sustainable strategies of development and that economic integration on the regional level is crucial for attracting investment in non-oil-related sectors of the economy and promoting the production of local goods.

Economic integration would significantly advance regional integration efforts. Specifically, integrating economically would encourage growth, employment, and bolster diversification of regional economies, thereby solving important development challenges in the MENA. Rouis and Tabor expand on this idea: “While it is not a panacea or a substitute for domestic reform, economic integration can help attract the investment needed to generate more and better jobs by removing barriers to trade and investment and by improving the enabling environment for both domestic and foreign investment” (Rouis and Tabor, 4). Accordingly, economic integration would advance regional integration efforts.

Previously, MENA countries have benefited economically from removing tariff barriers. Further liberalization of services would benefit them even more. For instance, Rouis and Tabor maintain that liberalizing regional trade in services would encourage trade of parts and components in addition to facilitating the emergence of regional production networks. Importantly, their studies find that the implementation of reforms to empower regulatory frameworks and encourage healthy competition would produce up to three times more benefits than solely removing tariffs (Rouis and Tabor, 37). Therefore, economic integration would improve existing regulatory frameworks and encourage positive regional competition, which would be highly beneficial for regional economies.
Theoretical Framework: ECSC and Integration in Europe

History has provided multiple examples of integration in the environment of complete discord and lack of political will. The modern European Union (EU) is perhaps the most prominent example of this. In the post-World War II milieu of conflicting interests, particularly those of France and Germany, certain European countries (including France, Germany, Luxemburg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy) agreed to establish a supranational institution in 1952 to oversee operations of the newly established European Coal and Steel Community, or the ECSC (Dinan, 1124). Although some scholars debate the extent to which economic integration via the ECSC played a role in the European integration, the ECSC and the very idea of economic integration is undoubtedly rooted in the foundation of the modern EU.

Remarkably, it is not political solidarity and shared ideology that paved the way for integration, but rather the economic motives of involved actors (Rosamond, 51). The initial economic emphasis provided important impetus for political rapprochement. Dinan, a political scientist, argues that although the ECSC did not significantly contribute to the economic development of its members, the political significance of this economic community was enormous: “Politically, the Coal and Steel Community symbolized the willingness of France and Germany to cooperate closely so soon after the end of the war and ... soon made the prospect of war between two erstwhile enemies not just unlikely but simply outlandish” (Dinan, 1124). Furthermore, the ECSC paved the way for the 1957 Treaty of Rome, that established the single market in Europe, known as the European Economic Community (Dinan, 1121). In relation to the MENA, the history of integration in Europe proves that economic integration may be a vital tool not only to settle and prevent conflicts in the region, but also to achieve a remarkable degree of regional integrity over time.

Some scholars seriously doubt the ECSC’s role in European integration. For instance, Alter and Steinberg propose that the unwillingness of member states to create shared defensive and political communities in Europe in late 1950s underscores the failure of the ECSC at integrating Europe. According to them, such behavior of the
ECSC’s member states indicates that states wanted less, not more, supranationalism. While it is true that states are often cautious of supranationalism, especially in the post-conflict conditions, the example of European integration indicates that integration is a long and difficult process. As advanced by Dinan, the ECSC was highly significant in political terms, allowing rapprochement between former adversaries and laying the foundation for future regional arrangements in Europe.

**Mechanisms of Integration**

Integration efforts should be gradual and carefully managed to avoid inefficiency. Specifically, the mismanagement of economic integration mechanisms could lead to heightened protectionism, which would encourage anti-integration lobby groups and upset integration with regional economies. Besides, such mismanagement would likely impede economic growth and competitiveness and produce ever higher costs (Rouis and Tabor, 7). Thus, integration needs to be gradual and carefully implemented to avoid these potential outcomes of inefficiency.

Gradual economic integration would produce benefits that would encourage deeper regional integration. For that matter, Rosamond delineates an integrational framework based on the European example. Overseen by a specifically created authoritative body, various sectors of regional economies would integrate, thereby also pressuring related economic sectors to integrate. Gradually, benefits produced during the initial stage of integration would encourage various interested groups to shift their support towards more integration. In turn, the expanding economic integration would require further, more comprehensive integration due to the need for regulatory control of integrated sectors of the economy (Rosamond, 52). Although this theoretical approach is ascribed to the European integration, the MENA could certainly benefit from such an approach.

However, economic integration in the MENA would require addressing some specific economic issues that are endemic to the region. As Cammett suggests, regional trading arrangements facilitate lower transaction and administrative costs. However, to achieve
lower costs, the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers to the flow of goods, services, and production among MENA states is required (Rouis and Tabor, 4). Notably, some of these preconditions have already been met, as seen in the examples of the GCC and the AMU. In addition to the elimination of tariffs, the integration of logistics of transport, trade, and infrastructure—as well as common policies to allow for equal and favorable investment climate—would also be necessary (Rouis and Tabor, 4). Accordingly, these preconditions would have to be met to ensure an unhampered integration process.

Modernization of infrastructure, particularly communication and transport, is of the utmost importance for economic integration. Improving trade-related infrastructure would create favorable conditions for investment and help propel integration in the MENA. In recommendations for economic integration in the GCC, Rouis et al. argue that reducing border control and developing infrastructure could positively affect intraregional trade in the GCC. Specifically, investing in the development of trade routes and regional railway links, while removing border control, would facilitate trade. However, such modernization would require states to cooperate, rather than compete, in areas of mutual interest. As seen in the case of the GCC, states compete in areas of transportation, finance, and downstream energy even though cooperation in these sectors has the potential to majorly boost regional economies (Rouis and Tabor, 1). Hence, intraregional cooperation and the modernization of trade-related infrastructure should be priorities for MENA countries.

To effectively manage integration processes and oversee the modernization of infrastructure, an openness to adjust domestic and foreign policies would be required (Rouis and Tabor, 5). Essentially, MENA states would need to establish institutions designed specifically to oversee integration on various levels. In adjusting their foreign policies, states would have to refrain from sectarian narratives. Considering the current state of affairs in the region, cessation of sectarian hostilities in countries like Iraq and Syria would be a particularly difficult process. Additionally, reforming regulatory practices to relax customs procedures and restrictions on foreign workers is needed to advance economic integration. Finally, each subregion in the MENA would require specific policy adjustments. For instance,
due to its close ties with the EU, Maghreb countries would need to reduce tariff barriers to facilitate cross-border trade. In contrast, Mashreq states, which are more connected with the GCC, should pay more attention to improving trade infrastructure (Rouis and Tabor, xxviii).

Remarkably, progress toward economic integration has already been made. MENA leaders are already considering economic integration as a strategy to stimulate economic growth and improve effective governance. For instance, Tunisian leaders plan to revitalize the now dormant AMU (Rouis and Tabor, 2). In addition, according to Shamshad Akhtar, Vice President of the World Bank MENA, national and regional authorities have already included trade in services on the agenda (Rouis et al., v). Although economic integration in the MENA is still inchoate, these promising developments demonstrate that integration is slowly progressing.

Regional trade agreements have already significantly decreased barriers to regional trade. One such agreement is the Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA). Established in 1997, PAFTA included eighteen countries, together accounting for more than 80% of trade in the region (Rouis and Tabor, 109). PAFTA prioritized the removal of barriers to trade in MENA and aimed to encourage the integration of trade and investment. Importantly, the establishment of PAFTA and a number of other trade treaties helped to reduce the average uniform tariff equivalent in MENA from 15% in 2002 to 6% in 2009, which made the MENA the region with the biggest tariff reductions during the global financial crisis (Rouis and Tabor, 18). Thus, existing regional trade agreements such as the PAFTA significantly contribute to regional economic integration.

Conclusion

With wars and conflicts conflagrating throughout the region, the contemporary MENA is one of the most disintegrated regions around the world. From Africa’s northern coast to the Persian Gulf, new conflicts continue to flare up. Meanwhile, integrity and peace appear ever more distant. Possible causes of geopolitical discord in the MENA are commonly attributed to a myriad of social,
political, historical, and ideological factors. While available research features a robust body of work discussing the catalysts of the MENA’s failed integration, only a few studies have been conducted to propose a viable strategy to revive integration efforts in the region. Would economic integration be the appropriate strategy to address the problem of regional integration in the MENA? The available theoretical studies of regional integration answer this question resoundingly: Yes.

Available studies demonstrate that the MENA may experience significant economic growth through economic integration. Additionally, economic integration would advance the sustainable development of MENA countries, many of which are highly dependent on hydrocarbon resources and face serious economic consequences amid the projected depletion of oil. Further, economic integration would spur broader regional integration, improve institutional reform and effective governance. Notably, reducing barriers to trade and implementation of reforms of regulatory frameworks to encourage competition in the region could potentially yield up to three times more economic benefits.

The context of the MENA region must be taken into account when developing a strong case for regional economic integration. Primarily, the examples of the Arab League, the GCC, and the AMU are of great importance. Studies demonstrate that states are cautious of supranationalism and are not willing to cede sovereignty despite having common goals. Poorly designed institutional mechanisms further hamper the process of decision-making. Also, the MENA currently faces exorbitantly high costs of intraregional trade and poor overall performance in the ease of doing business. However, as evidenced in the case of the GCC, whose members implemented a common market in 2008 and improved their logistics facilities, some progress has been achieved. Importantly, both the shortcomings and successes of cooperation in organizations like the GCC should be considered when developing a strategy for regional economic integration.

Overseen by an authoritative institution, gradual economic integration would encourage related sectors of economies of MENA
countries to integrate, thereby producing pressure for continued regional integration. However, MENA states would first need to eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers to the flow of goods in order to lower costs of trade, a feat partially achieved by countries in the GCC and some in the AMU. In addition, along with integration of logistics of transport, trade, and infrastructure, the modernization of trade-related infrastructure should be prioritized to encourage inward investment. Cooperation in the development of trade routes and regional railway links would improve the efficiency of trade.

The examples of the ECSC and the European integration reveal some commonalities with the situation in the MENA. Just like the prospects for integration in the contemporary MENA, European integration and the processes that led to the creation of the ECSC were strained due to conflicting interests of countries in the post-war environment. In this regard, the state of affairs preceding the ECSC’s creation is similar to the situation in the contemporary MENA. Yet, despite being constantly challenged and the persistence of many controversial issues, Europe has achieved an unprecedented degree of integration, with an economic trade union at the foundation of the post-war European regional order. Thus, European integration remains an example of how economic integration could advance deeper regional integration and should motivate MENA leaders to push for more integration despite persisting differences.

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1. World Bank (2017). Ease of Doing Business. [Online] World Bank. Retrieved October, 2017, from http://www.doingbusiness.org/ This database is compiled by World Bank and presents global, regional, and subregional rankings of ease of doing business. This source is particularly important for my project as it allows to showcase current economic conditions in MENA, which are vital in explaining why current integration efforts are stalled. Also, the indices from the database are crucial for developing a proper strategy of regional integration as it allows to identify exact sectors of economy that a particular country should target.

Table Methodology

As a first step, I compiled all MENA countries together, including Israel and Turkey which are commonly excluded from MENA. The rationale for including Israel and Turkey into the table is that both countries are geographically located in the region, have great vested interests in the region, and have enormous direct and indirect im-
impact on regional geopolitics. Further, I compiled scores of each respective country and juxtaposed them on the regional and global levels, which allowed me to construct a table in a descending manner, from the best performer to the worst performer. Next, I added a section on mean scores for region as a whole as well as for the concerned subregional organizations—the GCC, and the AMU. Doing so allowed me to demonstrate how particular subregions are doing better in their integration efforts and economic policies. To calculate means, I used the standard sample mean formula: $\overline{x} = \frac{\sum x_i}{n}$, where $\overline{x}$ stands for the sample mean; $\sum x_i$ means addition of all values of the sample $X$; and $n$ stands for the number of items in the sample.
The Strategic Territory Trusteeship: Global Security and the Case of Micronesia

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The Fear

The Pacific islands are a region of great significance to the Cold War. For decades, the United States utilized the strategic locations of the Pacific islands as a way to contain the threat of the Soviet Union, with special importance resting in the region of Micronesia. After years of international occupations, the region would eventually dissolve into separate states entirely in the late twentieth century. U.S. interests and the United Nations Territory Trusteeship Agreement characterize the thirty years between World War II and many of Pacific states’ independence. The actions taken by the United States between 1945 and 1986 to guarantee its control of the region resulted in an alarmist strategy influenced by containment, a disjunction in Western alliance, and Micronesian dependence and distrust. While the United States secured control of the region, it was not without a cost to Micronesia and a risk to global peace.

Immediately after the end of World War II in 1945, the United States began to consider the Soviet Union as an enemy of the of the free, capitalist world. Despite the Soviets’ damaged economy and infrastructure after the war, the U.S. feared the spread of their influence. Between 1946 and 1947, U.S. intelligence reports summarized the alarm of the possibility of a Pacific War and the likelihood of the Soviet Union influence occupying the territories of the Philippines,
China, and South Korea (Friedman, 2001, 37). Such occupations would not only result in the loss of trade networks for the U.S., but would also mean the loss of Asia to communism. The transition period after WWII proved to heighten tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union when they failed to agree upon the future of Asia and the Pacific. This disagreement was credibly met with concern after several Eastern European Republics were established by the Soviet Union, an action that the United States believed to violate the terms of the Yalta Conference (U.S. Department of State). Other historical events such as the disagreement on the reunification of Korea, the proxy force assistance in the Chinese Civil War, and the diplomatic relationship and status of Japan all aided in furthering the deep divide between the United States and the USSR (Friedman, 2001, 39).

Following these events, the United States foreign policy of containment was at the forefront of international militaristic and diplomatic decisions. As a result, acquiring some form of control in the Pacific region was nonnegotiable. Annexation of Pacific islands, meaning the total sovereign control by the United States, was at one end of the military strategy spectrum, while the implementation of a trusteeship agreement, meaning the allocation of administration and supervision of a territory by a designated authority, was at the other (Statement by the Honorable George C. Marshall). The U.S. government faced difficulty in satisfying the military by allowing total control of the Pacific basin while remaining true to the promises of President Franklin Roosevelt, who made assurances that the U.S. would not make territorial acquisition as a result of World War II (Friedman, 2007, 117). Despite this, military officials would continue to prefer full annexation over trusteeship status. After Japan’s role in the League of Nations and Washington Naval Treaty in 1922, two agreements that Japan defaulted on, officials maintained credible suspicions of multilateral peace agreements (Friedman, 2001, 73). It was through these means by which Japan allegedly used the Washington Naval Treaty to assist in the planning of the attacks on Pearl Harbor (73). The lasting result was U.S. military skepticism and caution of multilateral endeavors to promote global security.

After the region of Micronesia was won in the military campaigns against Japan, thereby ending Japanese occupation, it became a
source of contention between the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Navy, and Department of War. In February 1945, the Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn began to draft diplomatic yet strategic plans for the islands to advise Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, contrasting the ambitions of military advisors. Within a month, Charles Taussig, Chairman of the United States Section on the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, briefed President Roosevelt on the conflicting opinions between the State Department and the military. Lacking confidence in the United Nations and motivated by the interest to maintain American security and positive relationships with allies, President Roosevelt made a difficult decision. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes highlighted concern that if the U.S. were to insist upon annexation of the islands, it could establish precedent for the British to insist upon complete sovereignty of their territories in the Middle East. Such sovereignty would give the United Kingdom control over Middle Eastern oil, a resource the United States could not risk losing (Friedman, 2007, 120). Upon the death of President Roosevelt, Secretary Stettinius continued to hold discussions with various U.S. government officials, to include Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and General George Marshall. Officials were pressured to come to a solution before the impending United Nations conference in San Francisco. Within a few days, the officials had drafted a compromise on the trusteeship issue and notified newly appointed President Truman of the agreement (121). President Truman found the best solution would be working through the United Nations to form a trusteeship.

The Solution

Leading up to the establishment of a solution in the Pacific, the United States lobbied in the United Nations negotiations to earn administering authority over the Pacific basin. The perceived failures set by previous multilateral solutions, such as the League of Nations, still caused many American government strategists to question the abilities of a United Nations Trusteeship to guarantee the establishment of a working American military complex in the Pacific Basin.
Such an unyielding and outspoken stance amplified the already polarized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The nature of the U.N. negotiations also indicated Western allies’ concerns over the fate the various Pacific islands. American fears of the proper handling of islands such as Micronesia were revealed in their lobbying for a “strategic trusteeship,” the proposed solution drafted by Secretary Stettinius and the various government officials he consulted with following the death of President Roosevelt. Such a trusteeship made a mockery out of the U.N.’s prior trusteeship framework and even caused American allies to second guess the nature of the United States’ motives of control of the region (Friedman, 2001, 63). While trust territories were traditionally transitional states in the progressively postcolonial world, the United Nations continued to oversee the development of territories’ political and economic systems (United Nations). The introduction of a new administrator over a territory in the decolonizing world was inherently counterintuitive to the objectives of the international trusteeship system. Modern day colonialism was not to be sanctioned by the United Nations.

While the U.S. military desired full annexation of the islands of the Pacific to operate without the compromises of multilateral negotiations and oversight, it would accept the terms of a strategic trusteeship. By the terms of the agreement, the United States was agreeing to “security imperialism” (Friedman, 2001, 73). By 1947, the United States controlled or significantly influenced: Micronesia, the Ryukyus, Japan, the Philippines, the Bonins, and Marcus Island (73).
The map (Figure 1) reflects the strategic locations of these islands along the Asian continent, reflecting a relief to American security anxiety. In a landmark decision in 1947, the United Nations designated the U.S. as the administering authority of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Peoples, 6). This distinction of a security trusteeship was important to the history of the islands during the Cold War for several reasons. First, that title gave the administering authority the right to establish military bases and station military personnel on the land. The area of land under military use could be closed off from any or all international inspections. Furthermore, international supervision of the administering authority was given to the Security Council, rather than to the Trusteeship Council. While both councils represent entities and interests of the United Nations, the Security Council is primarily charged with maintaining international peace, while the Trusteeship Council protects the political, economic, and social advancement of the people within trust territories. The designation of supervision by the Security Council...
distinguished this decision as the only UN trusteeship to grant carte-blanc authority to block international intervention (Dorrance, 62). The strategic distinction of council oversight was critical due to the United States' ability to cast veto power on the Security Council (Peoples, 13). With this framework established, an American lake had been created in the place of the Pacific Ocean and a strategy for containment on the Western front progressed.

The Terms

Despite this setup, the United States was not meant to be the permanent landlord of the islands of Micronesia. Annual Reports from the U.S. Department of State indicate that the Trusteeship Agreement states for the administrating authority to:

foster the development of such political institutions are as suited to the trust territory and promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned (Article 6; Peoples, 13).

The text of this article set no date for the United States to relieve its authority and allowed for flexible interpretation. The agreement also explicitly stated that the administering authority will “promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants” by improving infrastructure and fostering the development of land and sea resources (Peoples, 13). The U.S. was also charged with protecting the inhabitants against loss of their land and economic resources. The terms of the Trusteeship Agreement determined the administrating authority could use the islands for certain military purposes and charged it with developing the islands socially, educationally, politically, and economically. A challenging task, the United States did not initially undertake measures to uphold this part of the agreement. When they did, the investment in Micronesia came at a cost to Micronesian hopes for independence in the near future.
Partly due to its geography, Micronesia faced economic trouble in the 1970s (Peoples, 9). Comprising no more than 750 square miles of islands when combined, the region is characterized by a comparative disadvantage in land (Trumbull). Combined with a small, diffuse population, natural resource exportation drove the economy, with a special importance vested in coconut byproducts. Additionally challenging to the economy, the islands of Micronesia are relatively scattered, while also far from any other large landmass, making transportation of goods difficult. This distance from other large landmasses translates to distance from the major markets of industrialized countries. These features of Micronesia are important when reflecting upon how multinational corporations saw little potential for investment or growth from this area. Furthermore, it provides a backdrop to the way in which the American influence will begin to change the nature of Micronesia.

Addressing its desire to promote security, the United States made military use of the land within the first decade of the agreement. In 1951, the CIA established an installation on Saipan to train Chinese militants to support Chiang Kai-shek, the anticommunist political leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Peoples, 14). For 11 years, Saipan remained under tight security and surveillance because of this operation. During the 1950s, a missile tracking system was built on the Marshall Islands by the U.S. Army. Constructed on the Kwajalein atoll, this facility is still operational today (14). Additionally, the islands of Bikini and Eniwetok atolls of Micronesia faced the most infamous military use. This was the site of American nuclear testing during the 1940s and 1950s. In order to conduct these tests, the indigenous people were forcibly removed and unable to return for 40 years. With the hegemonic use of the islands, the U.S. was strategic and consistent with blocking other nations from utilizing Micronesia to maintain its grip on the geopolitical advantage of possession of the territory (14).

The Investment

Valuing the Trusteeship Agreement, U.S. agencies did begin to make
several small efforts to uphold the agreement. The Navy worked between 1945 and 1951 to rebuild the island infrastructure (Peoples, 14). Attempts were made to improve the shipping facilities and communication technology. A four-month long survey determined the economic status of the islands and suggested the standards the U.S. should uphold to maintain the integrity of not only the agreement, but also the integrity of the living standards of Micronesians. However, Washington did little to consider the results of the Navy’s conclusion. In 1951, the responsibility of the islands transferred from the Navy to the Department of the Interior (15). Under this Department, Micronesia received little support. It was at this time that the economy began to take a downturn after decades of relative progress (15). Reliable markets were not established; physical infrastructure was ignored. Growth in the economy in the form of new sustainable jobs was almost nonexistent. It was no secret that the Department of the Interior was doing little to adhere to the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement of 1947. This finally led to UN intervention by sending a Visiting Mission to assess the status of Micronesia. The report’s conclusion was an embarrassment to the United States and led to a major shift in policy. It was under President Kennedy that changes to the affiliation with Micronesia began to emerge.

Balancing national security and anti-colonialism proved to be a difficult task, and even more difficult to legislate. However, in 1962, the National Security Action Memorandum 145 was passed (Peoples, 16). This document recognized the goal of binding Micronesia into a permanent political relationship with the United States while simultaneously striving to advance Micronesian interests in the United States by means of economic development. A year later, it was determined that a survey mission was needed to assess conditions in the area. Headed by Anthony Solomon, the appropriately named Solomon Report synthesized valuable information and made recommendations to satisfy both American security interests and pacify UN concerns (16). To this day, the majority of this report remains classified. However, the portions that are available indicate that a permanent relationship with Micronesia was a political necessity for the United States. It recommended that a direct vote by the electorate of
Micronesia be held to allow Micronesians to choose between independence and a permanent relationship with the United States. Building upon this recommendation, the Solomon Report also made suggestions to help guarantee a favorable plebiscite. These recommendations included effective capital investment, the introduction of patriotic rituals and the U.S. school curriculum, the sending of sixty Peace Corps Volunteers, and other forms of development (17). However, despite continued occupation, this public vote did not occur.

In 1963, feeling pressure to take action, the U.S. Congress began to invest in Micronesia at unprecedented levels. Between the years of 1960 and 1978, the appropriations set aside by Congress had reached eight times what they once were, even accounting for population growth during these years. Drawing from several wells to receive federal funding, Micronesia was receiving $130.5 million dollars in 1978 for the development of infrastructure, healthcare, and of course, a positive attitude towards the United States (Peoples, 18). This spike from $6.8 million in 1960 led to many changes in Micronesia. While these funds helped to build 234 public elementary schools and 78 power generating facilities, they also secured increased standards of living for Micronesians and achieved U.S. goals (18-19). This influx of investment lead to increased cash incomes and materialistic consumption on the islands as well. By all appearances, the U.S. was beginning to uphold its end of the bargain. However, the higher cost of living and materialistic consumption became arguably a curse rather than a blessing of American investment. Altering the subsistence economy and society of Micronesia into an American dependent enclave led to devastating consequences for the local population.

The Impact

The United States’ pursuit of its political goals in Micronesia affected several economic variables, including employment, business, and trade. Micronesians historically had found cash income through primarily subsistence means. Fishing and copra harvesting were com-
mon occupational activities. However, by 1977, roughly half of all Micronesian wages came from employment within a U.S. government funded agency (Peoples, 21). While the U.S. government provided jobs and wages, it also led to the direct dependency of Micronesian people on the United States in the altered economy. Even private employment reflects indirect dependence on the United States. The Department of State’s analysis finds that the income earned from government employees created a higher demand on the market for private businesses. Since the 1960s, private business development and employment in a U.S. agency provided industry reveal a positive collinear relationship (21). Whether by direct or indirect means, the Micronesian economy became heavily dependent on the United States after the establishment of the trusteeship.

Upon further reflection of the dependency of the Micronesian economy on U.S. expenditure, unequal distribution of investment across sectors becomes apparent. During the early 1970s, the largest source of private employment came from the service sector, such as retail, transportation, and construction (Peoples, 21). This is in contrast to the lack of investment in the production sector, which was once the primary sector of the region and highlights the dependence on U.S.-provided wages. Without an expendable proportion in wages, there is little demand for retail, transportation, and construction services. Under this framework, the sudden withdrawal of the U.S. would collapse the economy with drastic unemployment and insufficient producers. Micronesia would not only face a monetary crisis, but a survival crisis in the case of such an event.

Wages and employment, however, were not the only indicators of Micronesian dependence. Historically, Micronesia had depended on other countries such as Japan and Australia for manufactured goods (Peoples, 21). Understandably given the small land mass, lack of technological advancement, and untrained labor, developing its own production industry would be fruitless without a consistent demand to support industrialization on the islands. Over the years of the Trusteeship though, the dependence on importation became increasingly alarming. The imports expanded from manufactured goods to including that of imported food. By 1977, the value of im-
ports was eight times what it had been in 1963 (22). Traditional Micronesian food such as yams, taro, and fish found itself replaced with increasing demand for sugar, flour, and canned fish. A self-sufficient agricultural society became a market-based society. Within a year, what was once 30 million pounds of exported vegetables declined to 1 million pounds (Harwood). With more people employed and increased wages in non-agrarian industries, a demand for purchasable food increased and self-production of food became a time-permitting hobby. Notably, exports did not increase with imports. After analysis of the economic data, a ratio of imported to exported goods came to 19:2 (Peoples, 25). Despite the high American investment in the islands, little was done to increase Micronesia’s productivity or competitiveness in the global market. This further rendered dependence on the United States.

Exemplary of the changes experienced in the territory after WWII, the Eastern island of Kosrae demonstrates the drastic changes to the society and economy during the American years of occupation. During the trusteeship, Kosrae became subordinate to the Ponape district. Because of this status, no resident American administrator physically occupied Kosrae. Rather, an Island Council was established to function as a liaison between the U.S. District Administrator on Ponape and the population of Kosrae. Beyond establishing a subordinate position and restructuring the political framework of the native population, the presence of outsiders left physical marks on Kosrae. Prior to the trusteeship, the United States bombed Kosrae to harm the Japanese-built infrastructure on the island. The bombs destroyed most of the public facilities and what was not destroyed was neglected during the first years of the trusteeship, causing it to deteriorate. Instead of reparations, government-provided jobs by means of the Island Council were created. Governor Carlos Camucho of Guam was quoted as saying that the Islands of Truk, Yap, Kosrae, and Ponape were operating on budgets of $52 million collectively and that $50 million of the funding was provided by the United States. Even with these millions and government-provided jobs, the new economy of Micronesia still left unemployment hanging between 20-25% by 1979 (Harwood). The United States ultimately failed in rebuilding Kosrae and upholding its agreement in
the Territory Trusteeship. This lack of action was experienced throughout Micronesia, but was especially true for the rural islands such as Kosrae (Peoples, 60).

Looking to another island in Micronesia, Majuro of the Marshall Islands demonstrated how the physical damage caused by the war was not the only mark left by the United States. After the swing of investment under President Kennedy, the island was on the surface a pinnacle of modernity and prosperity. A newly built airport facilitated transportation and ushered in visitors. Supermarkets popped up along the streets. Children were being educated in an American style school system, learning to read and write. Radio and cable television kept islanders connected to the latest entertainment. At the same time in 1979, however, litter lined the dirt roads and suicide became the leading cause of death. A local newspaper on the island of Majuro called the place “one of the most wretched shack kingdoms in the world” (Harwood). The islands were not equipped to support a consumerist economy. The shift from the subsistence-based economy to a capitalist-sponsored consumer economy degraded the environment and imposed cultural influence on the formerly rural, communal culture. The introduction of the American model of government and economy to satisfy the United Nations and American interests was ultimately detrimental to Micronesians’ quality of life. This new form of reciprocity in the exchange of dollar bills for goods and services had a negative impact on the islands in a new way.

Following the death of President John F. Kennedy, the United Nations continued to criticize the United States’ lack of sufficient commitment to their agreement. Especially neglected was attention to the stipulation to foster the emergence of Micronesian self-determination. Due to pressure from the UN, a territory-wide legislature was established in 1965, resulting in the Congress of Micronesia. This body became a major political force, but early on was considered by the United States to be of little threat and importance. The Micronesian Congress ushered in hundreds of Peace Corps volunteers during the mid-1960s. With these often young, recent college graduate Americans came antiwar sentiment and frustrations directed to-
wards Washington. The volunteers inadvertently influenced politicians of Micronesia and added to the already present distrust of the United States. In 1968, Amata Kabua, later President of Micronesia, compounded this influence when he described Micronesian public opinion. He stated that due to unfulfilled promises, the people of Micronesia no longer took anything the U.S. administration said seriously (Dorrance, 77). With voiced grievances and an established political structure, Micronesia was en route to establish a new status of sovereignty built upon decades of neglect and abuse by the United States.

The Revolution

Despite Micronesian public opinion, the U.S. was confident in the overall satisfaction with the American presence and economic dependence. Because of this, the United States opened negotiations with the Congress of Micronesia as requested in 1969 (Dorrance, 79). The Micronesian Congress firmly rejected a subordinate territory status, pushing instead for sovereign states with free association with the United States. They continued by insisting upon a unilateral right to terminate the relationship at any time. The only alternative they offered to this was complete independence. Washington, having been so far removed and neglectful of the islands, had not witnessed the major political changes that had occurred in Micronesia over the years and not adequately formulated consistent, comprehensive policies for the islands of the Pacific (80). When the United States offered a rebuke of commonwealth status, the Micronesians countered with rejection, with the exception of the Northern Mariana Islands state. Finally, by 1972, the U.S. agreed to negotiate a free association relationship that Micronesia had first requested in 1969 (81). The processing of this change continued through the 1980s. In 1980, representatives from Micronesia and the U.S. met in Hawaii to discuss the interests of the negotiation (Trumbull). Progression of the negotiation was slowed by the objections of islanders to the new demands from Washington insisting on the use of the islands for military purposes.

Unable to unify all of Micronesia due to the political and cultural
diversity, the U.S. continued down two paths in liberating the desires of the inhabitants in the region. The Northern Mariana Islands underwent separate negotiations from the rest of Micronesia between 1972 and 1975. Following their negotiations, the Northern Marianas received Commonwealth status in 1986 (Dorrance, 82). Approved by an overwhelming majority on the islands, the people are now U.S. citizens with their own internal regulation of government, albeit with the promise of American defense assistance. In 1985, the Senate approved to permit a new status for Micronesia, under the guise of a 30-year extension to access the Pacific Missile Test Range at Kwajalein (“Senate OKs New Status for Micronesia,” San Diego Union, 1985). Today, the Micronesian states that are in free association with the United States today are sovereign and regulate their own internal affairs. As first requested by Micronesia, they reserve the right to terminate a relationship with the U.S. at any time in the pursuit of full independence. However, the U.S. remains responsible for the defense of the islands and can object to any third-party military’s access to them. Along with this, came the agreement of Micronesia to refrain from action counter to American interests (Dorrance, 84).

The Result

Ultimately, such occupation would not look much different from traditional colonialism (Friedman, 2001, 73). Both the State Department and the military ultimately wanted the same thing: to secure the strategic location of the Pacific islands for the advancement of U.S. security interests. The difference in opinion on the matter of how to do so reflected the military’s distrust of multilateral peace agreements and the State Department’s concern of global and American perceptions of modern imperialism. The decades of use of the islands by the United States left Micronesia in a damaged state. An isolated and self-sufficient region became globalized and dependent after the restructuring of the economic model. The monetary investment and presence of the American military resulted in changes to the islanders’ quality of life. The example of the extension of American influence to this region questions the principle of quality of life being connected to advancement and modernity. While the United States
resolved its communist fear, it did so at a great cost the pristine islands’ social, political, and economic systems.

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Fire Knowledge Feedbacks: How Public Opinion Integrates Fire Education with Fire Policy
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Wildland fire events concern an array of disciplines. They are physical in nature and play a role in many natural processes within fire-adapted ecosystems (Dombeck et al., 884). Direct and indirect economic costs are inherent to nearly every type of impact resulting from wildland fire. Fire is also a political issue because government leaders draft policies and enact programs that, in turn, determine legislative approaches to wildland fire (Donovan and Brown, 75). These policies and programs are intended to represent the will of the people, especially those whom fire affects most personally (Dombeck et al., 887). Fire activity is inextricably linked to environmental factors that vary spatially and contemporary landscape conditions reflecting both past and present interactions between humans and the environment (Schwilk et al., 285).

In the United States, our experiences with fire over the past century have shaped our approaches to managing it. Early twentieth-century debates about fire’s role in land management have resulted in a controversial legacy of institutionalized fire suppression. On one side stood landowners, who favored fire as a tool for fuels reduction and as a means of mitigating future fire risks (Donovan and Brown, 74). In contrast, foresters of this era were educated to believe that all forms of fire were detrimental. The fire suppression ideal seemed to
align with the conservationist philosophies of influential naturalists, including Frederick Olmstead and Aldo Leopold (Donovan and Brown, 74). Foresters gained mass support, and most people continued to oppose fire use well into the twentieth century due to public misconceptions regarding fire risk factors (Daniel, 135). Institutionalized fire suppression produced a legacy of social and ecological processes that are interlinked and have persisted to present. In many regions, the condition of natural landscape vegetation diverges greatly from its historical spatial distribution and health status, which has affected fire behavior (Schullery, 688). The elevated fire safety risks associated with fuel accumulation under fire suppression are most acute for communities where fire risks are naturally high (Jacobson et al., 930).

Public perception of fire as a land management tool subsequently affects fire policy, which translates into noticeable effects on the landscape. What the public considers as factors of fire hazard may not reflect the understanding of land managers and fire professionals. At times, there are inconsistencies between the perceived and actual ecological consequences of fire (Jacobson et al., 934). This is a result of the quality and quantity of information the public receives (McCaffrey, 12). The mechanism by which fire education creates and shapes public awareness of fire feeds back to opinion formation; furthermore, policy content draws from the resulting public perceptions regarding fire use. Understanding the social processes through which fire policy is constructed may aid in the development of policies that are more conducive to public safety as well as ecological health.

Research Questions

Several questions guide this paper. The first provides the context in which the remaining questions are posed and answered: (1) What is the nature of educational material conveyed in contemporary and historical public awareness programs concerning fire? The development and nature of public awareness depends on accessibility and content of information intended to further public understanding of fire. Specifically, I consider whether contemporary and historical educational
material pertaining to fire is accurate and scientifically informed.

The following question relates to how effective the material is in influencing public opinion: (2) *What is the intended audience’s experience with fire and how does this, in conjunction with fire education, contribute to the perceived risks and benefits of fire management actions?* Potential reporting bias may be evaluated based on whether known and accurate information is excluded, and how scientifically accurate that manner in which the educational material is conveyed.

The final question I ask is: (3) *How do the quality and quantity of fire education, and its effects on public opinion, feedback to public fire policy?* In answering this question, I highlight areas in which fire education could be compiled and distributed more effectively. I describe funding and modes of public involvement as factors that must be considered in order accurately to assess the translation of opinion to policy. In addressing these questions, I elucidate potential opportunities and barriers that exist for educators, land managers, government workers, and others who aim to improve fire education, public safety, and ecological management.

**Information Sources and Methods**

I answer the above questions with information gathered from peer-reviewed academic articles. I employ a historical lens on wildland fire exclusion to illustrate how and why federal land management agencies use fire today, and to suggest how public expectations could be shifted beneficially (Donovan and Brown, 73). I include sources that describe the sentiments and perceptions of people living near the wildland-urban interface regarding prescribed burning, and how this audience is influenced by educational efforts (Jacobsen et al., 929; McCaffrey, 12). I examine the education, training, and experience of fire professionals, and consider how these factors influence public educational content (Kobziar et al., 339). Because fire literature and concomitant educational efforts should resonate with the best interest of the public (i.e., fire management goals are inherently social), I also employ a source focused on social justice issues related to fire (Dombeck et al., 883). I draw and compare key arguments and appli-
cable information from each article to identify similarities, differences, inconsistencies, and contradictions. A comparative synthesis of these information sources addresses my guiding questions and constitutes my argument.

**Results and Discussion**

*Information content and communication over time*

A holistic approach to characterizing the history and effectiveness of fire education in the United States requires analysis of the intended messages, information medium, audience, and accessibility. The majority of sources whose primary purpose is to educate audiences about fire management and fire control draws from years of institutionalized fire suppression, which began in 1910 under the jurisdiction of the United States Forest Service. In early debates about fire as a natural tool for forest and landscape management, individuals with greater influence favored complete exclusion (Donovan and Brown, 74). Consequently, land management practices strongly emphasized (and may have depended upon) fire exclusion. However, in recent decades, and especially prominent during the Yellowstone National Park fires of 1988 in which almost 800,000 acres burned, a primary message of the National Park Service has been that wildland fire is a beneficial natural process. Through this transition from an emphasis on fire suppression to fire use, fire management agencies have realized the importance of educational efforts and have addressed this by increased funding and fire personnel (Warshefski, personal communication). Although fire is a vital component of long-term landscape functioning and agencies now recognize it as such, its publicization by mass media sources as a disastrous and fatal process has led to greater aversion and fear in public responses (Dombeck et al., 884; Schullery, 693). Distinctions between “good” and “bad” fire were seldom proposed, and the agencies responsible for monitoring governmental communications with the public pre-transition believed that labeling fire as beneficial in certain circumstances would confound their objectives (Donovan and Brown, 75). They therefore adopted the simpler claim that fire should only be managed by suppression in all instances (Schullery, 686). Following the Great Fire of
1910, which burned more than two-million hectares in the western United States, fire suppression appeared as a common-sense policy (Dombeck et al., 884). Unfortunately, programs and campaigns in contradiction to fire suppression were slow to incorporate new scientific findings into the educational material.

Informational material on fire has changed little in the course of a century, even as fire professionals and land management agencies become more informed about the importance of fire as a natural process. The educational content promoting fire suppression was magnified by policies that had guided managerial efforts for many years. The “10 a.m. policy” called for fires to be extinguished by 10 a.m. on the day following observation, and ultimately led to the creation of new policy initiatives aimed at reversing the effects of long-term fire suppression (Donovan and Brown, 75). Among these were the National Fire Plan (2000) and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (2003), which sought to address fuel loading as the critical issue (Donovan and Brown, 75). Donovan and Brown dispute whether these initiatives are reasonable, given the high costs and severe damages of wildland fires (76). While these well-intentioned efforts were not effectively incorporated into fire education, the initiatives that were incorporated proved incapable of mitigating the dangers of fire suppression. Smokey the Bear was the key mascot of fire prevention, and while its influence dates to the middle of the twentieth century, it has persisted and still encourages forests to grow with minimal disturbance (Grigg, 218; Dods, 476). For many generations, Smokey the Bear was more than a symbol. Its message became so deeply internalized that proponents of fire suppression were regarded “as militant an organization as [one would] ever find” (Grigg, 218).

Some educational material draws from fire research led by college and university fire programs, but could prove insufficient if the programs have yet to incorporate the latest fire science discoveries. There are barriers to implementing new educational programs with respect to fire professionals’ prior education, training, and experience. In some instances, the education is slow to include fire from an ecological perspective (Kobziar et al., 340). Resolving this disassociation entails reeducating fire professionals through renewed coursework to supplant their extant knowledge (Kobziar et al., 342). Senior
land managers have acquired knowledge and experience mainly in the context of fire suppression policies. Kobziar et al. suggest reevaluating position requirements to allow for transitions in fire management (343). This could also require reforming programs that support fire research. As wildland fire events are multifaceted, however, so too are new programs that aid in fire research, and planning for re-education on fire is both complex and difficult (Kobziar et al., 344). There are social, political, economic, and ecological factors that professionals must consider (Kobziar et al., 340). Kreuter suggests that academics, community leaders, and governmental researchers should collaborate in order to improve fire education content and availability (Kreuter, 24).

Public response to education and media messages
How and where educational material is received are predictors of its content and effectiveness. A survey conducted by McCaffrey found that simplistic messages originate in popular media outlets while complex explanations derive from more technical sources (McCaffrey, 14). The majority of survey respondents claimed newspaper and magazine articles and television supplemented their fire hazard awareness but failed to address local concerns, thereby deemphasizing the role that local responsibility plays in managing fires. Jacobsen et al. attribute this problem to the scale and content of mass media reporting (Jacobsen et al., 930). Sources targeting large audiences with diverse concerns often fail to address factors that should be considered in order to manage fire locally and produce oversimplified understandings (930). Personal experiences expose groups more directly to the realities of wildland fire events. Communities are less susceptible to media bias the closer they are to fire hazards (930). There is a positive relationship between direct personal contact with fire and informed tolerance of it. People who experience fire personally are more likely to accept it as a natural and necessary ecological process, although those who lose their homes in fire might become less accepting (934). Neighborhood meetings proved less effective for fire education than was anticipated (McCaffrey, 14). However, such meetings often inform attendees about defensible spacing and
thinning in addition to prescribed burning, whereas most other information sources do not (14). Government and personal contacts also inform residents of different fire management options and include fire department and forest agency representatives (16).

Proximity to fire hazards also determines how individuals will respond to fire education. Residents along the wildland-urban interface are likely to rely on direct experience with wildland fire to shape their response, and their reaction is generally more rational when the educational material is personalized to address concerns specific to local conditions (Jacobson et al., 934; McCaffrey, 12). Personal encounters with fire increase homeowner awareness of fire behavior and of the fact that fires at the wildland-urban interface can propagate to nearby structures (Radeloff et al., 799). These homeowners are more likely to know about the science of wildland fire and to develop attitudes in favor of fire as a land management tool (Jacobson et al., 934). Jacobson et al. argue that, in some circumstances, experience with fire makes residents less likely to take measures that would decrease wildland fire risk near their homes (934). A study found that contact with wildland fires diminished residents’ hazard responsiveness because they became less perceptive of actual fire risk through time (934). Of the fire management tools evaluated (defensible spacing, thinning, and prescribed burning), the majority of respondents believed that none were applicable to their situations. Kreuter et al. attribute this to responding homeowner characteristics, including property size and yearly household income (Kreuter et al., 457). The same survey conducted by Jacobson et al. compared newspaper coverage and public attitudes, knowledge, and behavioral intentions regarding fire following the Florida wildland fires of 1998 (Jacobson et al., 929). Media reports claimed that uncontrollable spread was an intrinsic property of fire (rather than fuel loading, or the accumulation of fuels derived from vegetation (Sikkink et al., 1)), and survey respondents reflected this assertion in their opinion of fire as a land management tool (Jacobson et al., 935). Following the Yellowstone National Park fires of 1988, a similar scenario ensued in which reporters characterized the fire events with negatively connotative words, which soon became embedded in popular opinion.
Fire has not been portrayed by news reporters and their editors as a beneficial process that ensures landscape and habitat integrity, but rather as a destructive event that should be excluded from all natural areas (Warshefski, personal communication; Jacobson et al., 930; Daniel, 136).

Media messages also influence fire research objectives that, in turn, can reinforce common perspectives on fire suppression. The media are interested in stories that will satisfy and expand readership, so they tend to sensationalize fires and their effects on nearby structures (Warshefski, personal communication). Meanwhile, fire management agencies seek to manage fire for its ecological benefits, for example, through prescribed burning. Mixed messages like these impede tolerance for prescribed burning even when fire suppression is understood as an obstacle to achieving explicit land management goals (Fernandes and Botelho, 117). In addition, the media often distinguish fire on private lands from fire on public lands, but greater focus is placed on private lands and on fire mitigation efforts (Paveglio et al., 46). Fire is perceived as a disaster that must be quickly extinguished to prevent it from threatening privately owned lands. Consequently, there is often no mention of fire’s environmentally beneficial role on public lands (46).

Effects of personal exposure to fire and fire programming
Exposure to accurate educational information following personal experience with fire led to a considerable shift in attitudes and behaviors relating to fire (Loomis et al., 21). The material effectively promoted individuals’ knowledge of and tolerance for prescribed fire (22). However, when there is an apparent mismatch between actual and reported risks of wildland fires, public opinion is less favorable (Daniel, 135). Likewise, greater risks of uncontrollable fire could accompany people moving into densely forested areas (137). Developers and homeowners seek pristine forest settings to increase property values, but development in such areas hinders the efforts of land managers to prevent extreme fires on private lands through fuels reduction by prescribed burning (136). Conflict between maintaining aesthetic goals and ensuring personal protection also occurs when the educational material targets its audiences’ ecocentric regard for
wilderness areas and wildlife. Jacobson et al. note that public concern following the Florida wildland fires of 1998 was oriented around harm to wildlife (Jacobson et al., 934). Consequently, public unease about fire’s effects on fauna reflected similar anxieties expressed in the educational content.

Evidently, well-known media outlets that convey simplistic messages pertaining to fire represent barriers to the enactment of proper fire policy. Some of the media reports do not disclose full accounts of the benefits of prescribed burning, which could suggest incomplete disclosure in other areas regarding fire management practices (Paveglio et al., 81). Media transparency and thoroughness promotes awareness of region-specific factors influencing fire hazards and behaviors. For example, Southern California is dissimilar to many regions of the United States because strong winds influence fire propagation in this region more than does fuel accumulation (Cortner and Gale, 246).

The level of interaction between educators and their audiences is an indicator of how the material will shape individual opinions regarding fire management practices (Paveglio et al., 81). Direct contact by reputable fire educators fosters public support for practices that have been historically controversial, including prescribed burning. Personal contact by government agencies garners the most support, and representatives of the fire department are conduits for awareness of these methods as well as greater understanding of how fire management practices are implemented, especially when contact is initiated prior to a planned burn (McCaffrey, 16; Taylor et al., 201). Mass media sources tend to complicate the issue rather than work to solve it, and they generally do not act in the public’s best interest or in close proximity to target audiences. In some instances, media reports emphasize fire on private lands in particular; however, most fires occur on public lands, so there is less information on fire in circulation by covering only fires on private land (Paveglio et al., 48). As a result, members of the public are less concerned about fire events because they are under the impression that their property is not at risk, so they do not inquire about more information regarding fire management. Toman et al. explain that a potential approach to counteracting this complacency is to personalize fire risks, especially
among those living along the wildland-urban interface (Toman et al., 321). Onsite presentations work well and amass significant support for fuels management, but there is a paucity of resources for campaigns of adequate scale to achieve policy directives (McCaffrey, 15).

The course of interaction initiated by fire education is expected to translate informed public awareness into public fire policy. Even so, lack of funding impedes the inclusion of informed views with current fire policies. Funding for practices that would reverse the consequences of fire suppression is often overburdened by traditional management practices (Donovan and Brown, 77). A shift in the costs and benefits of wildland fire management could create strong opposition amongst those expected to shoulder the greatest responsibility (77). Additionally, the budget structure written into suppression policies does little to warrant their retraction; money from other land management programs may be transferred to accounts explicitly reserved for fire suppression (389).

Conclusion

The social nature of public fire policy necessitates fire education to create public awareness and inform public opinion regarding fire's role in the landscape. This study has investigated the links between educational material and public awareness, and has essentially shown that personal, informed, and relevant material is most effective in encouraging the development of practicable public awareness. The feedbacks between public opinion and public fire policy are strong, and this study has accentuated the social nature of fire policy with regard to growing public interest and involvement in fire management (see figure 1).
For most of the twentieth century, fire suppression was promoted as the hallmark land management practice in an overwhelming majority of fire awareness programs. Fire is now understood as an essential component of healthy landscapes in fire-adapted ecosystems, but incorporating the amended material is difficult given the legacy of institutionalized fire suppression. Similarly, public outreach efforts derive content recommendations from fire professionals educated under college and university fire programs; if the programs are not up to date, then the fire education will not be either.

Educational material is most effective when delivered in close proximity to fire events, both geographically and temporally, and when the information is tailored to the concerns of a given community. Therefore, direct contact with government and agency representatives is the most promising form of fire education. In addition, personal experience with fire near the wildland-urban interface provides interactive, firsthand participation in fire management efforts. Coupled with direct contact, personal experience heightens homeowner awareness of the actual risks and benefits of fire management options and fosters actionable understanding of fire as a process.

Public opinion concerning wildland fire reflects the educational material in circulation. Often, the public’s apprehension regarding a particular aspect of fire embodies a similar assertion made by the media around the same time. The extension of media messages to

![Diagram](https://example.com/diagram.png)

**Figure 1.** Feedbacks and connections between the social processes related to fire.
public opinion occurs whether or not the information is accurate, so sometimes the public is misinformed. This is especially problematic when public opinion is expected to unite fire education with fire policy. Accordingly, recommendations for future educational efforts related to fire require open and honest dialogue amongst everyone involved and careful consideration of all interests because the outcomes have implications not only for people, but for the environment as well. For this reason, accurate and current science should be the basis of all public communications related to fire. One potential area for improved education relates to the economic consequences of alternative fire management strategies (Loomis et al., 4). Even so, and as demonstrated throughout this paper, fire education has significantly developed in the last twenty to thirty years to incorporate the benefits of prescribed burning and other methods of fuels reduction to encourage fires to burn more periodically and less intensely than they otherwise would under policies of fire suppression (The Nature Conservancy, 2).

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An Invented Tradition: The Intersection of American Nationalism and Sports

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This suggests that, as early as the nineteenth century, sports were embedded in American national rhetoric, providing shared traditions and symbols that could be used to communicate to the nation as a whole. The formation of such communities is integral to nationalism, a form of culture and political organization that provides citizens with a sense of identity and belonging. In the United States, sports like baseball and football became means of unifying American citizens and propagating American nationalism. Baseball, known today as “America’s Pastime,” was made popular during the Reconstruction after the Civil War, and bridged the divides of social class rank, geographic location, and socio-economic status. In the early twentieth century, the distinctly “American” football was championed as a demonstration of American exceptionalism. Both sports were foundational in the creation of an American national identity and an American nationalism. More recently, after the 9/11 attacks and Boston Marathon Bombing, sports have become a metonym for American nationalism and its resiliency. This paper evaluates the intersection of nationalism and sports in the United States, and demonstrates the importance of sports in the creation, maintenance, and support of American nationalism.

Nations, Nationalism, and Sports

Before examining how sports became so integral to the promotion of American nationalism, it is necessary to understand the theoretical ideas that define nations and nationalism. The idea of a nation brings to mind concepts of identity, tradition, political organization, and community. Modern nations have been defined and organized through the lens of nationalism, combining both cultural and political organization within the state. Ernest Gellner asserts that nationalism is a “cultural national community” in which culture and politics create a collective ideology for the people to internalize (Gellner, 1996, 367). He maintains that nationalism is inculcated through state control of culture and is invaluable to the creation of nation. He states that nationalism “is not the awakening of nations into self-consciousness: it invents nations” (Gellner, 1964, 369).

Benedict Anderson builds on the concepts of inculcated culture
and nationalism in his assessment (Anderson, 6). He emphasizes that nations are imagined communities because “members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (6). While Gellner focused on the inculcation of nationalism by the state, Anderson illustrates the pillars of culture and community that draw members together, and that, in the end, the “nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (7). A nation’s culture provides its members with a sense of national identification and unity through the creation of shared common traditions, values, and beliefs.

The relationship between sports and nationalism develops through the creation of shared practices and traditions. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger assert that in modern nations much of what is believed to be tradition from time immemorial is actually the result of ideological inventions between the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These inventions were important because of their purpose; they were used to create and to establish symbolic cohesion while legitimizing institutions and socializing the nation’s people with certain value systems and beliefs (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 9). Traditions of modern nations like the United States had to be invented to inculcate a feeling of historic continuity and to provide symbols of unity and membership in the new nation (9). Examples like the national flag, national anthem, and other national symbols were intended to create vague understandings of a citizen’s values, rights, and obligations (10). Hobsbawm and Ranger even specify that in the United States, the invention of the compulsory Pledge of Allegiance and national anthem aimed to promote a vague sense of loyalty and “Americanism” (11). Through these invented traditions, it is possible for the national populace to perform its membership of the nation.

The invention of national sporting traditions provides a uniquely effective medium for inculcating national feelings (Hobsbawm, 143). As a mass spectacle, sport is able to transcend the divide between private, public, and political worlds and create a unified national identity, regardless of social or economic links. Thus, the invention of sporting culture and tradition was of both social and political in
nature, according to Hobsbawm, because it provided a new medium for national identification and expression of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 143). Whether as spectators or participants in sport, games provide the opportunity for people to identify the strength of their nation through the camaraderie of a game and to demonstrate their national pride in the customs of these sport games.

The Evolution of American Nationalism and Sports

The importance of nationalism in sports in the United States is demonstrated by baseball and football. Both of these sports share a common trait: they are considered uniquely American with American histories and predominantly American leagues, spectators, and players. Throughout history, the United States has fostered a national identity based on the idea of American exceptionalism. This idea developed from the principles of America’s founding: a uniquely free nation with democratic ideals and personal liberties for its citizens. The concept of American nationalism engenders ideals of national differentiation and superiority into the national identity of the American people (Kemmelmeyer and Winter, 860). The evolution of baseball and American football demonstrates the importance of American nationalism and how it had an impact on the traditions and the national understandings of both sports. Steven S. Pope argues that the tradition of sports served to forge American national identity; much of the evolution of sports in the United States exemplifies Hobsbawm’s idea of invented tradition, with history and symbols embedded into the games serving to unify the American people. Essentially, baseball and football were Americanized in order to legitimize them as sports while also building and strengthening American national culture.

American nationalism was significantly challenged by the Civil War. With seven states seceding in 1860, rising to eleven by 1861, a central question of the Civil War was whether the United States would be a dissolvable band of sovereign states or one unified nation (McPherson). Even after the Union won, and the states became the United States once again, Reconstruction brought a wave of capitalist industrialization to the South that spurred transformative change.
across America. Pope maintains that prior to the 1870s, “America lacked both a dominant national identity and an established sporting tradition” (Pope, 21).

As the economy became increasingly nationalized, the need for a more powerful nation-state to regulate the economics, politics, and culture of America also arose. During this time, the need for an American national identity reached its peak. What is especially interesting about the nationalism that developed, Pope asserts, is that many Americans were conscious of the need to construct a concrete focus for national loyalty, strength, and nationalism (24).

American nationalism would create new symbols of community. Theodore Roosevelt articulated the goal for a renewed national identity that was prevalent during the Civil War period. This spoke to the idea of American exceptionalism, which would only allow room for “one loyalty, loyalty to the United States. . . . We must all of us be Americans, and nothing but Americans” (26). In forging an American national culture, it was necessary that it addressed the heterogeneity of American society and created unity amongst all people while representing the strength and uniqueness of the United States. In both the pre- and post-Civil War periods, sports served as an avenue for creating a national-level community.

Before the Civil War, baseball caught on as a popular club sport in the Northeast. Pope asserts that the new culture of a capitalist industrial society created a common set of values that could be relayed and legitimized through the sport (21). Baseball appealed to both members of the Union and of the Confederacy during the Civil War and thus persisted in its popularity throughout the war and into Reconstruction. By the 1860s, baseball was a well-organized sport with nearly 240 teams across the United States (22). The Civil War stimulated the migration of players and diffused the structure of the game across America. This fostered a national consciousness related to the sport and how it was played.

In the 1870s, baseball journalism gave further legitimacy to the sport and disseminated the game to an even greater number of American citizens. Newspaper articles emphasized the worthiness and effectiveness of baseball in developing a unified character
amongst the heterogeneous American population. More importantly, Pope demonstrates that through the press, headlines about individual games, rules, gossip, and other areas became matters of national interest and were believed to reflect the “national character” (63). By 1866, journalists and fervent baseball supporters had made the game their own. Advocates stated that it was “a pastime that best suits the temperament of our people [and] it has become the rage with all classes and conditions” (64). Baseball was promoted as the institution that would unify the diverse American people, intrinsically tying the game to American national identity. It was during this period that baseball gained its signature moniker as “America’s Pastime.”

An important point in the intersection of American nationalism, baseball, and Hobsbawm’s concept of invented tradition is the entirely invented history of baseball. In fact, baseball is an estranged version of the British game cricket but with looser rules and structure that lent themselves to being Americanized in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite being frequently cast as America’s pastime and the epitome of American values in sport, as of the 1890s, the creation of baseball was still largely in dispute. Baseball was in need of a history that would tie it to American tradition, culture, and nationalism. In 1907, Albert Spalding, whose name is recognizable today as a sporting good brand, sponsored a commission on baseball’s origins. With the support of former senators, governors, and baseball league owners, the commission based the entirety of its findings on an unverified letter from an engineer. The engineer claimed to have been taught the game in 1839 by American Civil War hero Major General Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown, New York. The Major General, he claimed, made it up on the spot. Thus, the origin story of baseball was born. Spalding proclaimed the history of baseball to be “free from . . . English traditions, customs, [and] conventionalities” (Pope, 94). The fact that baseball was now distinctly American served not only to emphasize its place in American national culture but also as an example of national differentiation. In this way, it tapped into the idea of American exceptionalism and through this origin story became an integral part of America’s national sporting tradition and perpetuation of American nationalism.
In the same decades that baseball was established as “America’s Pastime,” football also gained national popularity. Before the Civil War, football was widely considered an elite university sport. In fact, the Ivy League is named for a football competition held amongst member schools in the mid-nineteenth century. However, the game as it was played then is not like football today. Instead, it was much more akin to rugby with hardly any passing and only lateral tosses of the ball. Its reputation as a sport for the elite, combined with the dangerous nature of the sport itself, stunted the sport’s growth at the national level; in one year, at least eighteen people died and over 150 more were injured (Zezima). By the start of the twentieth century, there was even discussion of ending the sport at the university level altogether.

In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt, who was particularly fond of football, saved the sport by Americanizing it, demonstrating the strength of national recognition in its revival. He created a platform for negotiation between two factions, spearheaded by Harvard coach William T. Reid, who wanted to reform the game, and Yale coach Walter Camp, known as the “Father of American Football,” who did not. New rules allowed for passing of the ball, forward passes, and stopping the game when the player with the ball fell. Not only was the brutality of the sport significantly diminished, the new rules also made the sport uniquely American (Zezima).

In the years following the rule changes, colleges with football teams began to schedule major rivalry games on Thanksgiving, known as “turkey day” contests. This transformed secular traditions and created a commercial association with the sport and the holiday, legitimizing football as a bona-fide American sport while promoting American nationalism in the process (Pope, 32). When the United States entered World War I in 1917, football was used as a tool for building camaraderie and military training much like baseball had been during the Civil War era (32). This further legitimized the sport and initiated the long-standing relationship between the American military and American football.

As demonstrated by their origin stories, baseball’s and American football’s popularity and national recognition were influenced by the development of American nationalism. In 1919, a journalist stated
that nothing else appealed so well to foreign-born youth, or taught the American spirit so quickly; Americanized games provided an “immediate sense of belonging to a large American community in ways that few other . . . experiences provided” (Pope, 96). Pope asserts that it was during the same decades of baseball’s and football’s evolution that the American people began to identify with the United States as a nation, imagining themselves as a community rather than separate states as they had during the Civil War. The rise of American sports and their association with the military, national holidays, and a uniquely American history provided the American people with new ways to express their nationalism (Pope, 26).

**Modern American Nationalism in Baseball and Football**

Essential to the rise in popularity and national predominance of baseball and football were their ties to American nationalism. Their origin stories became distinctly American and included the idea of American invention that perpetuated the notion of American exceptionalism. In the twentieth century, these sports were tied to national holidays like Thanksgiving and the Fourth of July. Both of these invented traditions were important in creating a national platform for pride, celebration, and ritual that transcended the differences of the American people. Regardless of race, class, or religion, these holidays provided the American people with symbols of unity and solidarity that inculcated nationalist sentiment.

Combining sport tradition with national tradition served to bridge the gap between blatant nationalism and to create more subtle ways of performing membership to the United States. Sporting traditions serve to assimilate all classes, all races, and all people into the American way of life by means of promoting values of pride, meritocracy, fairness, and patriotism through sport rituals. Sports have become well-established cultural landmarks for maintaining and promoting American nationalism.

Today, the nationalist traditions embedded in baseball and football games can seem to have existed since time immemorial, despite having only existed for the last century or so. Understanding how
modern sport traditions are tied to American nationalism demonstrates how important sports are for American nationalism today. David Andrews argues that contemporary sport spectacles, especially baseball and football, are vehicles for expressing American national identity and promoting nationalism. This is because sporting traditions can be shaped and constructed by individuals or groups with the intent of promoting a specific set of values or ideas. This is then presented to a public audience, popularizing and legitimizing certain political or philosophical ideologies (Pope, 23). Through the structure of sports spectacles, i.e., baseball or football games, their ritualistic performance promotes the popular view of America at any given moment and resonates with mainstream views and values at the national level (Andrews). These sports appear as part of society itself and provide means of ideological unification amongst the nation’s people.

Before examining specific instances that spurred increasingly overt displays of nationalism in baseball and football, it is important to explore the routine nationalist displays and traditions that comprise the average game. Nationalism in sport traditions and culture may not be immediately evident, yet there are a number of rituals that serve to reaffirm American exceptionalism and display allegiance to America and its values.

At every professional sports arena in the United States, the American flag is present. A study by M. Kemmelmeier and D. Winter demonstrated that exposure to the American flag inherently promotes nationalism as it increases national attachment and “connects Americans to their nation” (Kemmelmeier and Winter, 860). The flag is honored at the beginning of each game, no matter the level or sport, with a call to honor the nation and the military by standing for the national anthem. The omnipresent image of the flag, combined with these rituals, serves not only to promote national unity but also to legitimize the nation-state it honors. In baseball, fans often even sing “God Bless America” during the seventh inning stretch. In military tributes, soldiers march across baseball or football fields as the band plays. In baseball, members of the military or federal government are often asked to throw ceremonial first pitches. This tradition began in 1912 when President William Howard Taft was asked to
throw the first pitch at a Washington D.C. game (Pope, 99). Then and today, these first pitches legitimize the status of these political figures and the national political ideology that they promote.

Baseball and football both developed, in part, as means of training and building camaraderie amongst members of the U.S. military during the Civil War and World War I. In the United States, American exceptionalism often points to the pillars of freedom, liberty, and democracy of American national identity. Members of the military are celebrated as saviors and defenders of these values, so it makes sense that the militarization of these sports and their overt ties to the military would be viewed as a way of being American (Andrews). The blurred line between the military and sports is seen in things like the camouflage uniforms worn by the San Diego Padres “to demonstrate respect for the dedicated men and women in uniform” (Andrews). Other teams have had American flags added to their uniforms or painted on their cleats. Some teams have the nation’s colors on their uniforms, like the New England Patriots, whose name even evokes a sense of American national pride.

In football, Military Appreciation Days are celebrated with flags that span the length of the football field, carried by members of the military, while those who have served are asked to stand as the crowd honors them. These examples demonstrate the sport traditions that ritualize honoring the United States, its military, and its national values. With these traditions, sports promote American nationalism and the unity of American national community.

Both baseball and football are traditionally played during national holidays, too. The Dallas Cowboys, known as “America’s Football Team,” has played on every single Thanksgiving Day since 1978. In 2016, their Thanksgiving game became the most-watched National Football League (NFL) regular season game ever on FOX network (Stites). This legitimizes football as an American tradition and sport, while also promoting an American holiday, an invented tradition that serves to unite the American people. Similarly, each Fourth of July, America’s pastime celebrates America’s birthday with a game. These games connect Americans to their national identity through the rituals of uniquely American sports. Pope asserts that sport spec-
tacles are filled with these rituals because sports are able to transcend class, race, and status. In these rituals, it is possible to create the sense of belonging to a larger American community and to promote the acceptance of American ways and values (Pope, 96). These rituals serve to enhance the national imagination, creating a sense of unity by providing the American people with shared culture and ceremonies. This becomes especially important in periods where the nation is under attack.

**American Nationalism and Sports Post-9/11**

American sports have become metonyms for the nation. As mentioned previously, sport spectacles provide a ritualistic setting that promotes American nationalism and reinforces mainstream views of the nation and its core values. In the twenty-first century, America has repeatedly suffered attacks from terrorist groups and extremists. After both the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, sports were used as a way to promote feelings of emotional collective solidarity and to create a national perception of American strength. A. G. Ingham asserts that the national sport community worked to create a national community experience; “sport as a civic ritual is embedded in political relations” (Ingham et al., 460). Baseball and football games became more politicized to show support for America as a whole and to “construct an illusion of consensus” (458). Regardless of the political or social divisions before the attacks, after both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon Bombing, “sports imagined the nation as a harmonious and united whole,” serving to intensify feelings of patriotism, belonging, and national identification (Andrews). These examples demonstrate the explicit relationship between American sports and American nationalism.

9/11 transformed American society. Rivaling only the attacks on Pearl Harbor during World War II, these attacks on American soil shook the nation. There was an immediate concern for the safety of the American nation, followed by the promotion of American exceptionalism, nationalism, strength, and values. In the aftermath of the
attacks, baseball and football served as spectacles that communicated the national sentiment. They were locations for national mourning and remembrance as well as for recovery.

The normal season for the NFL resumed in late September following the attacks. Andrews points to the first game as a moment of spontaneous nationalism, capturing the national need for unity and remembrance. Posters proclaimed, “Pray for Freedom,” and a flag that stretched the length of the field was brought out before the game began in remembrance of those who lost their lives. At the end of the game, a player ran across the field with an American flag exalted overhead. This sporting spectacle became an inherently nationalist one, promoting American strength, national unity, and solidarity in the wake of tragedy. The New England Patriots won the Super Bowl that year, and their win was heralded nationally as a symbol for American patriotism and American fortitude. The Patriots were said to represent the country in their win (Andrews).

At the World Series that year, President George W. Bush threw the ceremonial first pitch, as a flag recovered from Ground Zero flew overhead. “To see the commander in chief say, ‘I’m not vulnerable. I’ll stand right here on the mound at Yankee Stadium and nobody can bring harm to our country.’ That’s what the appearance represented,” said a White House press secretary about the monumental moment (Bodley). In the period after 9/11, the state organized political spectacles at sport events that inculcated nationalist sentiments amongst the American people and promoted national unity. These sporting events became symbolic of the nation as a whole and places for national healing while also promoting America as brave and capable of overcoming tragedy.

In 2013, the United States was once again the victim of a terrorist attack at the Boston Marathon. USA Today proclaimed that terror had returned and that the post-9/11 quiet had ended (Andrews). As Boston recovered, the Boston Red Sox baseball team became a metonym for America as a nation. Across the United States, the term “Boston Strong” became symbolic of the ability for America as a whole to overcome this instance of terror. When the Red Sox won, Sports Illustrated declared it a “Triumph After Tragedy.” The strength of the nation was symbolized through the performance and
spectacle of baseball.

In both the comeback from 9/11 and the Boston Marathon Bombing, national community was expressed through national sports and political events that reaffirmed American exceptionalism and promoted American strength. As New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani said, “we have emerged stronger and more unified. We feel renewed devotion to the principles of political, economic, and religious freedom. . . . We are more determined than ever to live our lives in freedom” (Andrews). Sport, sport spectacles, and nationalism after these attacks are taken to exemplify ideas of unity, freedom, and the indomitable American spirit.

**Conclusion: The Future of American Nationalism and American Sports**

In 2017, the symbiotic relationship between sports and American nationalism suffered a blow. The NFL 49er’s quarterback Colin Kaepernick chose to kneel during the national anthem instead of standing during a preseason game to protest police brutality at the national level. His protest resulted in a domino effect, causing other players and entire teams choosing to join his protest. Despite Kaepernick’s insistence that his actions had nothing to do with being American, or the military, he was immediately called out for being un-American and disrespecting the flag (Sandritter). The backlash has been strong, with ratings for the NFL plummeting and President Donald J. Trump stating that any player who does not stand should be fired (Kenny).

The fallout from this athlete’s protest demonstrates how the American public has come to expect, and even to feel the right to demand, nationalism in sports. Diversion from national sport traditions and customs has been cause for public outcry across the nation. While this demonstrates the deeply ingrained relationship between American sports and American nationalism, it also represents a conflict for the future. Going forward, this example prompts questioning: Will American nationalism in sports continue to unite the American people, or will it begin to illuminate divisions in the country? Does sporting nationalism promote the ideals of American freedom
and liberty, or does it require conformity? Only time will tell.

This paper has examined the longstanding relationship between sports and nationalism in the United States. Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm demonstrate the socio-political culture that is integral to nationalism. Nationalism is based on invented traditions and customs that establish a unified, imagined community amongst a nation’s people. In the United States, sports were an especially effective means for inculcating unified American nationalism in the years following the Civil War. As demonstrated, both baseball and football went through periods of reinvention, becoming uniquely American and tied to American ideals and values. Through the invention of sporting traditions, American nationalism grew, fostering national identity and unity within the diverse American population. Interwoven with politics, sports served to legitimize the nation-state just as the government’s support served to legitimize baseball and football as true American sports. Sports have continued to be a stage for promoting American nationalism in times of crisis in the twenty-first century. Both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon Bombing were followed by demonstrations of American strength and values through sports, affirming American exceptionalism and fostering national unity. Evaluating baseball and football throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries in America demonstrates that sports have been and continue to be a socially and politically powerful platform for the expression and maintenance of American nationalism.

References


Civic-Minded English Language Education for Feminist Classrooms

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Introduction

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is a person “who has been forced to flee his or her home country because of persecution, war, or violence” (2017). Similarly, the UNHCR defines an internally displaced person (IDP) as “a person who has been forced to flee his or her home for the same reason as a refugee” but does not cross an international border in search of safety (2017). While an IDP remains in his or her own country, they are forced from their home or region. As the nature of war has shifted, the number of IDPs has significantly increased in recent decades. Traditional international refugee law supports the notion that the refugee is a male who has been imprisoned and tortured by the state. This traditional conception of the refugee is a great disservice to women as it fails to account for their unique struggle as refugees. This “failure to account for and incorporate women’s experiences within the determination procedures amounts to systematic
infringement of their right to equality” (Valji et al., 63). This unfortunate fact has prompted us to focus on refugee women and has guided us in our research.

Since the passing of the Refugee Act of 1980, an estimated three million refugees have been relocated to the United States. San Diego County has welcomed more refugees than any other region of California consistently for the past seven years. The percentage of refugees has gone up a staggering sixty-four percent, which is due in part by the arrival of Syrian refugees (Morrissey). The country of Syria has been ravaged by a complex civil war with numerous actors—both state and non-state—who have respective stakes in the war’s outcome. In its six years, the civil war has internally displaced 6.3 million Syrians, caused five million to flee Syria, and killed an estimated 400,000 Syrians (Mercy Corps). Iraqi and Syrian refugee women currently living in El Cajon, San Diego, experience difficulty using English in public spaces. In order to live fulfilled and empowered lives outside of the home, these women require an English as a Second Language (ESL) curriculum that focuses on civic participation and engagement in the community of El Cajon. Currently, an ESL course by the name of Dialogue for Change is provided for refugee men and women by an organization called License to Freedom. License to Freedom is a non-profit and community-based organization based in El Cajon, San Diego, that promotes “non-violence through community education, self-sufficiency, and advocacy for refugee and immigrant survivors of domestic and relationship abuse in the East County and San Diego region” (License to Freedom). Although the refugee women of El Cajon are eager to improve their English skills, the existing curriculum provided by License to Freedom does not emphasize civics education. Civics education for adult English learners can be defined as the instruction and guidance for becoming active participants in the community. This education consists of practical implications through everyday, routine-inspired vocabulary including, but not limited to, hospitals, pediatric offices, and schools.
Rationale

The questionnaire we developed allowed us to compile oral histories of individual women with refugee status and evaluate the most effective ways to enrich their ESL education to best fit their needs. As researchers, we were interested in discovering the favorite pastimes and family outings the refugee women experienced in their respective home countries. We then provided these refugee women with the vocabulary associated with such activities. It was our hope that with such vocabulary, the engagement levels refugee women experienced in their country of origin could potentially be replicated in San Diego. The refugee women’s levels of engagement outside the home could be more easily replicated by their increased knowledge of the English language alone. English ability and proficiency could alleviate some of the barriers to adequate civil engagement in the United States. Ultimately, we hoped to enhance the quality of life for all refugee women and their families.

Literature Review

Reiko Yoshihara defines feminist pedagogy as “teaching which is anti-sexist, and anti-hierarchical, and which stresses women’s experience, both the suffering [their] oppression has caused [them] and the strengths [they] have developed to resist it” (quoted Yoshihara). From this definition, we focused on women’s experiences because it is the day-to-day activities of women that empower them to live fulfilled lives within society. Fluency in the English language in hospital, educational, and resource center settings is vital to the empowerment and well being of refugee women in El Cajon. Yoshihara’s interviews revealed that “encouraging a commitment to social actions” (Yoshihara) should be central to the language education of women. According to Smoke, “the United States needs to develop and maintain an informed citizenry and a high-quality workforce prepared to meet the demands of the world economy in the 21st century” (Smoke, ix). This need for an informed citizenry is especially applicable to the growing refugee community that needs civil English education to
participate meaningfully in society. Insofar as “much of the collaborative and progressive work in adult ESL is being done and written by women” (Smoke, x), our research team is uniquely qualified to develop the meaningful curriculum that will better serve adult English learners in our community. Alastair Pennycook emphasizes the issue that “many academics are involved in a disinformation campaign that helps to maintain the ‘covert racism and psychological violence to which dominated minority students are still subjected’ and to preserve the political status quo that is being threatened by the changing demographics” in the United States (Pennycook, 593). This is still applicable to refugee women in the El Cajon community who require an English education suited to their needs.

**Methodology**

Our research design comprised in-depth, individual interviews conducted with three women of refugee status. These refugee women were willing participants who attend License to Freedom’s Dialogue for Change during the week. Other than being of refugee status, we were not actively seeking women of any particular socio-economic background, age, or ethnicity in this research. Men were excluded from our research in order to focus on refugee women and their unique pursuit of empowerment and meaningful lives in their respective communities. With the help of an interpreter, we conducted interviews that were roughly twenty-five minutes in length. A refugee woman with sufficient skill in the English language interpreted our questions from English to Arabic, ensuring that our research participants had a clear understanding throughout the duration of the interview. The use of a female translator was integral to our intentions with this research because all of our access to interview subjects came through a female gatekeeper. Our translator was a well-recognized and highly respected woman within the program, and we believe she significantly impacted each woman’s willingness to give back to the program through participating in our research. By contrast, it is believed that a male gatekeeper would have provided us with a drastically different interview dynamic, risked inconsistency of information received in translation, and denied us the benefit of
the existing personal connection between the interviewee and the translator.

We began each interview by asking our female interpreter to translate our introductory letter aloud so as better to allow each woman to decide whether or not she was interested in participating in the research described in the letter. During each interview, one of us presented the questions according to our questionnaire as well as any relevant follow-up questions. Meanwhile, the other took notes of the interactions on her laptop. We took note of the verbal discussion as well as any nonverbal elements, for example, body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice. Additionally, we recorded nonverbal indicators such as whether their answer was delivered directly to us or to the interpreter. It should be noted that each interview was digitally recorded for accuracy and comprehension.

These one-on-one interviews enabled us, as researchers, to record the oral histories of our refugee participants. We chose to acquire the oral histories of our research participants because life histories serve various functions that we wished to illuminate through our study. Robert Atkinson defines “life story interviewing [as] a qualitative research method used to gather a subjective sense of an individual’s life with interdisciplinary applications” (Atkinson). We took a “naturalistic” approach during our interviews with the refugee women, allowing the “interviewee to speak from themselves” as this facilitated the “construction of their realities” (Atkinson). It was through this accurate construction of the refugee women’s realities that we came best to understand their needs and desires. Life histories often focus on a specific aspect of a person’s life or what someone remembers from a particular event. As such, in this study we were interested in our participants’ prior community engagement and comfortability engaging in activity outside of the home.

The use of direct and open-ended questions helped us establish what the refugee women considered significant life experiences. The feminist oral histories were gathered through intentional and active (or deep) listening, which is characteristic of a feminist interview approach. As interviewers, we did not nod arbitrarily as a feigned show of interest, nor were we preoccupied with our own agenda and fur-
ther questions. Instead, we conducted our interviews with an emphasis on providing genuine support for the women refugee interviewees. Several strategies for deep listening include “maintaining eye contact and nonverbal cues that [one is] listening, such as nodding” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy). These strategies worked to support our interviewees, as they provided their answers and were intended to make the interviewees feel valued and appreciated. We encouraged the most accurate construction of a historical memory by resting the power fully in the participants. We promoted the transparency and candor of the refugee women we interviewed by ensuring they felt comfortable and valued as they verbally shared their life histories with us. We used a naturalistic approach according to Linda Alcoff’s teachings in one-on-one interviews because we understand there is no such thing as a universal refugee experience. The women we interviewed were all living with refugee status in the United States, specifically in El Cajon, but their individual life experiences are not one and the same. It was not in the best interest of our research to treat the women as though they all came from the same place, spoke the same language, and shared the same experiences because these common overgeneralizations would have rendered our work inaccurate. Our questionnaire was designed to allow interview subjects to take ownership of their life stories so that we could assess their English learning needs and make progress in tailoring the Dialogue for Change program to be a source of empowerment for women and, therefore, their families. This method allowed us to collect data that went beyond the surface level of our questionnaire. The open-ended style of the questionnaire (i.e., “In what setting do you feel most comfortable? Least comfortable?”) gave the participants the freedom to expand on the given questions as they saw fit which is in line with the feminist, person-centered methodology endorsed by Atkinson. The research specifically focused on refugee women because of our interest in their shared experiences. We were interested in the ways in which cultural norms from their country of origin influenced their participation, or lack thereof, in engagements outside of the home, and were eager to analyze any parallels or uniformities among our refugee women participants in the ways they experienced
life and their levels of community engagement in their country of origin.

While our life story interviewing undoubtedly expanded our understanding as researchers and contributed to our study of interest, this method of study proved to be beneficial to our participants as well. The telling of a life story or history can help one “gain a clearer perspective on personal experiences” and “obtain greater self-knowledge, stronger self-image, and enhanced self-esteem” (Atkinson). With our feminist agenda in mind, it was our hope that this research benefited our participants as much as it informed our hypothesis. Our research style provided a cathartic experience for the refugee women we interviewed as they shared their stories and hopefully created “a clearer sense of [their] hopes for the future” (Atkinson). Life story interviewing served as an outlet for our refugee women subjects to discover value in their own voices and stories.

Following each interview, we utilized the memoing process, which records reflections about what the researcher is learning from the data, as a tool in our analysis. Through the memoing process, we wrote reflective commentary on aspects of our data to garner a deeper analytical understanding (Hesse-Biber and Leavy). For example, we recognized that certain data points could be attributed to our own inherent biases. Memoing allowed us to account for such instances. Results that confirmed our hypothesis were testimonials expressing specific areas of curriculum that were relevant to multiple women and were not addressed in the current curriculum available to them. Our hypothesis was contradicted and weakened by statements from women who felt their English education was complete and satisfactory for all of their needs.

Before conducting each interview, we emphasized the importance of full disclosure of our goals and motivations with the interview subjects. In order to create a more equal relationship between the refugee women and us, we had the translator first ask if they were willing volunteers. In order for their consent to be legitimate, we asked the translator to read the following statement to each woman in order for each of them to gain an understanding of our research and feel confident about our motivations:
Dear friends of License to Freedom,

We would like to thank you all for welcoming us to participate in your group sessions. We have enjoyed getting to know everyone very much. In order to thank you for so generously including us, we would like to customize and personalize lessons within your program. It is our goal this semester to create curriculum and funding for ESL lessons of your choosing. We need the help of ten women in order to determine what each of you are most excited to learn about. This will benefit all those at License to Freedom because you can ask for lessons specific to your interests and for lessons which you think others might enjoy. The most important thing to us is your feedback and your choices. We can not accomplish this without your help! We are so excited to be working on this project and know we will have fun working towards this goal together.

Our introductory statement allowed us to establish a foundation based on the democratization of knowledge production and a spirit of common goals with each refugee woman we interviewed. After hearing the statement translated in Arabic, a total of four women decided that our research topic was not of interest to them and we thanked them for their time and made no further efforts to enlist them. This step in our process significantly enhanced the quality of responses we received in interviews and clarified our intentions for our research to be a transformative process. This also established that our goal was not to speak on behalf of women whose life experiences are so different from our own. We relayed this specific message to empower these women to request whatever changes to the program they saw fit. Our goal was to communicate to each woman that the betterment of her life was in her own hands, her English education could be shaped however she saw fit, and that her participation in this research would help other women too.
Positionality

Our research was conducted within a feminist framework. Presently, there is a growing recognition of the issue of speaking for others. Linda Alcoff provides two reasons explaining why speaking for others is problematic. First, “where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says.” Accordingly, another cannot “assume the ability to transcend one’s location” (Alcoff, 6). Second, “location [is] epistemically salient, but privileged locations are discursively dangerous,” meaning that when someone from a position of privilege speaks for an oppressed group, the results can be disastrous (Alcoff, 7). This has “resulted in increasing or reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for” (Alcoff, 7). As is emphasized by Hesse-Biber and Leavy, we intended to remain “mindful of [our] personal positionality and that of the participant” (2006). A reflective researcher starts by “understanding . . . the importance of one's own values and attitudes in relation to the research process . . . [and] taking a critical look inward and reflecting on one's own lived reality” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy). We kept in mind Alcoff and Hesse-Biber and Leavy’s warnings as we conducted our research and evaluated our findings. We were aware that our respective identities, positions, and locations had an effect on our research as a whole. We accounted for our relatively privileged positions when conducting our research and analyzing our findings.

Questionnaire

We asked the refugee women the following questions:

- Can you tell me your current age and what age you were when you came to San Diego?
- Can you tell me about where you are from?
- What was it like growing up there? Did your family own a house? Was it as urban as San Diego?
- How often did your family leave the house for outings?
- Did you use cars or public transportation?
• What were your favorite childhood activities?
• Do you hope to recreate these activities for your children?
• On weekends, how did you spend your time?
• How important is spending time with friends or family?
• Do you have time to do community service?
• As a child, what did you hope to be when you grew up?
• Do you have similar long-term goals now?
• Are you a student? What has been your experience in school?
• What are your favorite and least favorite community activities?
• What are the most difficult errands for you?
• What activities outside the home are difficult for your children?
• How often do you socialize with friends?
• Do you like your children’s school?
• How often do you talk to their teachers?
• Do you have hobbies or join clubs?
• Are you comfortable making new friends?
• What are you most worried about when you leave the house?
• Which public places do you avoid?
• What are you still hoping to learn in ESL class?
• How comfortable do you feel with using English?
• What was your daily routine before coming to San Diego?
• Do you like living in San Diego?
• Does San Diego have everything that you need?
• Where in San Diego do you feel most comfortable? Where do you go to relax?
• Do you feel knowledgeable with etiquette in different settings?
• How involved do you want to be in your community?
• Do you know where the library, movie theater, park, and museum are located?
• If you could change something about San Diego, what would it be?

We also interviewed an ESL teacher and volunteer at Dialogue for Change and asked them the following questions:

• How long have you been teaching English?
• What do you enjoy most about teaching?
• What aspects do you consider to be difficult?
• What are your goals for your students?
• How will you measure your success?
• Are you worried about information retention?
• Do you give exams of any kind?
• What lessons do you prioritize?

Finally, we asked the director of License to Freedom and founder of the Dialogue for Change program the following questions:

• How long have you been offering the Dialogue for Change program?
• What are your goals for this program?
• Do you use evaluation methods?
• What are your curriculum requirements?
• What lessons do you consider most valuable to these students?
• Do you encourage feedback from the students?

Significance and Conclusion

Every Dialogue for Change refugee student spends a minimum of eight weeks in the program. We recommend that this program is
more adequately advertised on the License to Freedom website. Because of the wide variety of English language skill levels in the program, it would benefit the students to have larger class numbers to facilitate group work and participation. Each woman we interviewed expressed that she needs to learn English faster and that she does not prioritize friendships in her life. We believe these requirements are not mutually exclusive, and that there is a meaningful correlation that is not being fully utilized. With an increased emphasis on working in pairs during and outside of class, Dialogue for Change would be able to foster healthy friendships and support systems amongst participating women. These benefits would also serve to encourage studying and practicing English outside of class with peers who express the desire to achieve similar goals.

The greatest resource we can provide these women is each other. Lessons in class can be designed for group conversation practice. Groups can be organized by neighborhood that might facilitate groupings relevant to establishing carpools, neighborhood study sessions, shared childcare, and hopefully nearby resources for support in an emergency. Each woman we interviewed, regardless of time spent in the program, expressed that she wanted to learn English faster. They are already highly motivated and aware of how English fluency will benefit them; all they need are more opportunities to practice. Each woman mentioned that she still receives the news, watches television, or engages with social media in a non-English language. This signals a low level of English use outside of the class that is inhibiting the speed at which each refugee woman achieves satisfaction with her English skills. When asked to relate their comfort level in using English in public places, even the women who considered themselves to be relatively comfortable used the interpreter to answer the question. This supports our initial hypothesis that there is room for improvement within the Dialogue for Change program to achieve the goal on which it was founded.

The success of our research can be attributed to our open-mindedness and initial commitment to improving the lives of our research subjects. We strongly believe that such research must serve a social purpose and benefit more than just researchers themselves. We found this overall process to be meaningful and transformative for
both us and the women who were empowered to take ownership of their English education. By ensuring that the gaps in the Dialogue for Change program were filled by its participants rather than ourselves, our research produced results that were particularly valuable. This was key to the goals of License to Freedom as well as any organization that aims to enable people with immigrant or refugee status to participate in our shared community. This was and will continue to be essential to striving for an open, equitable, and free society from the local to the national level.

References


